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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Energy is not only one of the major production factors of modern economies, but it
is also a major driver of the well-being of society. The secure, economically efficient
and environmentally sound provision of energy is a major objective of industrial nations
in order to increase social welfare. Security of supply, competitiveness of economies
and environmental sustainability in energy markets are the key points of the European
climate and energy targets and are often referred to as the ‘triangle of energy policy’
(European Commission, 2010). In this day and age, energy generation requires resource-
and capital-intense technologies. Therefore, the efficient provision of energy depends on
an efficient deployment and allocation of these inputs as well as an efficient usage of the
technologies.
In economic theory, perfect markets are considered to be able to attain an efficient
allocation of goods. However, four standard causes of market failure may impede an effi-
cient allocation: market power, incomplete information, externalities and public goods.
All of these market failures are common issues in energy market analyses. The role
of energy markets in providing both essential production factors and consumer goods
indicates that market failures within energy markets may cause significant welfare losses
and are thus an important economic subject to consider.
Market failures may counteract the objectives of the triangle of energy policy that
industrial nations strive to achieve. In terms of energy security of supply (SoS), the
pursued level may exceed the level that is provided from the plain market mechanism.
Regarding the environmental sustainability of energy provision, externalities, such as
greenhouse gas emissions, may occur that are not internalized by market players.
The economic energy market analyses conducted in the presented dissertation ad-
dress these two topics in energy markets, namely security of supply and greenhouse gas
abatement. The first part of the thesis presents two papers that pursue model-based
analyses of SoS in the European natural gas market. These analyses are normative and
1
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holistic approaches that model the utilization of the European natural gas infrastruc-
ture based on the optimization of a social planner. Such an approach is indispensable
in an intermeshed network, such as the European natural gas network, as the usage of
infrastructure components has an impact on subsequent parts of the network.
The Russia-Ukraine gas dispute in January 2009 presented the importance of the
holistic approach from the European Commission’s position. The disruption of Russian
natural gas supplies to Ukraine, coinciding with record low temperatures in many parts
of Europe, had major impacts on the European gas market and resulted in a serious gas
supply crisis. A total of twelve European member states were affected with the conse-
quences of the supply disruptions differing for each particular member state. In general,
the affected member states were deprived of 20% of their usual gas supply. Moreover,
since many Eastern European countries mainly depend on Russian supplies and have
limited storage capacities, they suffered major shortages to industrial consumers. The
interruption could not be solely resolved by individual European companies or trans-
mission system operators (TSOs) and the European Commission concluded that greater
coordination of TSOs and policy interventions are crucial to aid future emergencies
(European Commission, 2009). The European SoS Regulation (European Union, 2010),
adopted in the aftermath of the supply crisis, aims to reduce the risks of disruptions
and to enhance the cooperation on a European level. Moreover, the European support
of the Nabucco pipeline project was a further attempt by the European Commission to
increase the level of security of gas supply in Europe.
A second major reason for the European Union (EU)’s policy interventions is the
ambitious climate and energy targets, the so-called ‘20-20-20’ targets, which are to be
reached by 2020. The objectives are the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from 1990
levels by 20%, a rise in the share of EU energy consumption produced from renewable
resources to 20%, and improvements in the EU’s energy efficiency by 20%.
According to the IPCC (2001, 2007), greenhouse gas emissions may aggravate the
effects of climate change as they cause increases in global average temperatures. Based
on the assessment carried out by the IPCC (2001), Stern (2007) analyzes the economic
impacts of climate change and reports that countries will be economically affected world-
wide. Stern (2007) estimates that the dangers of unabated climate change will result
in excess costs equivalent to 5-20% of global GDP each year depending on the range of
potential risks considered. Thus, externalized greenhouse gas emissions reflect a ‘public
bad’, characterized by non-excludability and non-rivalry concerning damage, and cause
significant welfare losses in the case of overprovision.
The second part of the thesis thus seeks to shed light on greenhouse gas abatement
potentials in the residential heating market, and to investigate the effectiveness of current
policies. Economic agents are known to cause greenhouse gas emissions, so understand-
ing their behavior is crucial to develop targeted abatement policies. Major greenhouse
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gas emitters include power generators, energy-intense industries and households. While
the behavior of power generators and energy-intense industries is mainly driven by the
objective of profit maximization, households may have diverse causes for their behavior.
According to the European Commission (2012), 36% of greenhouse gas emissions in the
European Union are caused by space and water heating, the majority of which is used
by the residential sector. The emission level of the residential sector depends on the
energy efficiency level and the type of energy carriers consumed in residential dwellings.
How these standards are maintained is determined by the amount and frequency of
investments in insulation measures and heating systems made by homeowners or land-
lords. Understanding the behavior of homeowners and landlords is thus important for
evaluating policies in energy efficiency and for deriving greenhouse gas abatement poten-
tials. Moreover, studying the impacts of policy interventions on consumer choices lays
the groundwork for further improvements and developments of currently implemented
policies.
In summary, the presented thesis analyzes two distinct economic subjects: security
of supply in natural gas markets and greenhouse gas abatement potentials in the residen-
tial heating market. These subjects considered both reflect key points in the triangle of
energy policy and are both associated with transnational market failures within energy
markets. However, these two subjects require different perspectives when performing
economic analyses. Security of supply analyses in an intermeshed network should be ap-
proached from a rather normative perspective of a social planner. On the contrary, the
analyses of greenhouse gases emitted by households are dependent on positive analyses
of consumer choices. Addressing these two perspectives thus requires tailored method-
ologies and modeling approaches, presented the following section.
1.2 Some conceptual foundations
The following sections provide a detailed description of the aforementioned normative
and positive concepts and the applied and developed methodologies. In addition, ad-
vantages and limitations of the methodologies are discussed.
1.2.1 Normative security of supply analyses
Normative approaches define optimal economic solutions based on the current under-
standing of economic optimality. The first part of the dissertation conducts analyses
based on a normative approach, which is the maximization of a social welfare function
by a social planner.
More precisely, the security of supply analyses conducted in the first part of the thesis
refer to scenarios of disrupted supply routes in the European natural gas network. The
effects of these disruptions on the usage of other infrastructure components as well as
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on marginal supply costs are investigated. An adequate analysis of network effects and
interdependencies requires a holistic perspective of the European natural gas market.
Such an integrated, normative analysis can be conducted with the TIGER1 model, which
considers the European natural gas infrastructure to be one system optimized by a social
planner.
1.2.1.1 The TIGER model
The security of supply analyses presented in the first part of the thesis are conducted
with the TIGER model (see Figure 1.1), a European natural gas infrastructure and dis-
patch model, which has been developed by Lochner and Bothe (2007). The objective
of the linear optimization in TIGER is to minimize the total costs of gas supply, while
following given capacity constraints and meeting regionalized demand. The total costs
include commodity, transportation, regasification and storage.2
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Figure 1.1: TIGER model
Source: EWI, illustration of selected pipeline and storage projects.
TIGER is a mathematical tool to compute an economically optimal dispatch of European
natural gas transports given certain data assumptions. The economic idea behind the
approach is the welfare maximization by a social planner that results in the same market
outcome that would occur given perfect competition. The cost minimization approach
can be interpreted as the minimization of the expenditure function of the social planner
1TIGER stands for Transport Infrastructure for Gas with Enhanced Resolution
2For more details on the objective function, constraints and data assumptions, see Appendix A.
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to realize the optimal utilization of the gas infrastructure. The expenditure minimization
is the dual problem of the primal problem of welfare maximization.
Primal problem Dual problem (1.1)
maximize W = W (s) = s− d minimize C = C(s) =
∫
c(s)ds
subject to C ≥
∫
c(s)ds subject to W ≤W (s) = s− d
s ≥ 0 s ≥ 0
where W and C are the respective objective functions, d is the vector of demand param-
eters and s is the vector of optimization variables. The term
∫
c(s)ds characterizes the
total system costs and c(s) are the respective marginal costs. The welfare function W
maximizes demand satisfaction. The TIGER model assumes that demand is inelastic
and that disruptions cause welfare losses which are larger than the costs of all supply
options.3 Figure 1.2 presents the optimization function. Increasing welfare, i.e. the area
above the marginal supply cost curve c(s), is equivalent to a minimization of total costs,
i.e. the grey area below the marginal supply cost curve c(s). Both is achieved by moving
the marginal supply cost curve c(s) downwards.
d,s
c
d
c(s)
total costs
welfare
Figure 1.2: Duality and cost minimization
3This assumption is illustrated by the left bend of the demand curve in Figure 1.2 depicting the value
of lost load.
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For the two problems, we have the Lagrangian functions:
Primal problem Dual problem (1.2)
max. L = (s− d) + λ(C −
∫
c(s)ds) min. Ld =
∫
c(s)ds+ µ(W − s+ d)
s ≥ 0 s ≥ 0
The solution of the maximization problem is:
µ = c(s) (1.3)
λ =
1
c(s)
(1.4)
Regarding the standard microeconomic optimization problem and the application of
Lagrange functions, the Lagrange multiplier reflects the shadow price at the optimal
solution. The shadow price is the infinitesimal change in the objective function arising
from an infinitesimal change in the constraint. In the primal problem, the shadow price
is the marginal welfare of relaxing the constraint. Equivalently in the dual problem,
the shadow price µ is the marginal social expenditure (or marginal total supply costs)
of strengthening the constraint. Duality defines the relationship between these two
constrained optimization problems by dictating that a) optimal supply quantities s∗
are the same in both problems, b) W = W ∗, c) C = C∗ and that d) the Lagrangian
multipliers are reciprocal to each other (λ = 1µ).
Shephard’s Lemma defines the partial derivatives of the minimum of the total cost
function (the social planner’s expenditure function)4:
∂C∗
∂c(s∗)
= s (1.5)
and
∂C∗
∂W ∗
= µ (1.6)
Differentiating TIGER’s cost minimization function with respect to the optimal welfare
level W ∗ yields the shadow price µ or marginal supply costs c(s). As W ∗ = W is the
optimal degree of demand satisfaction, the Lagrangian multiplier µ identifies the amount
of marginal social expenditure to meet an additional unit of demand. The model assumes
maximum welfare to be reached when demand d = s is satisfied. Disruption of demand
is always assumed to be more expensive than the most expensive supply option.
Transposing the primal problem to the dual problem of expenditure minimization
given a fixed level of utility has several advantages. One advantage of the dual problem is
that the solution exhibits an upper bound for the optimal value of the objective function
4For details on duality, the Lagrange optimization approach and Shephard’s Lemma see Chiang and
Wainright (2005).
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whereas the solution of the primal problem indicates a lower bound. Moreover, most
algorithms are aligned at minimization problems.
Under a socially optimal planning or equivalently the assumption of perfect compe-
tition, the marginal costs can be interpreted as prices. The optimization in TIGER is
conducted over several years, the social planner having perfect information and perfect
foresight. Thus, the social planner knows which gas volumes and which infrastructure
will be available. The optimization in TIGER accounts for further infrastructure con-
straints and provides the optimal solution based on given infrastructure assumptions.
TIGER was specifically developed for the evaluation of existing assets, proposed projects,
physical market integration and security of supply scenarios. The locational marginal
supply costs (shadow prices) of TIGER are a helpful instrument for the identification of
bottlenecks. In an optimal dispatch solution, the difference of marginal costs between
two nodes in the system should not exceed the difference of supply costs between these
nodes. A bottleneck occurs when there exists an insufficient transport capacity between
the two nodes (see Dieckho¨ner et al. (2012), EWI (2010a), Lochner (2011a), Lochner
and Dieckho¨ner (2008)).
In the security of supply analyses of disrupted routes (see Chapter 2 and Chapter 3),
scenario comparisons including and excluding the disrupted routes enable the quantifi-
cation of marginal supply cost differences as a measure for supply risks. Moreover, a
specific variable in TIGER enables the identification of disrupted demand volumes in
the event of a crisis. This variable allows for a cut in demand at costs that are signifi-
cantly higher than the costs of the most expensive supply option. This enables the cost
minimization problem to be solved, even if demand cannot be met.
1.2.1.2 Assumptions and caveats of TIGER
The linear programming approach of TIGER has several advantages. Following a nor-
mative approach, the interpretation of results is clear and identifies an optimal solution.
If a solution to the optimization problem exists, then the minimal social expenditures are
achieved. However, theoretically speaking, the solution is not necessarily unique. The
transport volumes and the shadow prices do not need to be unique as long as the model
achieves an equivalent total optimal solution. A strictly monotone total cost function
would solve the problem and result in a unique solution. In practice, a wide range of
sensitivity analyses and robustness checks have indicated that a clear supply-cost-based
ranking concerning the production and the transport routes can be identified. These
checks suggest that supply quantities and costs are strictly monotone.
A further major caveat alongside the normative approach is the assumption of perfect
competition. The model does not take into account that market players, such as the few
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major upstream suppliers, may exercise market power. However, this caveat is of less
importance in optimal dispatch than in market price analysis.
The assumption of perfect information and perfect foresight in the normative approach
is critical for security of supply analyses, as the model is able to anticipate a possible
shock. Additional storage volumes may be available to guarantee supply in a shock
situation. Combining two simulations, a first without a shock and a second, including
the results of the first simulation before the shock, leads to more appropriate results.
Regarding data inputs, the analyses using TIGER are based on a large number of
assumptions, especially concerning costs, capacities and demand. A unique database at
The Institute of Energy Economics (EWI) covers these detailed assumptions. The data
was gathered from public sources with due diligence and was edited with care. However,
the heterogeneity of sources and the uncertainty regarding future infrastructure projects
may restrict the data’s validity, especially concerning future developments.
The model results concerning the optimal dispatch have been validated in the report
EWI (2010a) and have been shown to adequately reflect actual gas flows. The differences
between the actual and model-simulated gas flows could be attributed to inefficient
capacity bookings or contract structures that are not considered by the model. As the
purpose of the model is to perform a normative consideration, a validation is difficult.
Moreover, the attempt of regulators to increase efficiency in the European gas market
may further increase the overlap of model-simulated and actual gas flows in the future.
The results of TIGER require a careful evaluation with respect to its assumptions.
Therefore, it is important to discuss some caveats concerning the interpretation of re-
sults. In the version of the TIGER model, as presented in this dissertation, additional
investments are included exogenously and are therefore varied in different scenarios to
analyze their impact. The bottlenecks identified indicate (temporary) impediments to
price convergence and physical market integration between countries, and do not imply
that additional investments to remove these bottlenecks are actually efficient from an
economic perspective. Adding a marginal unit of capacity would only be efficient if
marginal capacity costs were below marginal congestion costs. The calculation of the
profitability of investments is not in the focus of the analyses conducted. To determine
the full size of investment, endogenous modeling of investment decisions would be re-
quired in order to both capture interdependencies between investments and measure the
lumpiness of investments. Lochner (2012) presents an extension of the TIGER model
that includes endogenous investments.
In contrast to the modeling of investment decisions, the security of supply analyses
presented in this thesis aim at identifying the short-run economic effects of disruption
scenarios in terms of changes in marginal cost, demand curtailment and infrastructure
usage. The results of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 refer to the congestion that occurs
in an efficient market. Potential additional congestion, as a consequence of market
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inefficiencies (i.e. in terms of capacity bookings and network charges), is not detected
by the model approach. Thus, the normative approach indicates a lower bound for
congestion and disruption volumes, i.e. where bottlenecks may occur despite efficient
natural gas dispatch.
The assumption of inelastic demand requires careful interpretation. A quantifica-
tion of the costs of demand disruptions in the model is not possible since in reality,
the demand level would be reduced by consumers dependent on their substitution and
curtailing cost potential. Moreover, the parameterization of developments in natural
gas demand included in the analyses does not give enough regional detail to allow the
identification of potential bottlenecks which may arise between balancing areas within
countries. A Mixed-Complementarity-Problem (MCP) may account for elastic demand
but would require a set definition of demand elasticities. For the purpose of security of
supply analyses in natural gas markets, demand elasticities must vary by consumers and
regions. Estimating and modeling the diverse European natural gas demand in detail is
beyond the focus of this dissertation.
1.2.2 Positive analyses of consumer choices using microsimulation and
econometrics
Contrary to the analyses in Part I, the two chapters of Part II are positive analyses
investigating consumer choices on the micro-level. Greenhouse gas abatement potentials
are mainly determined by investment choices made by energy consumers concerning
long-term assets. Many energy-consuming technologies are capital-intense and therefore
remain in the technology stock for a longer period of time. The energy efficiency level
exhibited and the type of energy carrier used are determined by the investment decision
and significantly affect the level of greenhouse gas emissions. Investment decisions in
energy markets are made by different types of agents, such as power generators, firms or
households. In particular the investment decision of households is not strictly driven by
monetary objectives but also by non-monetary preferences. Major investment decisions
of households concern investments in heating systems and in dwelling insulation. Hence,
understanding household behavior is crucial for the development of targeted policies in
greenhouse gas abatement.
1.2.2.1 Discrete Choice Heat Market Simulation Model
Econometric models are a useful method to analyze consumer choices such as households’
decisions in heating systems as well as the resulting energy consumption and greenhouse
gas emissions. A reduction of greenhouse gas emissions may be achieved by the intro-
duction of policy measures that affect consumer choices. Understanding the effectivity
of policy measures in terms of greenhouse gas abatement is crucial to estimate impacts
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on welfare. Incorporating the empirically estimated choice behavior, a microsimulation
model enables the calculation of impacts of policy measures on consumer choices. The
combined approach of econometric and microsimulation techniques is therefore an ap-
propriate tool to investigate how policy measures may influence the investment decisions
of households, the level of greenhouse gas abatement and the partial welfare effects.
The Discrete Choice Heat Market Simulation Model (DIscrHEat), which has jointly
been developed by Harald Hecking an the author (Dieckho¨ner and Hecking, 2012), com-
bines these two techniques. DIscrHEat is applied in Chapter 4 of Part II of the presented
thesis to analyze consumer choices in heating systems and to derive microeconomic
greenhouse gas abatement cost curves. The basic economic concepts of the model are
presented in this section.
DIscrHEat is a dynamic simulation model for the German heat market of private
households which simulates the development of the German residential heat market for
the years 2010 to 2030 and uses the results of an empirical discrete choice estimation to
describe the behavior of households regarding their heating system choice. The starting
point of the model calculations is a detailed overview of the German building stock for
private households in 2010. We distinguish single and multiple dwellings, as well as eight
vintage classes. Each building class has an average net dwelling area and a specific heat
energy demand, which varies depending on the actual insulation level. Additionally,
data on the distribution of heating systems is included for each building class.
To simulate the future development of the German building stock (i.e. the newly-
installed heating technologies), DIscrHEat accounts for new buildings and demolitions.
Furthermore, it is assumed that a certain percentage of buildings is required to install
a new heating system. Those modernization rates are given exogenously. Moreover,
DIscrHEat is able to include diverse political measures like subsidies, taxes or standards.
In terms of model output, DIscrHEat delivers results of newly installed heating systems
for each modeling period, heat energy demand, final energy demand by energy carrier,
primary energy demand and greenhouse gas emissions.
The discrete choice estimates of the households’ choice behaviors are determined
by using data from the actual heating choice made in 2010 and the according cost
data for different heating systems. The econometric approach takes the observable costs
(investment costs, operating costs and fuel costs) into account, as well as non-observable
influences (switching costs or preferences), which affect the households’ decisions.
The drivers of the technology diffusion in DIscrHEat are the estimated probabilities of
the heating system choices for households. The estimation is based on a logit model,5
according to McFadden (1974). The diffusion is characterized by the probability that
household n chooses the technology j. The probability is the percentage of the utility
5For further detailed mathematical derivations, explanations of logit and conditional logit models see
Train (2003).
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Figure 1.3: DIscrHEat model
Source: EWI.
Vn,i of the chosen technology j relative to all possible technologies i (in exponents):
Pn,j =
eVn,j∑
i e
Vn,i
(1.7)
If policy makers plan to facilitate the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, they may
want to influence the technology choice of households in order to increase the number
of low-emission heating systems. One way to change the technology choice behavior
of households is to introduce policy measures that affect the prices of the technologies.
Such measures could be subsidies or taxes which may change the households’ utilities
and thus have partial welfare effects.
Based on Small and Rosen (1981) and McFadden (1999), the discrete choice approach
can be used to measure partial welfare changes between technology diffusions with and
without enforced policies. These partial welfare changes can be used to compute partial
welfare losses, excluding the benefits from reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The
partial welfare changes equal the changes in consumer surpluses in monetary units (i.e.
the compensating variation) caused by different household choices. Then, the partial
welfare losses indicate how much it would cost society to reduce a certain amount of
greenhouse gas. To derive a microeconomic greenhouse gas abatement curve, the welfare
effects, which result from a continuous variation of policy measures aiming at reducing
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greenhouse gas emissions, are measured.
A common instrument of welfare economics to measure the welfare effects of public
polices is the compensating variation (CV) (Hicks (1942)). The CV equals the monetary
compensation a household needs to get after a tax6 introduction in order to counterbal-
ance the price changes of the taxed goods (or technologies, in the specific case considered
here). Figure 1.4 illustrates the concept: Before the introduction of a tax, a household
maximizes its utility U0 and chooses between two goods x and y given the budget con-
straint b0. The optimal mix of x and y is achieved in point A, where the marginal rate of
substitution (the slope of the indifference curve) equals the negative price relation of the
goods (the slope of the budget constraint). The introduction of a tax that increases the
price of good y moves the budget constraint left to b1. The new optimal mix of goods
consumed by the household is now in point B, which may imply an increase or decrease
in the quantity of good x that is consumed, depending on the size of the income and
substitution effect. Now, the utility level U1 is lower than it was before the introduction
of the tax. In order to measure the monetary compensation that is needed to keep the
original utility level U0 given the new price ratio, the point C is identified. For simpli-
fication, x is considered to be a numeraire good with a price equal to one. The point
xmax indicates the maximum amount of x that can be consumed with budget b0 and b1,
and xmaxCV is the maximum amount of x that can be consumed given the compensated
budget constraint bCV . Hence, we can measure the CV as CV = x
max
CV − xmax.
y
x
C
A
B
y0maxyCVmaxy1max
xmax
U0
U1
xCV
max
b0b1 bCV
Figure 1.4: Compensating variation
6The focus is on taxes for illustrative purposes. The concept can also be applied to subsidies. See
Chapter 4.
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Following Small and Rosen (1981) and McFadden (1999), the CV of household n and
the technologies j can be computed within the discrete choice framework:
CVn = − 1
β
[
ln
∑
j exp(V
policy
n,j )− ln
∑
j exp(V
no policy
n,j )
]
(1.8)
The approach assumes a constant marginal utility of income denoted by − 1β . The
utilities V policyn,j and V
no policy
n,j are the utility levels before and after the introduction of
policy measures.
1.2.2.2 Assumptions and caveats of DIscrHEat
Due to its nature of being a microsimulation model and due to its bottom-up modeling
procedure, DIscrHEat requires a wide range of data. The data have been gathered with
due diligence and have been carefully evaluated; however the diversity of sources may
affect consistency. The data is only based on public sources. A detailed overview of
the database and the respective sources are provided in Appendix 4. Data have been
gathered at the highest level of detail available. However, more detailed data concerning
household characteristics and heating system choice would improve the modeling of
heterogeneous households and would increase the accuracy of the model.
A further caveat of DIscrHEat is the validity of the assumptions concerning mod-
ernization rates. According to IWU / BEI (2010) and European Commission (2012)
modernization rates in Germany and Europe remained low and relatively stable over
the past decades. Based on these sources, DIscrHEat incorporates exogenous mod-
ernization rates because given data limits the feasibility of an empirical estimation of
dynamic modernization rates.
Moreover, DIscrHEat assumes time-constant choice behavior of households based on
a discrete choice estimation of past heating system choices. Changes in future preferences
which require an adaption of the discrete choice estimates and are not considered by the
changes in technology costs, are not included. In addition, available technologies remain
constant over time. New technologies that are not known today but may be available
in the future are not considered. Technological progress is only covered concerning cost
assumptions.
Additionally, the discrete choice model incorporated in DIscrHEat has some caveats.
A prominent assumption of discrete choice models is the Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives (IIA) assumption. IIA defines that the ratio of the logit probabilities for
alternative technology choices does not depend on other excluded alternatives. Thus,
unknown future technologies that are not considered in the model would violate the
IIA assumption. Nonetheless, a major advantage of the IIA assumption is that relative
probabilities within the subset of considered alternatives are unaffected by the existence
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and characteristics of alternatives outside the subset. Hence, the consistency of the
estimator is not limited by the exclusion of alternative technologies.
One way to check if the IIA property holds is to test the hypothesis that the param-
eters estimated with all alternatives are similar to those parameters estimated with a
subset of alternatives (Hausman and McFadden, 1984). We test IIA in Chapter 4 and
show that it holds for our considered alternatives (see Appendix A).
A further caveat of the considered discrete choice approach is that it neglects price
endogeneity (see Berry et al. (1995)). Nevertheless, price endogeneity is not considered.
as it is assumed that energy prices are not determined by residential energy demand.
The price of oil and gas is influenced by global supply and demand effects, as well as
other sectors such as power generation, transport and industry sectors (rather than
private households’ heat demand).
The welfare measurement in terms of the compensating variation, based on the dis-
crete choice estimation also requires certain assumptions. The most critical may be the
assumption of homothetic preferences that accompanies the assumption of the constant
marginal utility of income. As a consequence, income effects on welfare losses are not
considered. No actual data is available that combines heating system choices and in-
come information for the households considered. More detailed data, if available, could
further improve the analysis. Relaxing the assumption of homothetic preferences and
accounting for income effects in the technology choice of households and in the compu-
tation of the partial welfare effects to avoid a certain amount of greenhouse gases are
all interesting topics that are open for further research. Torres et al. (2011) investigate
the sensitivity of mistaken assumptions concerning the marginal utility of income and
the impacts on the welfare measures in Monte Carlo experiments. They find that false
assumptions regarding the marginal utility of income can amplify misspecification of
the utility function. Throughout all misspecification cases analyzed, they find an un-
derestimation in the compensating variation. Hence, the analyses conducted in Chapter
4 which assume a constant marginal utility of income and which tend to demonstrate
that welfare losses are larger than technical costs, are rather conservative and may even
underestimate the compensating variation and welfare losses.
1.2.2.3 Differences-in-differences-in-differences approach (DDD)
Chapter 5 analyzes the effectiveness of subsidies on household investments in energy
efficiency, i.e. dwelling modernizations, regarding reductions in energy consumption.
In order to appropriately identify the effects of the policies (the treatment effect), the
heterogeneity of households, i.e. especially the differences between treated and non-
treated households, should be taken into account.
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Common quasi-experimental econometric techniques to evaluate public policies and to
measure treatment effects though there may be biases between the treated subjects
are the differences-in-differences (DD) and the differences-in-differences-in-differences
(DDD) approaches. DD controls for these biases by comparing the post-treated group,
the pre-treated group and another control group. Angrist and Pischke (2009), Imbens
and Wooldridge (2009) and Wooldridge (2010) present comprehensive surveys on the DD
and DDD approaches. One of the first economic analyses that used the DD approach
is a study on the effects of minimum wages (Obenauer and von der Nienburg, 1915).
The approach is exemplified using a simplification of the specific treatment problem in
Chapter 5.
The paper presented in Chapter 5 examines the question whether a subsidy program
to encourage investments in energy efficiency decreases energy consumption. For the
specific case analyzed in Chapter 5, the term ‘treatment period’ describes a time pe-
riod, in which a subsidy program for dwelling modernizations is in effect. No subsidies
are provided during the non-treatment period. There is a panel of households i. Two
groups of households (B ∈ {0, 1}), a non-treated group (B = 0) and a treated group
(B = 1), are considered. The non-treated group (B = 0) does not invest during the
subsidy period. The treated-group (B = 1) makes dwelling modernizations during the
subsidy period. Taking the difference between the energy consumption of the treated
group before and after the treatment is not an accurate method of identifying the effect
of the treatment, i.e. the effects of the subsidy on energy consumption. Dwelling mod-
ernizations in general, not only during the subsidy program period, may be a reason
for the potential difference between the energy consumption of the treated group before
and after the treatment. In order to control for the general impact of modernizations or
general changes in energy consumption, we need a control group. We thus additionally
differentiate between those households that have modernized (M = 1) and those that
have not (M = 0).
Altogether, now we differentiate between non-treated households that have not mod-
ernized (B = 0,M = 0), non-treated households that have modernized (B = 0,M = 1),
treated households that have not modernized (B = 1,M = 0), and treated households
that have modernized (B = 1,M = 1).
To identify the treatment effect properly, we estimate:
yi = α+ β1Bi + β2Mi + β3(BiMi) + i (1.9)
where y is the energy consumption, Bi with (Bi ∈ {0, 1}) is a dummy variable indicating
whether a household i is part of the treatment group Bi = 1 or not Bi = 0, and Mi
with Mi ∈ {0, 1} is a dummy indicating whether a household modernized (Mi = 1)
or not. The estimate β1 is the impact of the treated group and β2 is the impact of
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modernizations on energy consumption.
β1 = E(y|B = 1)− E(y|B = 0) (1.10)
β2 = E(y|M = 1)− E(y|M = 0) (1.11)
The estimate β3 is the interaction effect between modernizations and the treatment
group, and quantifies the impact of modernizations made by the treated group.
β3 = (E(y|M = 1, B = 1)− E(y|M = 0, B = 1)
− (E(y|M = 1, B = 0)− E(y|M = 0, B = 0)) (1.12)
The estimate β3 is the differences-in-differences (DD) estimator, which controls for the
modernizations and the treated group. DD can thus properly identify the impact of
modernizations made during the treatment period on energy consumption.
Next, in the case of a potential landlord-tenant problem7, it must be assumed that
the subsidy program affects modernizations made by homeowners to a different extent
than those made by landlords in tenant-occupied dwellings. In this case, the difference
between households must be controlled for in order to differentiate between the effects of
ones that live in owner-occupied and those that live in tenant-occupied dwellings. There-
fore, the following differences-in-differences-in-differences (DDD) model is estimated:
yi = α+ β1Bi + β2Mi + β3(BiMi) + β4(Oi) + β5(BiOi) + β6(MiOi) + β7(BiMiOi) + i
(1.13)
where Oi ∈ {0, 1} and Oi = 1 indicates homeowners and Oi = 0 indicates tenants.
In this approach, the model additionally controls for the effect of owners in general (β4),
for owners that belong to the treatment group (β5), for owners that modernized their
dwellings (β6) and for owners that modernized and are part of the treated group (β7).
The differences-in-differences-in-differences (DDD) approach computes two DD esti-
mators, i.e. for owners and tenants, and takes the difference between these two. The
DDD estimator β7 is given as the difference between the two DD estimators DDD =
DDowner −DDtenant = βDD3,owner − βDD3,tenant:
β7 = β
DD
3,owner − βDD3,tenant (1.14)
7The landlord-tenant problem is a principal-agent problem that may occur in renting markets and
may lead to underinvestment in tenant-occupied dwellings. The landlord-tenant problem characterizes
barriers for landlords to include investment costs in the rent and thus, to realize appropriate investment
returns. See Jaffe and Stavins (1994).
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with
βDD3,owner = (E(y|M = 1, B = 1, O = 1)− E(y|M = 0, B = 1, O = 1))
− (E(y|M = 1, B = 0, O = 1)− E(y|M = 0, B = 0, O = 1)) (1.15)
βDD3,tenant = (E(y|M = 1, B = 1, O = 0)− E(y|M = 0, B = 1, O = 0))
− (E(y|M = 1, B = 0, O = 0)− E(y|M = 0, B = 0, O = 0)) (1.16)
The estimator βDD3 refers to the estimator of the DD model presented in Equation
1.12. DDD is different from just adding a control group since it includes the interaction
effects. By rearranging the terms in Equations 1.14, 1.15 and 1.16, the DDD estimator
equivalently reflects the difference between the two DD estimators of the treated and
non-treated group, controlling for modernizations and homeownership through the DD
approach.
1.2.2.4 Assumptions and caveats of DDD
An important criterion for a good estimator is unbiasedness. For the DD estimator8 to
be unbiased the expected value must equal the real value, E(β3) = β3.
In addition, the following assumptions must hold for the DD estimator to be unbiased9:
• The model is correctly specified.
• The expected value of the error term is zero: E(i) = 0.
• The error term is uncorrelated with the variables in the equation:
cov(i, Bi) = 0 (1.17)
cov(i,Mi) = 0 (1.18)
cov(i, Bi ·Mi) = 0 (1.19)
The assumption of Equation 1.19 is often referred to as the ‘parallel trend assump-
tion’. In the presented subsidy program analysis, the parallel trend assumption is the
assumption that the modernization trend of treated and non-treated household is the
same. If these two household groups have different modernization trends, the DD esti-
mator is biased. Failing the parallel assumption is a common caveat in DD approaches.
Nonetheless, this is often solved by identifying further pre-existing differences in trends.
8The focus on the DD estimator is only for illustrative purposes. However, the assumptions also hold
for the DDD estimator.
9For the complete list of assumptions for an OLS estimator to be unbiased, see for instance van Auer
(2005).
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The more sophisticated approach, implemented in Chapter 5, supplementary controls
for homeowners and applies the DDD model. Moreover, two treatment periods and thus
two treated household groups are considered, as well as general time and regional trends.
A second major limitation that may affect the efficiency of the estimator and consis-
tency of standard errors is serial correlation. A DD estimation may rely on observations
of the same subject over several time periods. In this case, the dependent variables in
DD estimation are typically highly serially correlated. Moreover, the treatment variable
may change very little over the control groups. Using the usual ordinary-least-squares
(OLS) estimators would thus result in underestimated standard errors. However, this
limitation is addressed by introducing robust standard errors, clustered at the house-
hold level based on Huber (1967) and White (1980). Another possibility is to apply a
feasible-generalized least-squares (FGLS) model10, which accounts for serial correlation
through its variance covariance matrix.11 Both cluster-robust standard errors and the
FGLS model are considered in the estimation strategy given in Chapter 5.
1.3 Thesis outline and contributions
The thesis comprises four essays on the economic effects of specific topics in energy
markets. Each of the four essays is presented in a dedicated chapter within the the-
sis. The chapters are organized in two parts. Part I presents model-based analyses of
European security of supply scenarios. Part II analyzes the impacts of public policies
affecting consumer choices to promote energy efficiency and greenhouse gas abatement
in the residential heating market. In the following, the content of each chapter is briefly
summarized and the main results are outlined.
1.3.1 Security of supply effects of the Nabucco and
South Stream projects
The paper presented in Chapter 2, Part I has solely been written by the author of the
thesis and is published in Dieckho¨ner (2012b). It analyzes security of supply effects of the
major pipeline projects Nabucco and South Stream. In addition to Nord Stream, these
two pipeline projects have been announced to provide further gas supplies to Europe.
This raises the questions whether and how these projects may contribute to the European
Union’s focus on security of supply. Applying the natural gas infrastructure model
TIGER, this paper investigates the impact of these pipeline projects on southeastern
Europe’s gas supply. Gas flows and marginal cost prices are evaluated in general and
considering the possibility of supply disruptions via Ukraine for the year 2020. The
model results show a positive impact of these pipelines on security of supply despite few
10See Wooldridge (2010) for an overview of the FGLS model.
11For more details on the topic of serial correlation in DD models, see Bertrand et al. (2004).
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consumer cut-offs that result from intra-European bottlenecks. South Stream is only
highly utilized in case of a Ukraine crisis, supporting the idea that its main purpose is
to bypass Ukraine.12
1.3.2 Civil unrests in North Africa – Risks for natural gas supply?
The analysis of the paper in Chapter 3, Part I has been conducted in co-authorship
with Stefan Lochner and is published in Lochner and Dieckho¨ner (2012). The paper
investigates the impacts of disruptions of gas supplies from North Africa to the Eu-
ropean market. Such disruptions actually occurred during the uprising and military
confrontation in Libya that began in February 2011. An analysis of how Europe has
compensated for these missing gas volumes shows that this situation has not affected
security of supply. However, the situation would change if the North African uprising
was to spread to Algeria. Since Algeria is a much more important gas supplier to Eu-
rope than is Libya, more severe consequences would be likely. Applying the natural
gas infrastructure model TIGER, we investigate the impact of supplier disruptions from
both countries for a summer and winter period. Our analysis shows that disruptions
in the low-demand summer months could be compensated for, mainly by LNG imports
into several European countries. An investigation of a similar situation at the beginning
of the winter shows that security of supply would be severely compromised and that
disruptions to Italian consumers would be unavoidable. The analysis thereby highlights
the importance of taking the political stability of supply countries into account when
assessing the security of European gas imports.
1.3.3 Greenhouse gas abatement curves of the residential
heating market
The paper in Chapter 4, Part II has been written in co-authorship with Harald Hecking
(see Dieckho¨ner and Hecking (2012)). In this paper, we develop a microeconomic ap-
proach to deduce greenhouse gas abatement cost curves of the residential heating sector.
By accounting for household behavior, we find that welfare-based abatement costs are
generally higher than pure technical equipment costs. Our results are based on a mi-
crosimulation of private households’ investment decision for heating systems until 2030.
The households’ investment behavior in the simulation is derived from a discrete choice
estimation which allows investigating the welfare costs of different abatement policies
in terms of the compensating variation and the excess burden. We simulate greenhouse
gas abatements and welfare costs of carbon taxes and subsidies on heating system in-
vestments until 2030 to deduce abatement curves. Given utility maximizing households,
12This article is copyrighted and reprinted by permission from the International Association for Energy
Economics. The article first appeared in The Energy Journal (Vol. 33, No. 3). Visit The Energy Journal
online at http://www.iaee.org/en/publications/journal.aspx.
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our results suggest a carbon tax to be the welfare efficient policy. Assuming behavioral
misperceptions instead, a subsidy on investments may have lower marginal greenhouse
gas abatement costs than a carbon tax.
1.3.4 Subsidizing investments in energy efficiency
The analysis presented in the paper in Chapter 5, Part II has solely been conducted by
the author (see Dieckho¨ner (2012a)). Improving energy efficiency is one of the three pil-
lars of the European energy and climate targets for 2020 and has led to the introduction
of several policy measures to promote energy efficiency. The paper analyzes the effec-
tiveness of subsidies in increasing energy efficiency in residential dwellings. An empirical
analysis is conducted in which the effectiveness of subsidies on the number of dwelling
modernizations is investigated. Next, the impact of renovations on energy consumption
is analyzed using a differences-in-differences-in-differences approach for modernizations
made in given subsidy program periods, as well as for ownership status and household
types for more than 5000 German households between 1992 and 2010. By controlling
for socio-economic status, dwelling characteristics and macro-indicators, it becomes ap-
parent that homeowners invest significantly more and have significantly lower heating
expenditures than their tenant counterparts. Thus, the landlord-tenant problem tends
to broaden the energy efficiency gap. It is also found that the number of modernizations
made by landlords does not increase with higher subsidies. However, the renovations
made during the subsidy periods decrease the heating consumption of tenants. Given the
conditions that homeowners already invest more in energy efficiency, they increase mod-
ernizations only slightly with increasing subsides. However, these modernizations during
subsidy periods do not further decrease homeowners’ energy consumption. Thus, the
large part of the overall subsidies received by homeowners can be identified as windfall
profits.
Part I
Model-based Analyses of Security
of Supply in Natural Gas Markets
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Chapter 2
Simulating security of supply of the Nabucco
and South Stream projects for the European
natural gas market13
Applying the natural gas infrastructure model TIGER, this paper investigates the impact
of the Nabucco and South Stream pipeline projects on southeastern Europe’s gas supply.
Gas flows and marginal cost prices are evaluated in general and considering the possibility
of supply disruptions via Ukraine for the year 2020. The results show a positive impact
of these pipelines on security of supply despite few consumer cut-offs that result from
intra-European bottlenecks. South Stream is only highly utilized in case of a Ukraine
crisis, supporting the idea that its main purpose is to bypass Ukraine.
2.1 Introduction and Background
The declining European gas production will lead to an increasing dependence on imports
(Capros et al., 2008, IEA, 2008). Several plans for major pipeline projects will be
commissioned in the next decade to provide sufficient capacity for additional natural gas
imports, and investments in interconnections among countries are planned to improve
market integration. Moreover, several projects in focus should provide large-scale gas
volumes from non-European gas producers to European regions. In addition to Nord
Stream, which is online in 2011, the Nabucco and South Stream pipelines are the largest
projects planned. Although both pipelines could enhance the security of the gas supply
in the European Union (EU), they are expensive projects. The ambitious objectives
of the EU in terms of the percentages of renewables in the energy mix by 2050 may
lead to only a moderate growth in natural gas demand in the next decade and probably
to a significant decrease by 2050. Natural gas demand for heating is even expected to
decrease in northwestern Europe until 2030 through implementation of energy efficiency
13This article is copyrighted and reprinted by permission from the International Association for Energy
Economics. The article first appeared in The Energy Journal (Vol. 33, No. 3). Visit The Energy Journal
online at http://www.iaee.org/en/publications/journal.aspx.
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measures in buildings (Capros et al., 2010). It follows that not all major pipeline projects
may be essential for the security of supply in Europe, especially the Nabucco and South
Stream projects, which are designed to supply southeastern Europe.
A quarter of Europe’s gas demand is satisfied by imports from Russia, and 80 percent
of these volumes are transported from Russia through pipelines via Ukraine (European
Commission, 2006). The Russia-Ukraine gas dispute of January 2009 caused an un-
precedented disruption of gas supplies to the EU, described as the worst gas crisis in
International Energy Agency’s (IEA) history (IEA, 2009). Disputes between Russia and
Ukraine on the pricing of the commodity natural gas and its transit to the EU were
recurrent during the past decade (Stern, 2009).
Because of these threats to the security of the natural gas supply, European policy
will have to cope with several challenges. First, gas supply from non-European countries
has to be secured. However, since importing a high proportion of gas volumes for the
European market from one or only a few suppliers increases the risk of political pressure
and price increases, supply sources and means of transport to different European regions
should be diversified (European Commission, 2006, Reymond, 2007, Weisser, 2007). Po-
litical conflicts, such as the Russia-Ukraine crisis, could cause supply disruptions, and
a halt to these transits has a significant impact on the European gas market, especially
during times of high demand, such as the winter months. To secure gas supplies, addi-
tional gas infrastructure, that is, liquefied natural gas (LNG) import terminals, storage
areas, and major import pipelines, will have to be built (Cayrade, 2004, Lise et al.,
2008).
This paper investigates the effects of each of the Nabucco and South Stream pipeline
projects on European natural gas supply security in general and with a particular fo-
cus on a Ukraine crisis simulation. The paper also analyzes the major supply risks
associated with the EU’s dependence on the main transit country, Ukraine, and the
mitigating effects of Nabucco and South Stream and elaborates on the European gas
infrastructure system’s vulnerability, as well as its ability to respond and compensate.
The scenarios are simulated with the European natural gas infrastructure and dispatch
model TIGER from the Institute of Energy Economics, Cologne. The conclusions of
the paper depend on these specific assumptions, in particular on assumptions on pub-
licly announced infrastructure projects14 and on demand projections. Possible effects of
alternative assumptions are briefly discussed in the conclusion.
The next section provides a literature overview on issues related to the security of
supply in the context of major European gas pipeline projects and describes the Nabucco
and South Stream pipeline projects in detail. Their contribution to the two objectives
of European security of gas supply – the security of natural gas imports and import
diversification – is addressed. Section 2.3 describes the TIGER model which simulates
14The data on capacities based on current planning status is taken from ENTSOG (2009).
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three infrastructure scenarios to analyze the effects of route diversification by Nabucco
and South Stream in case of supply disruptions: a baseline scenario without either of
the two pipeline projects, a scenario that implements only the Nabucco pipeline, and
a scenario that implements only the South Stream pipeline. In section 2.4 the general
effects of the Nabucco and South Stream pipeline projects – especially the effects on
marginal supply costs – are analyzed for the year 2020 for a hypothetical peak winter
day, when supply disruptions are most probable. Section 2.5 analyzes the impact of the
two pipeline projects during a hypothetical Ukraine crisis on a peak winter day in 2020
on disruptions to consumers. Changes in marginal supply costs and gas flows for the
three infrastructure scenarios in comparison to the results of the no-crisis simulation are
presented. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Security of natural gas supply and the Nabucco and
the South Stream pipeline projects
2.2.1 Security of natural gas supply
The issue of security of supply in natural gas markets has been addressed by European
energy policy (European Commission, 2000, 2006, European Union, 2004). Dimensions
of security of supply cover a wide range of issues. Luciani (2004) defines security of
supply as ”the guarantee that all the gas volumes, demanded by non-interruptible (firms
or protected) customers, will be available at a reasonable price” (Luciani, 2004, p. 2).
Thus, physical availability of natural gas and the price play significant roles in guar-
anteeing security of supply. However, defining a precise threshold for a threat of security
of supply is a challenging task on which academics have not reached agreement. Many
studies have addressed the issue of security of energy supply, albeit without a specific fo-
cus on natural gas (CIEP, 2004, Correlje and van der Linde, 2006). Gnansounou (2008)
develops a composite energy vulnerability index to benchmark industrialized countries
in a long-term security perspective regarding oil and gas supplies. Cabalu (2010) eval-
uates different gas supply security indicators. These cover gas intensity, net gas import
dependency, a ratio of domestic gas production to total gas consumption and the geopo-
litical risk for Asian countries. Cabalu (2010) introduces a composite gas supply security
index, based on Gnansounou’s energy vulnerability index, that incorporates four of the
presented indicators to analyze an overall security of natural gas supply measure for
Asia. For the European market, Victor (2007) discusses aspects of global geopoliti-
cal security of supply for natural gas, but only a few studies focus on specific pipeline
projects. Holz et al. (2009) analyze European gas supplies until 2025 using the strate-
gic model GASMOD and find that pipeline availability remains a critical issue. Stern
(2002) analyzes the impact of dependence on natural gas imports and the influence of
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liberalization on security of gas supply and recommends a policy framework to prevent
disruptions to consumers. He analyzes European relationships with non-European gas-
exporting countries and the influence of a liberalized European market on security of
gas supply and differentiates between short-term and long-term adequacy of supply and
infrastructure in the transport of gas to the demand regions. Stern (2002) also discusses
operational issues, such as stresses of weather and other operational influences, and
strategic security, such as catastrophic default of infrastructure or supply sources. Fur-
ther, associated with import dependence Stern distinguishes among source dependence,
transit dependence and facility dependence.
The current paper addresses transit dependence and facility dependence with a focus
on the effects of the two pipeline projects, Nabucco and South Stream,15 on security of
supply. The major security of supply risks associated with the EU’s dependence on
the main transit country of Ukraine (transit dependence) are reflected in the results
of the Ukraine crisis simulations in which the mitigating effects of the Nabucco and
South Stream projects, the European gas infrastructure system’s ability to respond and
compensate, and its vulnerability (facility dependence) are analyzed.
Stern (2002) addresses the problem of attributing costs to events that have a low
probability of occurrence but a high impact on supply and the difficulties for policy
makers to balance costs and risks in order to find measures to cope with these events.
This paper presents an approach to the analysis of such events.
2.2.2 The Nabucco project
According to Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH (2010), the Nabucco project
describes a gas pipeline connecting the Caspian region, the Middle East and Egypt via
Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary with Austria and further on with the Central
and Western European gas markets. The pipeline route with a length of approximately
3,300 km should start at the Georgian/Turkish and/or Iranian/Turkish border and run
via Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to Baumgarten, Austria. The pipeline’s transport
capacity is expected to amount to 31 bcm per year, and total investment costs are ap-
proximately 7.9 billion Euros. From an EU point of view the Nabucco project should
present an opportunity to diversify gas supply options and to reduce the EU’s depen-
dence on Russia.16 The Caspian region, especially Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, and
the Middle East-Egypt, Iran and Iraq, are discussed as supply sources for the project.
15Currently, there are three further ”southern corridor” pipelines discussed, that could connect the
Middle East or Caspian Region with Europe: The Trans Adriatic Pipeline (Trans Adriatic Pipeline,
2011), the Interconnection Turkey Greece Italy Pipeline (IGI Poseidon, 2011) and the recently announced
South-East Europe Pipeline (Financial Times, 2011). These pipelines, however, connect only a part of
the regions connected by Nabucco and South Stream.
16The Nabucco project is designated as of strategic importance by the European Union in the Trans-
European Networks - Energy (TEN-E) program.
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However, no supply contracts have yet been concluded, a fact that may affect the com-
missioning of the project. Problems that have arisen in the context of suppliers for the
Nabucco pipeline are often discussed (Bilgin, 2007, 2009).
The Nabucco pipeline will be built only if sufficient volumes are contracted. The
political risk of defaulted supply contracts is difficult to estimate and will depend on
who the suppliers are. Turkey plays a major political role in the negotiations on supplies
because it will need significant additional gas volumes in the future to meet projected
rising demand (and the country neither has an own production nor sufficient gas storage)
and because Turkey is the first transit country for the Nabucco pipeline. Turkey has
already been negotiating with the EU on the volumes that should be withdrawn from
Nabucco to satisfy the Turkish demand, and it has already signed and extended many
of its gas contracts with its surrounding gas-producing neighbors. However, Turkey is
interested in withdrawing as much Caspian and Middle Eastern gas as possible. There-
fore, Turkey’s geopolitical position could be both an opportunity and a threat for the
EU.17 Based on a geopolitical analysis, Bilgin (2009) recommends including at least two
countries from the Middle East and Caspian regions as suppliers for the European gas
market, which could be possible via Nabucco. Erdogdu (2010) analyzes strength and
weaknesses of the Nabucco project with a focus on the policies of different countries
involved and concludes that its realization largely depends on non-European actors and
their interests.
In short, the Nabucco is an uncertain and cost-intensive project that could help to
cope with the EU’s security of supply challenges because it could provide significant
gas volumes from non-European countries, it diversifies supply sources, and it diversifies
supply routes that transit mainly European Member States.
2.2.3 The South Stream project
A number of routes for the pipeline are being discussed, including onshore sections across
the Russian Federation and several European countries, as well as offshore gas pipelines
via the Black Sea and the Adriatic Sea. South Stream is expected to provide a capacity of
63 bcm per year by 2016 and to diversify the Russian natural gas supply route to Europe,
thereby strengthening European energy security (South Stream, 2010)18. The source of
Russian gas for South Stream is as uncertain as the source for Nabucco. Natural gas
production in the Volga Region is declining (Stern, 2005), and there will not be enough
17Kardas¸ (2011) analyzes actual political Turkish-EU relations in the context of the Nabucco Inter-
governmental Agreement (IGA) and the discussion on Turkish-EU membership. He concludes that the
latter has negatively affected an energy cooperation. However, he makes the point that the signing of
the IGA in July 2009 gave indication for a better future energy cooperation. Turkey reduced its claims
on access to Nabucco volumes and on discounted prices whereas the EU agreed on reverse flows on
Nabuccco to Turkey and access to European gas stocks in case of emergency. Nonetheless, the future of
Turkish-EU relations in terms of Nabucco remain uncertain.
1850 percent of the South Stream AG is owned by Gazprom.
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gas for 63 bcm to be exported per year. For the coming decades, large explored gas
reserves in Russia are mainly in western Siberia and the Yamal Peninsula. Production
in Yamal was approved to start in 2011 but is delayed because of the economic crisis
and the uncertainty on European demand developments (Pirani, 2010). Russian exports
to Europe are not likely to be much higher than 200 to 220 bcm in 2020 (Socor, 2009).
Another issue is that this area is more than 3000 km away from the start of South Stream
at Dzhubga. However, Russia is already importing Turkmeni gas and is also interested
in purchasing gas from Shah Deniz II, an Azerbaijani gas field (Kupchinsky, 2009),
which could also be used to supply South Stream. In addition, to avoid transit and
political costs, Russia could also consider transporting its gas from the Yamal Peninsula
to Europe via South Stream. However, Nord Stream, with 27 bcm (or 54 bcm after the
expansion), seems to be a much cheaper option for Russia because of the higher costs of
Caspian gas volumes and the long-distance of South Stream to future production regions.
Moreover, Nord Stream avoids the Ukraine and other transit countries in transporting
the gas farther on within Europe and even to southern Europe. Considering these
circumstances, South Stream seems to be more a strategic option than a cost-efficient
one for transporting Russian gas to Europe. Barysch (2010) states that it is a political
project with the purpose to cut out transit countries like Ukraine and Belarus, and to
prevent Nabucco which threatens Gazprom’s monopoly.
About 80 percent of Russian gas exports go to Europe, and about 40 percent of EU
imports stem from Russia (IEA, 2009). Therefore, each party is dependent on the other,
which may lower the default risk for Europe and may be a lower risk than it would
bear with contracts with Middle Eastern countries. However, South Stream does not
support the EU’s goal of diversifying supply sources. Moreover, although South Stream’s
planned extremely large capacity could be a strategic tool, it is not clear whether or how
the pipeline could be completely filled.
In summary, South Stream offers the option to import large-scale (i.e., twice as
much as Nabucco) gas volumes from non-European countries, gas transported via South
Stream would have to be contracted with the mainly Russian state-owned natural gas
company Gazprom, even if it originally stems from a Caspian country, and South Stream
offers an alternative route to the existing routes from Russia.
In general, the development of the European gas market is very uncertain with
several risks for the planning of pipeline constructions. In addition to the access to
supply sources, European gas demand development in the context of the EU’s ambitious
climate change targets and the role of unconventional gas remain uncertain (Barysch,
2010).
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2.3 Methodology
This section presents the framework and methodology for the model-based analysis that
has been conducted to identify the impact of the two pipeline projects Nabucco and
South Stream on security of natural gas supply. Thereby, importance of the routes and
capacities of these two projects for security of supply is identified. Regarding that both
pipelines are major import routes in addition to the old-established route via Ukraine,
which is fraught with risk, their impact on security of natural gas supply in case of a
hypothetical Ukraine crisis is analyzed.
2.3.1 The TIGER-model
Different types of natural gas market models are presented in literature. Theoreti-
cal natural gas transport optimization models include those presented by de Wolf and
Smeers (1996), de Wolf and Smeers (2000), Ehrhardt and Steinbach (2004), Ehrhardt
and Steinbach (2005) and van der Hoeven (2004). Midthun et al. (2009) present a
modeling framework for analyzing natural gas markets that accounts for further tech-
nological issues related to gas transportation – primarily the relationship between flow
and pressure. The mixed-complementarity models presented by Gabriel et al. (2005),
Gabriel and Smeers (2005) and Holz et al. (2009) focus mainly on modeling competition
and agents with focus on natural gas trade determining supply volumes to the European
market in different types of competitive environments.
The results presented in this paper for the year 2020 are based on simulations with
the natural gas infrastructure model TIGER (Transport Infrastructure for Gas with
Enhanced Resolution). Developed by Lochner and Bothe (2007), it enables an integrated
evaluation of the utilization of gas infrastructure components – pipelines, storages and
terminals – and their interaction. Therefore, the model can be used for a comprehensive
analysis of the short-term supply situation and gas flows within the European long
distance transmission grid.
TIGER’s focus is on the optimal dispatch within the European gas infrastructure
system.19 The results of the TIGER model thus represent the first best distribution of
natural gas and utilization of infrastructure components within Europe assuming that
the European Commission’s regulative objective to achieve an efficient functioning of
the natural gas transport infrastructure within the next decades is accomplished.20
19A similar modeling approach for the US market is presented by Ellison (2007).
20Fast steps into this direction have already been made by introducing and revising Gas Market
Directives (European Union, 1998, 2003, 2009). A model validation presented in EWI (2010a) shows
that the model can adequately reflect real flows apart from minor deviations. Efficient swaps in the
model’s pipeline system reflect the higher willingness to pay in regions where supply shortages occur in
comparison to regions where supply is still adequate. In an efficient transport sector contracted volumes
will be resold to regions with a higher willingness to pay, if sufficient transport capacity is available.
30 Chapter 2. Simulating security of supply of the Nabucco and South Stream projects
Maximum supply volumes to the European market, demand developments as well as
capacity and start-off dates of existing infrastructure and infrastructure projects are
exogenous to the model. The results cover flows in the pipeline system, the utilization
of pipelines, LNG terminals, and the system of storage. The infrastructure components
are considered with respect to integration, and effects on marginal supply costs. (See
Figure 2.1 for an overview of the model.)
The marginal supply costs or nodal prices (Lochner, 2009, 2011a) quantify how
much it would cost to meet an additional unit of demand at a specific node in terms of
determining the next cost-optimal solution to satisfy this additional unit. Within the
linear optimization framework, the marginal supply costs represent the shadow costs on
each node’s balance constraint for each period. They indicate the marginal system cost of
supplying one additional cubic meter of natural gas to a specific node at a certain point in
time. These additional cost estimates thus cover the sum of all costs such as production,
commodity, transport, regasification or storage costs that are accumulated in the cost-
minimal solution to meet the node-specific additional unit of demand. Hence, they
also account for opportunity costs. In a perfectly competitive and efficiently organized
gas transport market, the marginal supply costs at each node in the system should be
equal to a theoretical wholesale price at that node. Therefore, an analysis of changes in
marginal supply cost indicates the effects the simulated scenarios could have on market
prices in a perfectly competitive market. If there is a disruption in supply, the marginal
supply cost estimator rises towards infinity within the model.21 Based on marginal
supply costs and disruptions computed, the model gives an indication where additional
infrastructure might be needed as a starting point for further cost-benefit analyses.
21A detailed description of the objective function, the main constraints, the computation of marginal
supply costs, a list of all cost components, their sources and application in the model is presented in the
Appendix.
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2.3.2 Data assumptions
Demand, supply and infrastructure assumptions are based on EWI (2010a).22 The de-
mand scenario used is the EWI/ERGEG demand scenario, which is based on Capros
et al. (2008) and adapted to the economic crisis from 2009 on. The peak day demand
assumptions applied are published in the Ten Year Network Development Plan of the
European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSOG, 2009). This is the
highest possible daily demand level published and reflects a worst case scenario in terms
of security of supply. In terms of pipeline projects in general – new pipelines, expansions
and reverse flow projects – the scheduled projects are included based on EWI (2010a)
which are those projects that the European regulators considered likely. With respect to
the several intra-European pipeline projects and planned expansions of interconnector
capacities between countries, those published in ENTSOG (2009), slightly adapted ac-
cording to EWI (2010a), are implemented in the simulations. Table 2.1 gives an overview
of European demand, the maximum pipeline import volumes, as well as the aggregated
European production and infrastructure capacities that are available in 2010 and that
are assumed to be online in 2020. The upper limit of pipeline import volumes available
to the European market is either predefined by pipeline capacity restrictions or by the
maximum export potential of the producer country.23
Table 2.1: European gas market in 2010 and assumptions for 2020
in billion cubic meter 2010 2020
Demand 489.1 533.31
Upper limit imports* 374,86 548.81/579.81**
from Russia 197.15 201.48
from Norway 121.22 112.82
from Algeria 45.40 55.35
from Caspian Region ︸︷︷︸ 0.99*** 18from Middle East 15.5/46.5**
from Lybia 10.10 9.9
LNG import capacity 164.92 279.02
European production capacity 190.61 124.7
Storage working gas volume 85.17 140.39
Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE), BP (2011), Eurostat (2010), and EWI (2010).
All data refers to EU-27.
Data for 2020 sum up model inputs.
*Imports are restricted either by export potential or pipeline capacities.
LNG imports are only constrained by the capacity of regasification terminals (LNG import capacity).
**Only in Nabucco Scenario, based on the assumption that capacity to Turkey is extended then.
***From Caspian and/or Middle East.
22For a detailed overview of additional primary sources applied in EWI (2010a), the parameterization,
the cost assumptions of the model, and the respective data sources, see Appendix A.3.
23More details on these assumptions, see EWI (2010a).
Chapter 2. Simulating security of supply of the Nabucco and South Stream projects 33
2.3.3 Scenarios
To analyze the impact of the two pipeline projects three different scenarios are simulated:
• The Baseline Scenario uses the assumptions listed above and includes one line of
Nord Stream with an annual capacity of 27.5 bcm.
• The Nabucco Scenario is based on the Baseline Scenario, but it also assumes
the Nabucco pipeline will provide an additional 31 bcm in 2020. The route of
Nabucco, based on data published by Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH
(2010), runs from Turkey via Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to Baumgarten,
Austria with several connections to the national grids that allow for withdrawal
and consumption of Nabucco gas along the way.
• The South Stream Scenario incorporates the South Stream pipeline instead of
the Nabucco pipeline, but it otherwise makes the same assumptions as the Base-
line Scenario. The pipeline’s route is implemented as published by South Stream
(2010) from Russia via the Black Sea to Bulgaria and from there on with two differ-
ent onshore connections: one via Serbia, Hungary and Slovenia to Arnoldstein in
Southern Austria and the other via Serbia and Hungary to Baumgarten, Austria.
A pipeline connecting Greece and Italy is included based on EWI (2010a). A third
route of South Stream via Greece to Brindisi, Italy is assumed to be unlikely if the
pipeline connecting Greece and Italy is commissioned. It is thus not implemented
in the simulations.
The three infrastructure scenarios are first simulated allowing for supplies via Ukraine
in order to generate some general results and to establish a basis for comparison of the
simulation of a hypothetical Ukraine crisis. The evaluations presented in the following
section are based on simulated daily gas flows.
34 Chapter 2. Simulating security of supply of the Nabucco and South Stream projects
2.4 Results of no-crisis simulation for 2020
This section first presents general results on security of natural gas supply in Europe
based on the Baseline Scenario. Second, the Nabucco and South Stream Scenario are
compared with the Baseline Scenario. The results of the three infrastructure variations
focus on a peak winter day in 2020, i.e. the day with the highest demand and therefore
the strongest impact on security of supply.
2.4.1 Baseline Scenario results of no-crisis simulation
Increasing import dependency has a crucial impact on security of natural gas supply in
Europe in the next decade which is shown in Figure 2.2 presenting the supply mix for
2009 and the simulated supply mix for 2020. Russia’s role as a major exporter to the
European Union increases. Russia covers additional 11.5 percentage points of European
gas supplies in 2020.
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Figure 2.2: Supply mix in 2020
These additional Russian volumes are mainly transported via the Nord Stream pipeline
(27.5 bcm in 2020), the Yamal pipeline via Belarus and Poland (about 32 bcm) and via
Ukraine. European production decreases especially in the UK, where production is at
11.1 percent in 2009 and decreases to only 4.8 percent of EU-27 gas supply in 2020. Thus,
intra-European gas flows from the production regions in the UK and the Netherlands
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are decreasing and flows on all new and existing pipeline import routes are increasing.
Nord Stream causes a reduction of flows via the Czech Republic in comparison to 2010.
In 2020, the additional volumes sent via Ukraine are transported further on to Hungary,
Slovakia and Austria, to meet higher demand in this region.
The Baltic region, eastern Europe and Italy exhibit low marginal supply costs in
comparison to Western Europe in 2020 (see Table 2.2). Western European countries are
distant from non-European gas producers and the marginal unit of natural gas supplied
to this region is comparatively cost-intensive because the incurred costs cover either
additional transport costs or relatively high LNG import costs. In the Balkan region
bottlenecks occurring on the peak day, the worst case scenario in terms of security of
supply, lead to disruptions to consumers. These occur because of a lack of interconnector
capacities to the adjacent countries relative to the high level of demand. The only
import pipeline from Bulgaria to Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)
provides an average daily capacity of 2.6 million cubic meters per day (mcm/d), which
is not sufficient to meet the Macedonian peak demand of 3 mcm/d assumed for 2020
by ENTSOG (2009). The same holds for the interconnector from Serbia to Bosnia
and Herzegovina with 1.9 mcm/d compared with a peak demand of 2 mcm/d, and
the Serbian demand of 20 mcm/d, which is significantly higher than the assumed cross-
border capacity of about 13 mcm/d from Hungary, and about 4.3 mcm/d from Romania.
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2.4.2 Nabucco and South Stream Scenario results of no-crisis simula-
tion
The inclusion of Nabucco and South Stream in the simulation changes gas flows on
major import routes. Flows on Nabucco push Russian volumes further to the West and
cause a higher utilization of the routes via Ukraine and Slovakia. On the contrary, South
Stream takes over volumes from these routes and sends them directly to Bulgaria. In the
Baseline Scenario these volumes are transported via Ukraine and further on to Romania
and Bulgaria. Figure 2.3 shows the gas volumes transported to the European market by
Nabucco and South Stream sorted by the countries where these volumes are withdrawn
and consumed. Nabucco and South Stream volumes remain in eastern Europe.
Based on the cost-minimizing simulation of a peak-day scenario without crisis, Nabucco
brings more gas to the European market than does South Stream. Nabucco volumes
provide main supplies to Bulgaria and Hungary, as well as Turkey, and minor volumes
are withdrawn in Romania. These volumes reduce marginal supply costs significantly in
eastern Europe, especially in Hungary and Bulgaria (see Table 2.2). Only minor marginal
supply cost decreases of around one percent can be observed in Western Europe. Bel-
gium, Netherlands, Luxembourg (Benelux countries), France, Spain and Portugal are
not significantly affected by the commissioning of Nabucco. On average, marginal supply
costs decrease by 1.4 percent within EU-27.
South Stream only transports natural gas to Bulgaria and minor gas volumes to
Serbia and Hungary (see Figure 2.3). In opposition to the Nabucco, Scenario disruptions
in Serbia are avoided in the South Stream Scenario, which simultaneously causes slight
average marginal supply cost increases (0.1 percent, see Table 2.2) in the European
Union, especially in Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia and the Czech Republic because of the
rerouting of Russian volumes.
However, the disruptions in the Balkan countries Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
FYROM cannot be prevented on a peak winter day even with the inclusion of Nabucco
and South Stream because both pipelines bypass this region.
In summary, Nabucco and South Stream provide additional capacity and another
option to transport gas to the European market, so they both improve the supply situa-
tion in terms of changes in marginal supply costs or the avoidance of disruptions, which
are observed only in eastern and central Europe. Significant effects for Western Europe
occur neither in the South Stream nor the Nabucco Scenarios.
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The negative values in the Nabucco crisis scenario indicate injections into the pipeline in Romania.
Figure 2.3: Withdrawal of gas volumes along the route
2.5 Results of Ukraine crisis simulation for 2020
Since about 80 percent of Russian gas to the European Union is currently transported
via Ukraine, a supply disruption on this route is the most threatening scenario for
the European gas supply. Therefore, the effects of a disruption of four weeks of gas
imports via Ukraine on the locational marginal cost price estimators are evaluated for
the Baseline Scenario. Subsequently, the effects of the inclusion of the Nabucco pipeline
or the South Stream pipeline are investigated. The analysis of the simulation results is
carried out as a comparison of the three infrastructure scenarios.
2.5.1 Baseline Scenario results of Ukraine crisis simulation
A disruption of gas supplies via Ukraine causes major gas flow changes mainly in eastern
Europe. Natural gas is withdrawn from storages in eastern Germany and partly trans-
ported to Poland, the Czech Republic and further on to the gas hub in Baumgarten,
Austria. Storages in southern Germany provide volumes for Austria and volumes from
western German storages are partly sent further on to Switzerland. Volumes withdrawn
in northern Italy remain in the domestic market. (See Figure 2.4 for the additional
volumes withdrawn from storages during the crisis.)
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The respective changes in marginal supply costs analyzed result from a simulation with a
stoppage of gas supplies via Ukraine in comparison to a scenario without such a crisis. On
a peak winter day, the simulated four-week stoppage in gas supplies via Ukraine leads
to disruptions to consumers and significant effects on marginal supply costs in large
parts of southeastern Europe. For the Baseline Scenario presented in Table 2.3, given
the planned pipeline infrastructure expansions, a peak day scenario itself would already
cause disruptions in a no-crisis simulation (see section 2.4). These peak day disruptions
are aggravated in a crisis simulation. Without a Ukraine crisis only 4 percent of peak
day demand is disrupted in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 17 percent in Serbia and 27 percent
in Macedonia, which increase to a complete disruption of peak day demand in Bosnia
and Herzegovina and Macedonia during a Ukraine crisis. In addition, in a Ukraine crisis
simulation, between 15 to 27 percent of consumers in Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary
are also cut off from gas supplies (see Table 2.3 and Table 2.4).
In Croatia, no consumers are disrupted. However, marginal supply costs indicate
that disruptions would occur at the margin if demand increases only slightly. Increases
in marginal supply costs of more than 3 percent occur in eastern Europe, while Germany,
the Benelux countries and Poland are confronted with slight changes in marginal costs
that result from the compensation through German storage volumes (see Figure 2.4).
Western European countries, which are supplied by Norwegian and Algerian pipeline
gas as well as LNG imports (i.e. UK, Ireland, Switzerland, Italy, Portugal, France and
Spain) are not significantly affected by the crisis.
In the Baltic countries, Finland and Estonia, marginal supply costs even decrease
by more than 40 percent in the crisis simulation. Because of the cut-off of Russian
volumes to Western Europe via Ukraine and the available Russian export potential, these
countries receive additional Russian volumes. In contrast to marginal costs being driven
by expensive storage withdrawals in a no-crisis simulation, these additional Russian
volumes lead to significant reductions in marginal supply costs.
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Table 2.3: Change of marginal supply costs during crisis
Country* % change Baseline % change Nabucco % change South Stream
AT 4.23% 4.52% 1.28%
BA peak day disruption peak day disruption peak day disruption
BE 1.41% 0.53% 0.48%
BG crisis disruption marginal crisis disruption -1.92%
CH 0.58% 0.02% 0.03%
CS peak day disruption peak day disruption -1.87%
CZ 3.09% 4.74% 0.70%
DE 1.31% 1.42% 0.37%
EE -42.94% -40.59% -7.01%
ES -0.14% 0.07% -0.03%
FI -42.44% -40.08% -6.99%
FR -0.02% -0.11% 0.00%
GB 0.18% -1.06% 0.00%
GR crisis disruption crisis disruption -1.34%
HR marginal crisis disruption 3.37% -0.55%
HU crisis disruption crisis disruption -0.07%
IT 0.19% 0.31% 0.00%
IE 0.72% 0.37% 0.10%
LT -9.22% -9.38% -7.42%
LU 1.80% 0.73% 0.69%
LV -5.86% -5.78% -5.81%
MK peak day disruption peak day disruption peak day disruption
NL 1.37% 0.34% 0.47%
PL 1.13% 2.66% 0.01%
PT 0.03% 0.11% -0.02%
RO crisis disruption marginal crisis disruption crisis disruption
SI 4.33% 0.00% 0.64%
SK 8.39% 0.00% 3.89%
The wording ”marginal crisis disruption” indicates that no volumes are disrupted,
but an additional unit would be.
Therefore, no marginal supply costs can be computed.
*ISO Country Codes
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2.5.2 Nabucco and South Stream Scenario results of Ukraine crisis
simulation
The compensation for the missing Ukraine transits causes overall changes in the uti-
lization of infrastructure components and gas flows. The differences of supply volumes
between the crisis and the no-crisis scenario are presented in Figure 2.4. The compensa-
tion within the applied overall optimization framework could even reduce the utilization
of alternative infrastructure to the Ukraine route, which is indicated by the negative
bars. Therefore, including all changes between the crisis and no-crisis scenarios, the net
length of the bar in Figure 2.4 reflects the aggregated compensated or disrupted volumes
via Ukraine for each of the three infrastructure scenarios.
These aggregated volumes differ because the utilization of the Ukrainian routes in
a no-crisis simulation varies depending on the major pipeline available to supply the
European market. Without a Ukraine crisis South Stream already takes over some of the
volumes that are transported via Ukraine in the Baseline Scenario. Thus, in the South
Stream Scenario, given that Ukraine transits were already lower than in the Baseline
Scenario, the missing volume – about 77 mcm/d less than in the Baseline Scenario –
must be substituted if there is a supply disruption via Ukraine. Rerouting of Russian gas
volumes and only a small proportion of withdrawal from storage in Germany and other
European countries can then substitute for the missing Ukrainian volumes. Rerouting
here turns the volumes that have been transported via Ukraine in the no-crisis simulation
to another route from Russia in a crisis simulation.24 Thus, less west-to-east gas flows
take place with South Stream than in the Baseline Scenario and no significant gas flow
changes occur in western Europe.
Because of several bottlenecks in southeastern Europe, 15 million cubic meters (mcm)
less LNG are imported into the Krk terminal in Croatia and 13 mcm less gas is with-
drawn from eastern European storage on the peak day during the simulated Ukraine
crisis. These supply reductions are also compensated by additional supplies via South
Stream.
24These routes could be Nord Stream, the Yamal route via Belarus and Poland to Germany, Blue
Stream or South Stream depending on the Scenario. In the South Stream Scenario, Russian gas is
rerouted via South Stream because Nord Stream and the Yamal route are completely utilized.
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Figure 2.4: Differences regarding supply volumes between crisis- and no-crisis simu-
lation
The net length of the bars – positive part less the negative part – indicates the sum of the missing
Ukraine transits and how these are compensated.
South Stream being only poorly utilized in a no-crisis simulation offers generous redun-
dant capacity during a crisis simulation (see Figure 2.3 on page 38). During a halt of
gas supplies via Ukraine, gas transported on South Stream more than triples on a peak
demand day, which demonstrates the extent of redundant capacity available. Because of
this alternative supply option, gas flows in west Europe remain mainly unaffected by the
crisis except for north Italy where the missing volumes are compensated for by storage
withdrawals and South Stream supplies. South Stream then provides less volumes for
the Bulgarian market, but significant volumes for the Serbian, Slovenian, Hungarian
and Austrian market. It eliminates persistent supply disruptions in Serbia; avoids the
crisis-induced disruptions that occurred in the Baseline Scenario in Bulgaria, Greece
and Hungary; and reduces increases in marginal supply cost significantly in Slovakia,
Croatia, Austria and Germany.
Disruptions to consumers can be observed in Romania due to a lack of pipeline ca-
pacity from Hungary to Romania and South Stream bypassing Romania,25 although
large volumes are transported to neighboring Bulgaria. But the disruptions in Romania
are reduced from 15 to 10 percent of peak day demand in comparison to the Baseline
Scenario. Referring to the mitigating effects these extra volumes have on the marginal
25Gazprom and Romania have started negotiations on Romania joining the South Stream pipeline
network. A feasibility study will be worked out, but it is not yet clear whether this could result in a
different route that excludes Bulgaria. (Euractiv.com, 2010)
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supply costs and on disruptions to consumers, South Stream’s large-scale capacity has
a significant impact on security of supply in terms of transit country risks. So it signifi-
cantly reduces the dependence on Ukraine. However, based on cost-minimization, even
in a peak day scenario South Stream is poorly utilized if other transport options from
Russia are available.
By contrast, gas volumes transported via Nabucco do not have a crowding-out effect
on Ukraine transits in a no-crisis simulation, so the missing Ukraine volumes are much
greater during a crisis simulation. These missing volumes are mainly compensated for
by withdrawals from storage in eastern Europe, Germany, Italy and other European
countries. Germany, which has the largest storage working gas volumes in Europe, with
more than 25 bcm, provides additional volumes during the crisis to be transported east.
Nabucco provides additional volumes for Italy and Austria, which in addition receive
some volumes from northern Italian storages during the crisis. In comparison to the
Baseline Scenario more German storage volumes can therefore be sent to northeastern
Europe. In the Nabucco Scenario, in the simulated crisis on a peak day, 10 mcm less
volume than in the no-crisis simulation is rerouted from Russia, that is, transported on
a route other than the Ukraine route (Blue Stream in this case). The simulated Ukraine
crisis causes a bottleneck in the interconnector from Turkey to Bulgaria, which results in
this decrease in Blue Stream flows. Again subtracting these negative volumes from the
positive bar for the Nabucco Scenario mirrors the missing Ukraine volumes (see Figure
2.4).
During the halt of Ukrainian transits, Nabucco gas supplies to Bulgaria and Turkey
remain the same as in the no-crisis simulation, and additional volumes are transported to
Hungary and Austria (see Figure 2.3 on page 38). These additional volumes are mainly
injected in Romania, as Nabucco is already completely utilized from the start of the
pipeline in a simulation without a crisis. Since some volumes are consumed in Bulgaria,
capacity is then available in Romania. The gas volumes injected into the pipeline are
withdrawn from storage in Romania, mainly to reduce disruptions in Hungary and to
mitigate increases in marginal supply costs in Austria. Introducing the Nabucco pipeline
does not reduce the peak day disruptions that result in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina26.
However, during the simulated Ukraine crisis, disruptions in Bulgaria, Romania and
parts of Greece are avoided such that only increases in marginal supply costs occur,
rather than consumer cut-offs. In addition, disruptions in FYROM are reduced from a
100 percent in the Baseline Scenario during the Ukraine crisis to the peak day disruption
level of 27 percent. However, the improvement of market integration with Nabucco leads
to minor increases in marginal supply costs in Austria, Czech Republic, Poland and
26The Bosnian natural gas company BH-Gas has already shown interest in extending its gas supplies
through connections to major pipeline projects. It has asked Turkey’s Bota to help it connect to the
planned Nabucco and TAP pipelines in an effort to diversify its gas supplies (Balkans.com Business
News (2010)).
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Northern Germany over the marginal supply costs in the Baseline Scenario. Again, it is
cost-efficient, within this modeling framework, to accept these slight increases in order
to prevent disruptions to customers in other regions.27
Additional consumer cut-offs caused by the Ukraine crisis on the peak day are re-
duced by both South Stream and Nabucco. In the Baseline Scenario about 54 mcm
are additionally cut off during the crisis, but only about 13 mcm are additionally cut
off with Nabucco included, and South Stream’s extensive capacity further reduces the
disruptions to about 9 mcm. (See Figure 2.4. These numbers reflect the differences
between the crisis and no-crisis scenarios in Table 2.4.)
2.6 Conclusion
The Nabucco and South Stream Pipelines are often discussed in the context of security
of European gas supply. The results of the simulations with the TIGER model show that
security of supply in Eastern Europe increases with the inclusion of either Nabucco or
South Stream based on assumptions covering currently publicly announced infrastruc-
ture plans. Nabucco reduces marginal supply costs in many Eastern European countries
and South Stream prevents disruptions to consumers in Serbia that occur in the Baseline
Scenario. However, consumer cut-offs in some Balkan countries cannot be avoided by
either Nabucco or South Stream because these cut-offs occur as a result of insufficient
interconnector capacity. These results are conditional on the specific assumptions.28
Additional not yet announced interconnector capacity expansions that may occur dur-
ing the interim would mitigate or even prevent these consumer-cut-offs. The same holds
for a lower demand scenario whereas significantly higher demand could even worsen the
disruptions.
Without either Nabucco or South Stream, the European market is strongly depen-
dent on transits and on a functioning pipeline system in Ukraine. Not even flexible
LNG imports can reduce this dependence because of the bottlenecks that occur in the
European pipeline system during a halt of Ukraine transits.
Generally, the inclusion of Nabucco and South Stream in model simulations of a
Ukraine crisis both increases security of supply and leads to a reduction of disruptions
to consumers and to lesser price increases. The impact of these improvements varies sig-
nificantly over different European regions and is most effective in southeastern Europe.
Nabucco prevents disruptions in Bulgaria and Romania and South Stream in Hungary,
Serbia and Bulgaria. However, not all disruptions within the European market can
27These effects reflect a higher willingness to pay in regions confronted with supply shortages.
28Bottlenecks identified in the paper that might lead to disruptions refer to congestion which occurs in
an efficiently working market. Potential additional bottlenecks as a consequence of market inefficiencies
are not detected by the modeling approach.
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be avoided by these pipeline projects because of intra-European bottlenecks. Persis-
tent disruptions remain in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Former Yugoslavian Republic of
Macedonia. These results are based on assumptions on significant demand increases in
this region and publicly announced plans on infrastructure developments. A connection
of South Stream to Romania or (reverse flow) capacity from Hungary to Romania could
mitigate disruptions to consumers there. The same holds for a connection of Nabucco to
the Serbian market or a better integration of the Hungarian and Serbian market. More-
over, because of the significantly lower capacity of Nabucco, additional LNG volumes
imported into Croatia would be needed to eliminate disruptions in Hungary and Serbia,
but these volumes could be transported only if bottlenecks in Croatia were removed.
The effects of the pipeline projects in Western Europe are small.
Based on cost-minimization, the model results show that South Stream, which is
poorly utilized even on a peak winter day in a no-crisis simulation, supplies primarily
Bulgaria. However, South Stream offers redundant capacity in a crisis simulation to
reroute Ukraine transits during the simulated halt of supplies via Ukraine. In the crisis
simulation, South Stream is highly utilized, so it would be built primarily to bypass
Ukraine. Both pipeline projects enable a diversification of supply routes especially with
respect to the main routes via Ukraine and, if implemented, should contribute to securing
gas supplies. However, only Nabucco would reduce the dependency on Russian gas,
assuming adequate alternative suppliers in the Middle East and Caspian region were
available to provide gas for the pipeline, and would support a diversification of supply
sources.
In summary, Nabucco and South Stream provide additional large-scale pipeline ca-
pacity in southeastern Europe, but they also increase security of supply by extending
supply options and mitigating the effects of potential supply disruptions via Ukraine in
this region. However, the attribution of relevant costs, apart from relative changes in
short-term marginal supply costs, and the probability of events that have high impact
on security of supply are not evaluated.
The determination of the optimal security of supply level by comparing marginal
costs of investments into the Nabucco and South Stream pipeline with marginal ben-
efits of additional security of supply provided remains open for further research. For
measuring these benefits a detailed investigation on country-specific demand profiles
and elasticities is needed, especially because of the uncertain demand developments in
the EU within the next decades. Moreover, an efficiency analysis of a potential invest-
ment in the Nabucco and South Stream pipeline projects would complement a long-term
economic analysis of security of supply.
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Civil unrest in North Africa – Risks for natural
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In this paper, we analyze the impacts of civil unrests in North Africa on European
security of natural gas supplies. Applying the natural gas infrastructure model TIGER,
we investigate the impact of supply disruptions from Algeria and Libya for a summer and
winter period. Our analysis shows that disruptions in the low-demand summer months
could be compensated for by LNG imports. An investigation of a similar situation at the
beginning of the winter shows that disruptions to Italian consumers would be unavoidable.
The analysis thereby highlights the importance of taking the political stability of supply
countries into account when assessing the security of European gas imports.
3.1 Introduction
The political uprising in Libya at the beginning of 2011 has severely affected the country’s
pipeline exports to Europe. The Greenstream pipeline from Libya, which supplies around
nine billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas to Italy each year, stopped operations on
22 February 2011 and deprived the Italian gas market of significant volumes for eight
months.
This article analyses the current and potential effects on the European gas market
of supply disruptions in North Africa. In general, the European Union imports 10
bcm annually from Libya and another 54 bcm from Algeria which together amount
to about 13 percent of EU gas consumption and 28 percent of non-European imports
(or, taking into account Norway, 20 percent of non-EU imports). (All figures are for
2010 and based on BP (2011).) However, Europe’s dependence on North Africa differs
significantly between countries and is higher for Southern European countries. The only
pipeline from Libya to Europe, Greenstream, supplies about 10 percent of Italian gas
29The paper is a joint work of Stefan Lochner and the author and is published in Lochner and
Dieckho¨ner (2012).
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consumption. Another 25 percent of Italian gas demand are provided via the Trans-
Mediterranean pipeline (Transmed) from Algeria. The Maghreb-Europe pipeline as a
link from Algeria via Morocco to Spain delivers about 20 percent of Spanish gas demand;
a new line directly from Algeria to Southern Spain, the Medgaz pipeline which started
operating in 2011, can supply an additional 8 bcm per year (see the gas flow map in
Figure 3.4 for the different supply routes to Southern Europe).30 In addition to these
pipeline supplies, North Africa is also a relevant supplier of liquefied natural gas (LNG)
to the global market. Algeria exported about 20 bcm in 2010, most of which arrived in
the EU (BP, 2011).31 Therefore, North African countries are important suppliers for the
European natural gas market. The current civil unrests in this region and a potential
spread to Algeria might have a significant impact on the security of natural gas supplies.
This article offers a in-depth analysis of short-term security of supply threats arising
from the current instability in North Africa. In the next section, it is discussed how
the prolonged disruption of natural gas supplies from Libya suggests a different threat
to European security of natural gas supplies than the ones observed in Eastern Europe
in the past. It not only concerns a different route and region but it is also due to a
different cause: domestic political uprisings leading to civil-war-like unrest and, in the
case of Libya, outside military intervention and war. Security of supply is discussed
in the context of the existing literature. To document the events in Libya in 2011,
Section 3.3 describes the reaction of the gas market and how consequences to consumers
were avoided. Extending our perspective to the more important North African supply
country to Europe, Algeria, we apply a European infrastructure and dispatch model
(presented in Section 3.4) to simulate crisis scenarios for supply disruptions from North
Africa. Results focusing on necessary gas flow diversions and potential consequences to
consumers in Europe are presented in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 offers some concluding
remarks and policy implications.
3.2 Security of European natural gas supply and political
stability of supplier countries
Previous research on security of natural gas supply can be categorized into issues of
technical infrastructure facility maintenance on the one hand and a more economic
perspective regarding the provision of the commodity natural gas on the other hand.
30With the first line of Nord Stream providing an additional capacity of 27.5 billion cubic meters
annually from Russia to Germany since 2011 and with a second line of that volume that should be in
operation in 2012, another major supply option is available especially to Northwestern Europe.
31Libya is only a minor LNG exporter (less than 0.5 bcm in 2010). The other North African LNG
exporter, Egypt, exported close to 10 bcm in 2010: 50 percent to Europe, the rest to North America
and the Asia-Pacific market.
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Literature on the latter thereby distinguishes between different causes of potential in-
securities. Because of its decreasing indigenous production, the European natural gas
market is increasingly dependent on supplies from non-European countries with differ-
ent political systems. Therefore, types of security of European natural gas supplies in
economic terms are firstly, the very long-term view of the range of reserves and resources
(Costantini et al., 2007), the mid-term availability of suppliers to the European market
(Holz et al., 2009), their bargaining power and aspects of global geopolitical security of
supply (Victor, 2010) and last the analysis of short-term disruptions due to political dis-
putes such as between Russia and transit countries like Ukraine (Bettzu¨ge and Lochner,
2009, Dieckho¨ner, 2012b, EWI, 2010a, Lochner, 2011b, Monforti and Szikszai, 2010).
Although the long-term uncertainty arising from political instability is also an issue, the
immediate consequences of the situation in North Africa fall into the short-term supply
security category.
However, they have a different cause compared to previous events. The economic
disputes seen in the past were in general resolved after a couple of weeks. Suppliers
like Russian state-owned Gazprom, or the transit countries, have a strong incentive
not to harm the relationship with its main consumption region, i.e. the European
Union. This does not hold for political conflicts such as those that started this year
in North African countries where severe civil unrests and fundamental political regime
changes take place: The relationships with natural gas consumers in foreign countries
may not be of importance to the different stakeholders in a politically motivated civil
war. Nevertheless, the consumer countries might be significantly affected by this supply
risk.
This type of risk has rarely been discussed in the academic literature in the past as
most of the literature focuses on security of supply in general or the risks associated
with transits of Russian gas.
There are some contributions that address North Africa in the terms of security of
natural gas supplies. Algeria’ role as a major supplier is, for instance, analyzed within
different frameworks. Egging et al. (2008) develop a mixed-complementarity model for
the European natural gas market where Algeria is a major supplier. Darbouche (2011)
discusses Algerian export strategies in the medium term with a focus on how reliable
production targets are – and comes to the conclusion that these may have to be revised
downwards until 2015. Lise et al. (2008) analyze long term gas supply security in Europe
with their market equilibrium model GASTALE. Within their study, they analyze the
impact of a disruption of supplies from Algeria for 2020 on demand and prices. They
find that only Southern European countries are significantly affected, i.e. Italy and
Spain. These countries have to rely on LNG in this case, which results in significant
price increases. The results of the large-scale study by EWI (2010a) are similar for
2019. However, the study focuses on a four week disruption which is only found to be
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critical for Spain if sufficient substituting LNG volumes cannot be procured in the short
term. With respect to the crisis in Libya in 2011, Lochner and Dieckho¨ner (2011) offer a
qualitative discussion of the lessons for EU security of supply legislation and show that
a Libya-only disruption is not critical for security of supply.
Weisser (2007) and Stern (2002) define security of supply dependence and provide a
differentiation of the type of dependence for natural gas. These definitions cover source,
transit and facility dependence and structural risks of natural gas supplies. According to
Weisser (2007) and Stern (2002) risks to these dependences could be triggered by drivers
such as natural catastrophes, political conflicts, terrorism, wars and civil unrests. Thus,
the stability of the mainly non-Western countries, where most of Europe’s natural gas
imports come from, could have an impact on security of natural gas supplies.
According to the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) for Political Stability and
Voice and Accountability32 published by the The World Bank Group (2010), the two
major supplier countries to the European market, Russia and Algeria, exhibit negative
values in a range from -2 to -1 whereas European countries have mainly positive indicator
values even for Romania, which is the country with the lowest value (see Figure 3.1).
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Figure 3.1: Worldwide Governance Indicators
The very low value of the ‘Voice and Accountability Index’ for Libya in 2009 gives an
indication to the limited rights of Libya’s citizens at that time and reflects the risk
32The indicators are computed including several hundred individual variables from different analyses
and surveys of a variety of public and private institutions as well as NGOs. The indicators listed in
Figure 3.1 reflect ”The process by which governments are selected, monitored, and replaced: 1. Voice
and Accountability (VA) – capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and
a free media. 2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (PV) – capturing perceptions
of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent
means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism” (Kaufmann et al., 2010). The higher the
index value of a country, the more pronounced is the respective characteristic.
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for civil uprisings. These eventually started at the beginning of February and severely
impacted the country’s pipeline exports to Europe. However, two more things need
to be noted. First, a strong dictatorship suppressing its citizens and not being held
accountable for its actions can still be politically stable - as Libya has been for more
than 40 years. Therefore, drawing conclusions from any such index needs to be treated
with caution. Second, measuring political stability is equally difficult, even more so as
political stability can be interpreted differently in different countries. As also illustrated
in Figure 3.1, the WGI indicators present Libya to be more politically stable than Algeria
- and more surprisingly, also more stable than EU member states Romania and Spain.
Turning back to natural gas supplies, however, it can be concluded that two of
the main suppliers (Russia and Algeria) are not highly rated with respect to political
stability and voice and accountability – the latter also holds true for Libya. Hence, there
appear to be significant short-term security of supply risks from political conflicts.
Because of political uprisings in Libya, the Greenstream pipeline was not in operation
between February 22 and October 13, 2011. The disruption deprived the Italian gas
market of large volumes. While the consequences to Europe were limited (Lochner and
Dieckho¨ner, 2011), a spread of the uprisings in North Africa to other countries could
worsen the situation for Europe. Therefore, even if the part of North African supplies
delivered as liquefied natural gas may be substituted by LNG from other sources in the
currently well supplied global gas market, these type of disruptions could be a severe
risk to natural gas supplies.
Within the security of natural gas supply regulation of the European Union (2010),
clear preventive measures for enhancing security of supply are defined. One of the most
prominent pillars of the regulation is that the infrastructure of each European country
must be able to compensate a disruption of the most important infrastructure component
for 30 days in times of a demand level of a 1 out of 20 winter. These conditions are
mainly deduced from the transit country risk discussion after the repeated gas dispute
between Russia and Ukraine in January 2009. So far, no significant disruption occurred
due to prolonged political conflicts. But depending on the importance of the involved
countries for European natural gas supplies and the duration of the conflict, this might
have severe affects on natural gas consumers in Europe.
As the role of and the potential short-term insecurity arising from the dependence
on Russia have been discussed in the literature, especially in the context of transit
disruption, this article focuses on the different type of risk associated with natural gas
supplies from North Africa. The impact of disruptions caused by the recent turmoils in
Libya and by hypothetically similar events in Algeria on security of European natural
gas supplies are thus analyzed in the next sections.
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3.3 Libyan gas export disruption in 2011
Following the fall of the regime in Tunisia and the departure of Egyptian president
Mubarak in January and early February 2011, the unrest in the Arab world spread to
Libya. The military started violent crackdowns on mostly peaceful protests on February
15. More demonstrations in the following days were met by increased violence; armed
protesters also started to attack government buildings in a number of cities across the
country. The situation quickly escalated into a civil war-like confrontation between
reform-oriented protesters and the Gaddafi regime and its supporters. As a consequence,
international corporations in the country’s oil and gas exploration sector started to wind
down operations and withdraw their international staff from the country.33
On February 22, Libyan pipeline gas exports to Italy came to a halt. Nevertheless,
the consequences for the Italian gas market were limited. There were no disruptions
to consumers; even price spikes at the Italian natural gas trading points did not occur.
The high flexibility of European natural gas transmission system - and the end of the
winter implying declining demand - meant that natural gas supply shortfalls from Italy
were rather easily compensated by additional volumes from other sources as illustrated
in Figure 3.2.
The 25 million cubic meter (mcm) per day usually imported via the Greenstream
pipeline from Libya, were mainly compensated by a simultaneous increase in imports via
the TAG pipeline from Austria. This pipeline mainly carries Russian gas via Ukraine,
Slovenia and Austria to Italy. Although it was not possible for Russia to instantaneously
increase exports to Italy - it takes about two weeks for Russian gas volumes to be
transported all the way to Italy - the country made up most of the shortfalls over the
following months. In the short term, Algerian gas exports remained at a relatively high
level and additional natural gas was withdrawn from storages in Italy (and possibly
also Austria explaining the speedy increase of deliveries on the TAG route). All other
volumes supplied to the Italian market (domestic gas production, LNG imports, imports
via Switzerland) remained at the normal level. It is also evident from Figure 3.2 that
the availability of natural gas was sufficient to even start the refilling of storages for the
following winter (negative storage withdrawals in Figure 3.2) by April 2011.
Table 3.1 further illustrates how volumes were compensated over the whole seven
months until the start of the next winter (October 1) compared to the previous year.
(Supplies slowly resumed on October 13th, 2011.) Almost 80 percent of the missing
imports from Libya were compensated by additional Russian gas volumes. As demand
was actually 1.7 billion cubic meter (bcm) lower, storage injections between March and
September 2011 were higher than in the previous year. This also partially compensated
33For a detailed discussion of the events in Libya in spring 2011, see for instance Institute for Security
Studies (2011).
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the higher storage withdrawals in the first weeks of the disruption in February. Again,
all other volumes into the market were basically at the level of the 2010 summer.
Table 3.1: Italian gas balance from March to September
Import pipeline / 2010 2011 Difference / Change
country [bcm] [bcm] [bcm] [mcm/day] [%]
Transmed (Algeria) 13.64 12.40 -1.23 -5.8 -9%
Greenstream (Libya) 5.06 0.00 -5.06 -23.6 -100%
Transitgas (Switzerland*) 5.48 7.05 +1.57 +7.4 +29%
TAG (Austria**) 9.95 13.93 +3.98 +18.6 +40%
Gorizia (border Slovenia) 0.07 0.07 -0.00 -0.0 -2%
LNG imports 5.22 5.21 -0.01 -0.1 -0%
Italian Production 4.84 4.77 -0.06 -0.3 -1%
Storage Balance*** -6.53 -7.37 -0.84 -3.9 +13%
Total 37.73 36.07 -1.66 -7.7 -4%
Source: Own calculations based on SnamReteGas.
*Import route for Norwegian and Dutch gas volumes.
**Import route for Russian gas volumes.
***Negative: injection into storage.
However, these findings do not allow the conclusion that the European gas market
in general and the Italian market specifically are not vulnerable with respect to North
African and Libyan gas supply disruptions. Firstly, the disruptions occurred at the end
of the winter. Supplies recommenced before the next winter. As evident from Figure 3.2,
significant storage withdrawals of between 80 and 125 mcm per day were required during
the first days of the disruption to compensate the shortfall. Normally, withdrawals of
such volumes only happen on individual cold days in January or early February. If
a disruption were to happen earlier in winter, storages might deplete quickly causing
shortages at the end of the winter. The majority of the disruption in this case affected
the low demand summer months. Secondly, the conflict in Libya affected a relevant but
not the most important North African gas exporter to Europe. Algerian gas volumes
have a much higher market share in the Italian and Spanish gas market. A disruption
of exports could potentially cause more concerns for consumers.
Therefore, the model based analysis at the focus of this paper aims to identify crit-
ical situations for the European gas market which could arise from unstable situations
in North Africa. This mainly concerns the export of gas by pipeline. LNG volumes
in general can be compensated easier as in a sufficiently flexible global LNG market,
additional cargoes would be diverted to Europe if European wholesale prices were to
rise as a consequence of a crisis in North Africa. Hence, the focus of the analysis is on
Libyan and Algerian pipeline exports. The model applied to do so is presented in the
following section.
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3.4 Model-based analysis of potential future disruptions
Methodologically, we apply a natural gas infrastructure and dispatch model of the Eu-
ropean gas market presented in Lochner and Bothe (2007) and Lochner (2011a). It is a
linear optimization model minimizing the total cost of gas supply in the European gas
market taking into account the relevant technical constraints of the infrastructure and
assuming an efficient utilization of infrastructure assets. The integrated consideration
of the gas infrastructure components, i.e. pipelines, storages and terminals, allows eval-
uations of interdependencies and of the effects of single events on the system as a whole.
Thus, the model is well suited for comprehensive analyses of the supply situation and
gas flows within the European long distance transmission grid - and has been used in
academic and applied research in this capacity.
The model’s cost-minimization approach is based on the assumptions of a perfectly
competitive and efficient organization (regulation) of the gas transportation market. It
does not account for institutions, agents or contractual relations. Hence, it offers a
benchmark of a first-best utilization of the infrastructure. A mathematical description
of the model is provided in the Appendix A. On the input side, the model is fed with
assumptions on supply, demand and the infrastructure in place (with a high level of
spatial detail, see Figure 3.3). Supply is injected into the pipeline grid at the respec-
tive system entry points (or via LNG vessels at the terminals), the network is used to
distribute the gas spatially – with storage as an intertemporal connection allowing gas
from one period to the other.
Demand assumptions are assigned to the respective nodes (natural gas sinks) were
the commodity has to be transported to. Outputs include the utilization of all considered
infrastructure assets in each time period, gas flows in the system and locational marginal
supply costs. In modeling terms, these marginal supply costs are the dual variable on
the energy balance constraint. They indicate how much it costs to supply an additional
unit of gas to the respective node and can, hence, be interpreted as an indicator for the
price in a competitive market (see Section 3.5.3). The model is a stochastic one (see
Appendix A) which, in simultaneously computed scenarios, accounts for uncertainty
with respect to temperatures (which influence household gas demand for space heating)
and the reliability of supply (supply disruption from North Africa or not). Presented
results in the following section refer to the median temperature case.34
Numerical assumptions refer to a simulation of the year 2011. The demand projection
is based on Capros et al. (2010); the availability of supply volumes on EWI (2010a). The
infrastructure available is the one in place in 2011 according to the database by GIE
(2010). On the demand side, we do not include an elasticity of demand to enable
34The stochastic modeling reflects a number of scenarios. Interpreting the distribution of results is
not relevant for the context of this paper. We therefore evaluate the median demand scenario which can
be interpreted as the expected value given the temperature uncertainty.
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Figure 3.3: Modeled infrastructure elements in Europe
the identification of all supply short-falls. From a modeling perspective, we include a
threshold price of 55 EUR/MBtu at which demand is reduced (based on the value of lost
load according to UKERC, 2009). Hence, the model always aims to supply consumers
with natural gas up to this (prohibitively high) marginal cost of gas provision. If that is
not possible, demand is curtailed and the price indicator in the model simulations jumps
to around 55 EUR/MBtu (which equals around 180 EUR/MWh).
We investigate nine scenarios which differ with respect to the affected country and the
duration of the disruption. Regarding the supplier countries, pipeline export disruptions
from Libya, from Algeria or from both countries are varied. The duration and timing of
the crisis is modified for 8 months in summer (March to October as in Libya in 2011),
for 8 months in winter (September to April) and for one whole year. The specification
of these scenarios is listed in Table 3.2; additionally a Reference scenario (Sc.0) without
any pipeline supply disruption is modeled as a benchmark for comparisons.
As mentioned in Section 3.3, we do not explicitly consider the effects of the dis-
ruptions to the global LNG market. These might arise as production stops in North
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Table 3.2: Scenarios
Affected time / country Libya Algeria Libya & Algeria
March to October Sc.1a Libya summer Sc.2a Algeria summer Sc.3a Maghreb summer
September to April Sc.1b Libya winter Sc.2b Algeria winter Sc.3b Maghreb winter
one year starting in March Sc.1c Libya 1year Sc.2c Algeria 1year Sc.3c Maghreb 1year
Sc.0: Reference scenario without any disruption.
Africa would also affect the region’s LNG exports (from Algeria and Egypt). However,
in today’s large and liquid LNG market, we presume such volumes could be substituted
by LNG imports from other countries such as Qatar, Nigeria and Trinidad and Tobago.
While there might be a few concerns in very short-term (the time it takes to organize
diversions and physically get them to Europe), this cannot expected to be the case in
the long term: Algeria makes up only 6.4 percent of the global LNG market of 298 bcm
in 2010 (BP, 2011).
3.5 Results
The aforementioned scenarios are simulated with the model and analyzed with respect to
the impact of the supply disruptions. Thereby, we focus on consequences to consumers
in term of wholesale price effects and supply cut-offs. In addition, the gas market’s
reaction, i.e. how volumes are replaced, is evaluated.
3.5.1 Diversion of gas flows
In a competitive gas market, price signals indicate supply shortfalls. If the disruption of
imports causes a deficit of natural gas in one region, the wholesale price in that region
would increase and attract additional gas shipments from other regions.
Such gas market reactions could, for instance, be observed when Ukraine transits
from Russia were interrupted in 2009 (Lochner, 2011b) or during the Libyan civil war
and export disruption in the summer of 2011 (see Section 3.3). If the Libyan supply
disruption would extend into high-demand winter, such gas flow diversions would need
to intensify; the same holds true if the larger supplier Algeria were affected. The average
daily flow diversions for the Algerian summer and winter disruptions (Scenarios 2a and
2b) and a Libyan disruption into winter (Sc. 1c) are displayed in Table 3.3.
Three findings become obvious concerning security of natural gas supplies to Italy in
these scenarios. First, the compensation of an Algerian gas supply shortfall in summer
(Sc.2a) is compensated similar to the Libyan shortfall of 2011: The majority of addi-
tional volumes comes via the TAG pipeline from Austria. As more natural gas from
Algeria needs to be replaced (as was the case from Libya), additional volumes come via
Switzerland and further LNG cargoes are landed in Italy. Second, this rise of imports
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Table 3.3: Compensation of shortfalls of Algerian or Libyan supplies to Italy
Source of gas Sc.1b Libya winter Sc.2a Algeria summer Sc.2b Algeria winter
TAG (Austria) +1.4 (+1%) +33.7 (+56%) +1.5 (+1%)
Transitgas (Switzerland) +13.2 (+269%) +19.9 (+302%) +39.9 (+813%)
Gorizia (border Slovenia) +0.1 (+16%) +0.9 +3.1 (+358%)
Transmed (Algeria) +0.7 (+1%) -81.4 (-100%) -89.7 (-100%)
Greenstream (Libya) -16.3 (-100%) +6.8 (+45%) +5.7 (+35%)
LNG imports +0.8 (+3%) +16.3 (+115%) +2.0 (+7%)
Storage Balance 0.0 -4.1 (-11%) -23.9 (-35%)
Italian Production 0.0 0.0 0.0
Demand Curtailment 0.0 0.0 +14.3
Difference to Sc.0 Reference in million cubic meter (mcm)/day.
Please note that no percentage values are provided, when values are zero in Sc.0 Reference.
of Russian gas via the Transgas-TAG route via Slovakia and Austria in summer in Sce-
nario 2a, which helped to reduce the deficit of the Libyan supply disruption in 2011
(see Section 3.3), may not be possible in winter (Sc.1b and Sc.2b). Export and transit
pipelines for Russian gas are higher utilized in winter for supplies to other European
countries. The Transgas(-TAG) route also supplies the Czech Republic, Austria, South-
ern Germany and France. Hence, there is not sufficient capacity for increasing flows to
Italy. Instead, other gas sources and routes need to be tapped in order to supply Italy
in winter. Third, this effect is largely compensated by increases in the flows via Switzer-
land to Italy. This route (from Germany) via Switzerland, thereby, usually transports
Norwegian and Dutch gas to Italy. As in the case of Russian import pipelines, natural
gas production facilities in these countries are usually highly utilized in winter making
output increases difficult. However, additional volumes can be brought into the Swiss
and German markets for supply to Italy. These include LNG imported in the Nether-
lands, France or the UK. As of the winter 2011/2012, the Nord Stream pipeline as a
new route also enables the delivery of Russian gas directly to Germany. Although these
volumes are unlikely to be transported all the way through Germany and Switzerland
to Italy, they improve the supply situation in Germany and free up additional volumes
of Norwegian and Dutch gas for transport to Italy. Thus, in high-demand winter, only
limited additional volumes can be brought into Italy via Austria in case of a supply
disruption from North Africa. The route via Switzerland offers some free capacities,
LNG imports in Northwestern Europe and Russian gas deliveries via Nord Stream into
Germany can increase the availability of alternative supplies. Nevertheless, not all con-
sumers in Italy can be supplied at all times and some demand curtailments is necessary
if Algerian exports cease for a prolonged time period in winter (see also Section 3.5.2).
For the other country receiving pipeline gas from North Africa, Spain, demand cur-
tailment is not necessary at any point due to the sufficient LNG import capacities,
provided that LNG cargoes can be contracted (see Table 3.4). We assume that the
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global LNG market is sufficiently well supplied in order to provide additional LNG car-
goes. In the Libya supply disruption (Sc.1a-1c), effects to the country are limited: Some
additional LNG is imported and transported to France (especially in winter). These
volumes compensate France for the aforementioned diversions of Russian gas to Italy
in this case. However, this effect is very small. When Algerian pipeline exports are
disrupted, either in summer, in winter or for one year, the missing volumes of about 56
mcm per day35 are entirely compensated by additional LNG imports. This is possible
as the country has sufficient LNG import capacities. In fact, as the Algeria disruption
implies shortages of pipeline gas in Western and Central Europe, Spanish exports to
France actually rise, especially in winter. As in Scenarios 1a-c, LNG import capacities
in Spain can contribute to supplying additional gas volumes to other countries in the
North, i.e. France. Significant volumes are then also diverted from France towards Italy
(see previous paragraph).
Table 3.4: Trade balance Iberian Peninsula across scenarios
Scenario Imports from Exports
[all values in mcm/day] Algeria LNG to France
Sc.0 Reference 56.2 65.1 7.0
Difference to Reference:
Sc.1a Libya summer +0.1 -0.1 0.0
Sc.1b Libya winter +0.7 0.0 +0.7
Sc.1c Libya 1year +0.7 -0.2 +0.5
Sc.2a Algeria summer -56.9 +59.0 +2.2
Sc.2b Algeria winter -55.6 +55.8 +0.2
Sc.2c Algeria 1year -56.2 +58.6 +2.6
Sc.3a Maghreb summer -56.9 +63.5 +6.7
Sc.3b Maghreb winter -55.6 +55.8 +0.2
Sc.3c Maghreb 1year -56.2 +61.6 +5.5
This effect further increases if pipeline exports from the whole Maghreb region come to a
stop. Then, LNG imports increase by up to 63 mcm/day for further exports via France
to the other regions affected by shortages from Maghrebian supply. Demand curtailment
in Spain is not necessary at any point because of sufficient LNG import capacities.
Figure 3.436 displays the diversion of gas flows for this extreme scenario (Sc.3c) of no
pipeline exports from the Maghreb region in a whole year. Generally, the illustration in
Figure 3.4 confirms the previous observations in the different scenarios, which are more
pronounced when total exports from the region stop for one year: The total net-export
from Spain to France increases by 2.2 bcm. In Italy, 12 and 16 bcm are additionally im-
ported via Austria/Slovenia and Switzerland respectively. The additional LNG imports
35Please note that the year 2011/2012 is the basis of our simulation, i.e. the Reference parameterization
includes the new Medgaz pipeline from Algeria to Southern Spain.
36The pipelines with increasing and decreasing gas flows of more than 1 bcm/year are visualized in
different colors and LNG terminals are colored where imports rise. Pipelines with only small changes in
gas flows are in a transparent color.
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in Italy can only amount to 2.9 bcm due to capacity restrictions. The gas delivered via
Austria is largely Russian gas. The volumes that are supplied via Switzerland are addi-
tional LNG volumes imported in the Netherlands, France and the UK. Other changes in
flows allow these volumes to get to Italy: Interconnector flows from the UK via Belgium
to Germany increase while flows in the other direction (Norwegian and Dutch gas to
the UK) decrease. Hence, more gas is available in Germany for transports south. In
addition, gas from French LNG import terminals is transported to Switzerland.
	
	
			
	
		
			
		
Greenstream
Transmed
MedgazMaghreb-
Europe
Figure 3.4: Gas flow changes Maghreb 1 year disruption vs. Reference Scenario
As the results on gas flows in this subsection have shown, the events in Southern Europe
have pronounced impacts on gas flows over most of Central and Western Europe. The ap-
plied model helps to understand these interdependencies and can contribute to improving
concepts dealing with the mitigation of consequences from supply crisis. Nevertheless,
as the discussion in the next section shows, severe supply disruptions, for instance from
Algeria, can not be resolved with gas flow diversions alone. In this case, consequences
to gas consumers are unavoidable.
3.5.2 Demand curtailment
The most severe consequence to consumers arises from demand curtailment if price
inelastic demand exceeds supply. The model was programmed to first reduce industrial
gas consumption, so it would do so in Switzerland before, for instance, reducing supply
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to Italian households. Table 3.5 shows how much consumption cannot be met by supply
in the disruption scenarios. The scenarios which reflect a disruption of supplies from
Libya only (Sc.1a-c) are not listed in Table 3.5 as no demand curtailments take place.
This reflects the observations from reality. Supply to consumers was secure at all times
in summer (Section 3.3) and the observable but moderate price reactions for the winter
futures did not indicate that the situation may become very problematic when demand
is higher37.
Table 3.5: Demand curtailment in disruption scenarios
Country Demand Sc.2b Sc.2c Sc.3b Sc.3c
[values in mcm] in 2011 Algeria winter Algeria 1year Maghreb winter Maghreb 1year
Italy 80,424 726 1,236 3,900 4,978
Switzerland 3,420 78 118 527 744
Spain 37,045 0 0 0 0
Slovenia 1,096 16 19 91 115
Croatia 3,471 52 60 337 410
The situation is different in the case of an Algerian disruption. While such a scenario
could be compensated in summer months - as discussed in the previous section, there are
sufficient excess capacities on the Russian import route and demand is lower in summer -
this is not possible in winter. As shown in Table 3.3, spare capacity on the TAG route via
Austria only allows minimal supply increases. Similarly, LNG import terminals operate
close to the capacity restriction according to our simulation enabling supply increases
of only about 7 percent. The additional volumes procured in Northwestern Europe
may then not be sufficient in winter. In the simulation with temperature-dependent,
stochastic demand, the expected demand curtailment necessary in Italy is then 726
mcm (Sc.2b) over the whole winter (November to February). However, not only Italy
is affected. The market is very well integrated with the Swiss natural gas market, so
price spikes in Italy due to demand-supply gaps result in price spikes in Switzerland as
a result of the efficient market hypothesis. Hence, demand curtailment might also take
place there. The same holds true for Slovenia and Croatia, which are well integrated
with Italy physically and which receive the same supplies via the TAG route (which
might be delivered to Italy in the crisis). Total expected demand curtailment outside
Italy amounts to another 146 mcm over the whole winter in Scenario 2b. This value
even rises to almost 200 mcm if Algerian supplies stop for a whole year (Sc.2c).
In the event of a Maghrebian crisis affecting both Algerian and Libya, demand cur-
tailment cannot be avoided, even if the winter turns out to be a rather warm one.
37Future prices for the 2011/2012 winter in Italy were 21 percent higher than the average of the NBP,
TTF, Zeebrugge prices as it was unclear at the time whether supplies would have resumed by then (ICIS
Heren European Gas Markets EGM 18.14 28 July 2011, page 13). In the previous winter (2010/2011),
there was no persistent difference between prices at the different European hubs.
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Expected demand curtailment in Italy is 3.9 bcm if the crisis only affects the winter. If
it lasted through summer, so that storage facilities cannot be properly filled before the
winter, the expected value for Italy is 1 bcm higher. In all affected countries, expected
demand curtailment exceeds 6 bcm according to the model simulations.
Table 3.5, however, also shows the aforementioned comfortable situation of Spain.
Sufficient redundant capacities for LNG deliveries ensure that demand cut-offs are not
necessary, even in a prolonged crisis in the Maghreb region. However, consequences to
consumers do not need to be limited to demand curtailment. Another effect potentially
affecting all of Europe are price spikes.
3.5.3 Price effects
In our model, we measure price increases as the change in marginal supply costs. In a
competitive market, marginal costs are identical to prices. Nevertheless, as the full price-
demand curve is unknown (and we use inelastic demand), these marginal supply costs
should only be used as indicators for wholesale prices. In our network, such a locational
marginal prices (or nodal price, see Lochner, 2011a)), is calculated for each point in
the system (node). For the evaluations in this section, we select representative ones for
the directly affected countries Italy and Spain. Additionally, to gain a perspective on
the price effects in the rest of Europe, the price estimators for the UK and Germany
are also discussed. It needs to be stressed that the focus of our analysis is on pipeline
supply disruptions. Hence, it is assumed that neither potential Algerian LNG export
disruptions nor the increase in European LNG demand in the scenarios have an impact
on the global LNG price. While this is a simplifying assumption, it helps to illustrate
the effects of the dependencies arising from pipeline supplies alone. While price effects
may, thus, be underestimated, it becomes clear what the effects on top of any LNG
price effect – which is beyond the scope of this article to measure – would be. The price
increases on the days with the highest prices in the respective scenario relative to the
prices in the Reference scenario are illustrated in Figure 3.5 (please note the log-scale).
Regarding the supply disruption from Libya, our model confirms the insignificant
price effect observed in reality: Only when the supply disruption lasts for one year,
locational marginal supply costs exceed the ones in the Reference scenario by about 25
percent in Italy. Due to the high level of physical market integration in the European
gas market, the same increases can also be observed for all the other countries in Figure
3.5. This is a consequence of sufficient transport capacities being in place and the perfect
competition assumption: Arbitrage causes prices to increase in Spain, Germany and the
UK as well.
The situation is significantly different for a supply disruption from Algeria. Again,
if it were to happen only in summer (and end by October), marginal supply costs would
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only increase mildly by about 5 percent in all countries. However, supply disruptions
in winter or for the duration of one year, which would lead to demand curtailment for
consumers in the countries listed in Table 3.5, would also cause price spikes in Italy.
The marginal supply cost peak in the modeling environment is thereby determined by
the assumed demand curtailment price (value of lost load assumption). Interestingly,
the price spike in Italy also translates to price spikes in Germany - but not the UK and
Spain. In Germany, demand curtailment is not necessary and the transport pipeline
to Switzerland and Italy would be congested most of the time due to the high import
demand in Southern Europe. However, when the line is not congested, there is a signif-
icant demand for transports from Germany towards Italy, so arbitrage, again, leads to
an albeit smaller price spike in Germany and Central Europe. This causes significant
congestion from the LNG terminals in Spain and Northwestern Europe (where addi-
tional imports take place, see Figure 3.4) towards Germany. All pipelines into Germany
would be heavily congested. This congestion prohibits arbitrage and price formation
takes place separately: Price formation in Germany and Italy is impacted by demand
curtailment in Southern Europe. The one in the West and Northwest is not and LNG
becomes the price setting supplier. The situation for supply disruptions from the whole
Maghreb region is almost identical to the Algeria only case.
Hence, we can conclude that price effects in a rather small crisis (Libya) are limited.
If they happen in a prolonged disruption, sufficient infrastructure and arbitrage cause
them to spread across Europe. In severe disruptions in winter, demand curtailment
causes price spikes and congestion. Congestion causes separate price formation in the
different European markets with Central Europe being more effected by events in the
South than Northwestern Europe or the Iberian Peninsula. The latter, in general, is
well protected from price spikes if the global LNG market is sufficiently well supplied.
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3.6 Conclusion
The natural gas export disruptions during the civil unrest in Libya in 2011 demonstrated
a potential threat to security of supply neglected in most analyses of European security
of natural gas supply. A civil war may last for a prolonged time period and economic in-
terests regarding current and potential future gas sales take a back seat. Hence, exports
may be disrupted for several months or even longer. Especially for grid-bound pipeline
exports, the transport infrastructure usually does not exhibit sufficient redundancies to
compensate disruptions. Therefore, assessments of security of supply as the ones obliga-
tory for EU member states need to take this potential risk into account. Measuring the
arising risks or the probability of a disruption is difficult. The World Bank Governance
Indicator for political stability presented in this paper ranked Libya to be relatively
stable. However, the Voice and Accountability Index exhibits almost the worst value for
the ability of citizens to participate in politics. The fact that a civil uprising happened,
and that two other large exporters to Europe (Algeria and Russia) exhibit a potential
for civil unrests (according to both World Bank Governance Indicators), is not only a
cause for concern but also illustrates the importance of taking political stability into
account.
In our model-based analysis for North Africa, we find that the threat from civil
unrest in Algeria would be much larger than the minor consequences felt in Europe
from the Libyan supply disruption. While most missing volumes in the summer of 2011
could be replaced by Russian gas, this is no longer possible in high-demand winter when
Russian gas is already consumed elsewhere. The main compensation of the missing
volumes would then have to come from LNG imports into terminals all over Europe and
especially in Northwestern Europe from where these volumes would be routed to Italy via
Germany and Switzerland. Nevertheless, a globally well supplied LNG market would not
be able to compensate all missing imports from Algeria due to infrastructure bottlenecks
between the import terminals in Northwestern Europe and Southern Europe. Some
demand curtailment to consumers in Italy and potentially some neighboring countries
would be unavoidable in winter; price effects are also felt in Central Europe. The other
larger importer of Algerian gas, Spain, is, however, in a much better position. Sufficient
redundant import capacities, especially on the LNG side, ensure a steady supply of gas
to the market under the assumption that the LNG market is sufficiently flexible.

Part II
Consumer Choices, Energy
Efficiency and Greenhouse Gas
Abatement Policies
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Chapter 4
Greenhouse gas abatement curves of the
residential heating market – a microeconomic
approach38
In this paper, we develop a microeconomic approach to deduce greenhouse gas abatement
cost curves of the residential heating sector. By accounting for household behavior, we
find that welfare-based abatement costs are generally higher than pure technical equipment
costs. Our results are based on a microsimulation of private households’ investment
decision for heating systems until 2030. The households’ investment behavior in the
simulation is derived from a discrete choice estimation which allows investigating the
welfare costs of different abatement policies in terms of the compensating variation and
the excess burden. We simulate greenhouse gas abatements and welfare costs of carbon
taxes and subsidies on heating system investments until 2030 to deduce abatement curves.
Given utility maximizing households, our results suggest a carbon tax to be the welfare
efficient policy. Assuming behavioral misperceptions instead, a subsidy on investments
might have lower marginal greenhouse gas abatement costs than a carbon tax.
4.1 Introduction and Background
The social costs of greenhouse gas emissions as a global externality are more and more
spotlighted in the worldwide public discussion. Since the UNCED39 in Rio de Janeiro
1992, but latest since the Stern Review (Stern, 2007) and the IPCC report on climate
change in 2007 (IPCC, 2007), politicians, engineers, ecologists and economists argue
about optimal strategies of greenhouse gas avoidance. Consequently, national objectives
and policies for greenhouse gas abatement have been introduced in the last years. Besides
the emissions produced by major polluters such as the energy sector, a significant part of
38The paper is a joint work of Harald Hecking and the author (see Dieckho¨ner and Hecking (2012)).
39United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
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overall emissions stem from small emittents such as households. Hence, the achievement
of reduction objectives strongly depends on the behavior of economic agents.
The heating sector is thereby a good example. In the discussion of greenhouse gas abate-
ment, heat provision in residential buildings is often tagged the sleeping giant. Besides
enhancing thermal insulation, the replacement of inefficient and carbon intense heating
systems holds a huge potential of emission reduction. However, there is no easy wake-
up call: the total greenhouse gas emissions in the residential sector is the aggregated
result of millions of households’ individual decisions on heating systems and building
insulation. Thereby, each one faces different investment costs, habits, preferences and
therefore motivation to reduce his building’s greenhouse gas footprint. Subsidies and
carbon taxes are two prominent policy measures to incentivize greenhouse gas reduction
in the residential sector. However, either strategy imposes costs: not solely monetary
for technical equipment, but also in terms of welfare losses due to tax and subsidy dis-
tortions. Thus, to quantify total social costs of emission reduction, our paper aims at
deducing a welfare-based greenhouse gas abatement cost curve of the residential heating
sector, thereby accounting for costs and households’ behavior and preferences.
Several studies have already addressed pollution abatement curves based on wel-
fare effects of environmental taxes using a general-equilibrium approach (Ballard and
Medema, 1993, Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996). In addition to these studies on the macro
level, among the analyses on the micro-level most studies are mainly technical thereby
focusing on the technical equipment costs (Kavgic et al., 2010, Swan and Ugursal, 2009).
One example of such technology-based approach is a recently published study by McK-
insey & Company, Inc. (2009), which identifies significant energy savings with low costs
for society. Huntington (2011) discusses the overestimation of the reduction potential
in the McKinsey & Company, Inc. (2009) study, which results from assuming adoption
rates of technologies of 100%. In an aggregated approach Huntington (2011) shows that
accounting for the households’ behavior and their reactions on policy measures would
revise the greenhouse gas abatement curves downwards as well as by including policy
costs. There are microeconomic analyses that investigate the impact of environmental
policies: Tra (2010) evaluates the benefits of air quality improvements in a discrete choice
locational equilibrium model that accounts for welfare impacts of policy interventions
in a microeconomic context. However, to date there are few attempts to derive microe-
conomic greenhouse gas abatement curves that account for the behavior of economic
agents. Our paper fills this gap.
In the light of current literature, our paper contributes to public economics, the
analytical and the numerical literature in two ways: First, it extends earlier work by
being the first paper to derive a greenhouse gas abatement cost curve based on household
behavior and welfare losses on externalities in a microeconomic setting. We have chosen
this approach because the abatement potential of many externalities depends on the
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behavior of microeconomic agents. Second, the paper investigates the impact of carbon
taxes and subsidies numerically. Here we expand on the analytical work by developing
a numerical microsimulation model based on an empirical discrete choice estimation.
Microsimulation models are a useful tool to analyze the diffusion of technologies and
the impact of environmental policies. Kazimi (1997) uses a microsimulation model to
investigate the effects of vehicle price changes in emissions in the Los Angeles area.
She applies a microsimulation model which – similar to our model DIscrHEat – also
incorporates the results of a discrete choice estimation.
The use of the numerical model enables us to derive specific greenhouse gas abate-
ment cost curves and analyze the welfare effects of different policies. Our paper thus
combines the strengths of analytical and numerical approaches: in a stylized analytical
model we present a microeconomic approach of how to derive a greenhouse gas abatement
curve based on welfare measurement in discrete choice models. Our numerical model
based on empirical household behavior allows to derive greenhouse gas abatement curves
of specific policies and to explore their mechanisms in a more realistic setting.
To conduct our analysis, we choose Germany as exemplary case for two reasons: first,
the insulation level of domestic buildings is already very high and further insulation is
very cost-intense in terms of greenhouse gas abatement compared to the installation
of new heating systems (Buildings Performance Institute Europe (BPIE), 2011, Inter-
national Energy Agency (IEA), 2011). Second, since more than 90% of all residential
buildings are heated decentrally, the households’ individual heating system decisions
have a strong impact on the total greenhouse gas emissions. Both aspects underline the
importance to account for the household’s decision behavior on investment in heating
systems.40
We first derive analytically how the adoption of technologies takes place based on
household behavior in a theoretical discrete choice framework.41 We show how this dif-
fusion process is affected by public policies and its impact on greenhouse gas abatement.
The discrete choice approach further allows for the derivation of different welfare mea-
sures such as the compensating variation and excess burden (Diamond and McFadden,
1974, McFadden, 1999, Small and Rosen, 1981), which we use to derive welfare based
greenhouse gas abatement curves. Second, given this setting, we develop DIscrHEat,
an economic microsimulation model of the German heat market for the years 2010 to
2030. Its core idea is to simulate the households’ decision behavior on a new heating
system. In the current market for heating systems, we observe that the heating system
decision is based not only on observable heating system costs, but as well on hidden
factors such as non-observable costs and preferences. To account for both aspects, we
40Because greenhouse gas abatement costs for insulation measures are so high in Germany, for sim-
plification, we exclude the households’ decisions on thermal insulation from our analysis.
41See for Train (2003) for an overview of discrete choice approaches on which we base our framework.
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choose a discrete choice model estimated with current domestic investments into heat-
ing systems and their respective observable costs. We then apply our simulation model
to investigate the impact of different greenhouse gas abatement policies on newly in-
stalled heating systems and greenhouse gas abatement until 2030: e.g. a carbon tax
increases the observable costs of carbon intense technologies, thereby c.p. reducing their
installations and consequently carbon emissions. Applying the approach of Small and
Rosen (1981) and McFadden (1999), we derive the welfare costs of policy measures in
terms of excess burden in our numerical framework. From that we deduce welfare-based
greenhouse gas abatement curves of the investigated policies, thereby accounting for
household behavior.
Our results confirm the implications of Huntington’s paper suggesting that welfare-
based greenhouse gas abatement curves run above technical cost curves. Thus, account-
ing for the behavior of households and their reactions on policy measures implies greater
costs for society than pure technical equipment costs. Second, despite a flat curve of
marginal excess burden of greenhouse gas abatement, the marginal costs of public funds
might increase very steeply getting closer to the peak of the Laffer curve. This indicates
the limits on an implementable level of a carbon tax rate in reality. Third, our results
suggest that in most cases a carbon tax causes less welfare losses than subsidies on tech-
nology investments. However, in case of behavioral misperceptions or credit barriers,
subsidies on investments might be reasonable.
The paper is organized as follows: The next sections 4.2 and 4.3 provide a brief
overview of previous research and presents the theoretical approach to the derivation
of microeconomic greenhouse gas abatement cost curves. Section 4.4 describes the mi-
crosimulation model DIscrHEat and the different policy scenarios we consider. Section
4.5 presents our results, first, in Section 4.5.1 on the effects of the policies on greenhouse
gas abatement and the diffusion of technologies. Second, Section 4.5.2 presents the wel-
fare impacts of the different policies to derive greenhouse gas abatement cost curves in
4.5.3. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Previous research
There are two strands of literature which are related to our paper. The first strand is on
energy demand modeling in general. There are a variety of studies that model the energy
demand of the private sector and that identify drivers of energy consumption and energy
efficiency. Swan and Ugursal (2009) and Kavgic et al. (2010) give an overview of different
bottom-up models and models to analyze residential energy consumption, i.e. mainly
technology-based energy demand modeling approaches. These bottom-up models are
based on extensive disaggregated data and components that influence energy demand
on an individual detailed level. This model type is often applied to identify cost-efficient
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technology options for achieving certain greenhouse gas emission abatement targets.
There are also a variety of top-down models that focus on rather macroeconomic rela-
tionships. These models use aggregated empirical data to investigate the interrelation
of the energy sector and the economy as a whole by variables like GDP, income, temper-
ature and prices of energy carriers. Mansur et al. (2008) analyze the impact of climate
change on energy demand and welfare in the US applying a discrete-continuous model of
fuel choice and energy consumption. They find a potential increase of American energy
expenditures and welfare losses caused by temperature rise. Madlener (1996) provides an
overview of the different time-series based methodologies applied to analyze residential
energy demand. Rehdanz (2007) examines the determinants of household expenditures
on space heating and hot water supply in Germany based on panel data and covers a
number of socio-economic characteristics of households along with dwelling character-
istics. Braun (2010) examines building, socio-economic and regional characteristics in
a discrete choice model focusing on space heating technologies applied by households
but not on the heating system choice in terms of new heating system installations.
Michelsen and Madlener (2012) conduct a survey about heating system installations to
analyze the influence of preferences about residential heating system specific attributes
on the adoption decision in a discrete choice estimation.
The second strand of related literature focuses on numerical approaches to the de-
duction of greenhouse gas abatement costs. The literature on greenhouse gas abatement
modeling can be categorized into general equilibrium modeling approaches and technical
models. Bovenberg and Goulder (1996) develop an emission abatement curve based on
marginal welfare costs in a general equilibrium setting. Nordhaus (2011) and Pearce
(2003) determine different social damage costs of greenhouse gas. Morris et al. (2008)
apply a general equilibrium model to compute marginal abatement costs and marginal
welfare costs for different greenhouse gas prices. They argue that the marginal abate-
ment costs in their model reflect the shadow prices on the greenhouse gas constraint on
certain countries or sectors. This is interpretable as a price that would be obtained under
an allowance market that developed under a cap and trade system. They come to the
conclusion that these marginal abatement costs are not closely related to the marginal
welfare costs. The marginal abatement costs of their model vary over countries and are
sometimes above and sometimes below the marginal welfare costs and therefore they
conclude that they should not be used to derive estimates of welfare change.
A recent study on greenhouse gas abatement curves on the micro-level has been
published by McKinsey & Company, Inc. (2009) which establishes a cost-efficient green-
house gas abatement curve for different energy efficiency measures. Huntington (2011)
discusses the overestimation of the reduction potential in the McKinsey & Company,
Inc. (2009) study. According to Huntington (2011), McKinsey & Company, Inc. (2009)
neglect the real behavior of private households assuming adoption rates of technologies
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of 100%. In reality, a new technology might not be cost-efficient for everyone even if
it is cost-efficient for the average consumer. In addition, the adoption and diffusion of
technologies proceeds slowly in general. Huntington (2011) also mentions the exclusion
of the households’ reactions to the introduction of policy measures and the exclusion
of policy costs in the McKinsey & Company, Inc. (2009) study. Introducing basic as-
sumptions to these additional costs and impacts on the greenhouse gas abatement curve,
Huntington (2011) revises the curve to highlight implications for policymakers if they
base their decisions on a what he calls ”out-of-pocket” technology based cost curve.
4.3 Theoretical approach
Energy efficiency and greenhouse gas abatement policies can have different impacts and
purposes. They can either try to influence the number of low emission investments
made by trying to incentivize the household to invest earlier or more often; or they try
to make the household investing in less greenhouse-gas-intense technologies. We focus
on the latter.
Diffusion process of technologies
We have different representative household categories n (n ∈ {1, ..., N}) that have to
install a new greenhouse-gas-emitting technology j (j ∈ {1,...,J}) as the previous system
has to be replaced due to break-down.42 Each alternative technology causes different
amounts of greenhouse gas emissions. The probability Pn,j that a representative house-
hold n chooses a technology j is a function of the total annual system costs cn,j
43 and
some household specific characteristics zn:
Pn,j = f(cn,j , zn) (4.1)
The total annual system costs cn,j are a function of the investment costs in,j , the energy
consumption en,j , the energy price pj and two policy measures that we model: Car-
bon taxes Tj , which are derived from a Pigovian carbon tax τ
44, and subsidies on the
42This is a realistic assumption for heating systems as shown in IWU / BEI (2010), but also holds for
expensive building insulation or other investments into energy efficiency.
43We do not consider the impact of policy measures on the number of investments, but only on the
structure of heating system choices. Therefore, the total annual system costs are relevant and not a
differentiation between investment costs and future energy savings. Based on IWU / BEI (2010), we
argue that households only change their heating system when it is broken. Finding out reasons for this
behavior is open for further research.
44In our heat market microsimulation model, the Pigovian carbon tax τ times a conversion factor CFj ,
times the total heat demand TDn of a household and divided by the annual use efficiency of a heating
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investment Sj :
cn,j = f(in,j , en,j , pj , Tj , Sj) (4.2)
Based on the alternative-specific conditional logit model, first presented by McFadden
(1976, 1974), the indirect utility Un,j of household n that chooses between different
technologies j is given by:
Un,j = Vn,j + n,j (4.3)
Vn,j is the observable utility of the household whereas n,j captures further factors that
influence the utility but are not in Vn,j .
Vn,j is:
Vn,j = αj + βcn,j + γjzn (4.4)
with αj being alternative-specific constants that give an extra value to each technology. β
represents the negative total annual system cost impact and γj is a vector of technology-
specific impact on the household characteristics. We get:
Un,j = αj + βcn,j + γjzn + n,j (4.5)
The choice of a household can be described as a dummy variable yn,j :
yn,j =

1, if Un,j > Un,i ∀i 6= j
0, else
(4.6)
system AEj results in Tj . CFj indicates the amount of greenhouse gas emissions per kilowatt hour of
the different energy carriers.
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The choice probability that determines the diffusion process of a technology is defined
as:
Pn,j = Prob(yn,j = 1) = Prob(Un,j − Un,i > 0, ∀i 6= j)
= Prob(n,i − n,j < Vn,j − Vn,i, ∀i 6= j) (4.7)
where n,i, n,j ∼ iid extreme value, n,i − n,j has a logistic distribution45 and only
the difference between two utility levels has an impact on the choice probability and not
the absolute utility level.
The probability that household n chooses alternative j is46:
Pn,j =
eVn,j∑
i e
Vn,i
=
eαj+βcn,j+γjzn∑
i e
αi+βcn,i+γizn
(4.8)
This determines the proportion of installations of technology j among the new systems
chosen by household type n.
Own cost changes and those of alternative heating systems affect the choice proba-
bilities of a heating system. These cost impacts on the choice probability of a heating
system can be described in terms of elasticities. The elasticity of a household’s choice
probability with respect to heating costs of the system j that he chooses is given by:
∂Pn,j
∂cn,j
cn,j
Pn,j
= β(1− Pn,j)cn,j < 0 (4.9)
which is negative because of the negative cost impact β < 0.
The elasticity of a household’s choice probability for j with respect to heating costs
of an alternative system i is given by:
∂Pn,j
∂cn,i
cn,i
Pn,j
= −βPn,icn,i > 0 (4.10)
with i 6= j.
45The logit model with its elasticities are a standard approach to model the diffusion of technologies.
See for instance Geroski (2000).
46For detailed mathematical derivations and explanations of logit and conditional logit models see
McFadden (1974) and Train (2003).
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The effects of the model are ceteris paribus and allow for the computation of own
and cross cost elasticities on the diffusion rates of the different technologies, i.e. the
choice probabilities of an alternative, keeping all values fixed. The changes in the total
greenhouse gas emission level are determined by the diffusion process.
The elasticities account for the cost effect β on the technology choice. An advantage
of the inclusion of Pn,j in the elasticities is that changes of Pn,j depend on the current
level of Pn,j .
47 The restricted substitution pattern of the choice probability holds on
the individual level and is much more flexible on the aggregated level over all household
types. On the aggregated level, the substitution pattern also accounts for the hetero-
geneity of households.
Welfare effects of different policies
The aggregated net utility in our model over all households that change their technology
and install a new one in period (year) y ∈ 2010, ..., 2030 is defined as follows:
Uaggr. = nC +
N,J∑
n=1,j=1
yn,jVn,j (4.11)
C is a constant positive utility level that is assumed to be the same for all household
types n and indicates the minimum utility of a new technology. nC ≥∑N,Jn=1,j=1 yn,jVn,j
by definition because a new technology needs to be installed when the old one is broken
and thus is assumed to imply a higher utility than costs. The utility Vn,j is negative
because it indicates the cost impact of the essential new systems on the aggregated
utility. As for the welfare analysis only the differences between two aggregated utilities
with different policies are of importance, we can neglect the constant C from now on.
When we introduce a carbon tax which increases the costs of greenhouse-gas-intense
47Analyzing the development of the German heat market over the last 60 years indicates that this is
a realistic assumption and that changes resulting from the cost advantages of new heating systems take
place only inertially and based on the number of heating systems of that type that are already installed
(BDH, 2010), (IWU / BEI, 2010). The inertia of the heating system stock results from the long life spans
of the heating systems and the fact that heaters are only exchanged when they are broken. Adoption
rates of heating systems that already have a large market share are much higher. The proportional
substitution pattern of conditional logit models is often criticized. In the case of the homogeneous good
heat, it seems however to be appropriate. See for instance Train (2003) for a detailed discussion of the
substitution patterns of logit models.
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systems to incentivize investments into the lower-emission technologies, the relative an-
nual costs of the different heating systems change. This leads to different investment
decisions. The introduction of such policies, which are not lump-sum, cause welfare
losses even if the tax revenues are redistributed lump-sum. The households that have
to modernize their systems are elastic but not completely elastic as presented in the
previous section. For simplification, we assume that the supply function is completely
elastic.48 Then, the welfare loss, i.e. the excess burden, is the difference between the tax
revenue and the aggregated compensating variation over all households. The compen-
sated variation of the introduction of a tax indicates how much the government needs
to pay the households to compensate the resulting price increase and keep their orig-
inal utility level. For a subsidy, the compensating variation reflects the willingness to
pay of the households to keep the subsidy. Therefore, for both cases, the tax revenue,
which could be redistributed to the respective households and the subsidy expenditure
of the government which could be collected from consumers via a lump-sum tax, must
be compared with the respective compensating variation.
The compensating variation CVn is determined for each period y by an equation
based on McFadden (1999) which is a generalization of the compensating variation of
logit models introduced by Small and Rosen (1981).49
To determine the difference in consumer surpluses of the two scenarios with and
without policy measures, we get:
∫ V policyn,j
V no policyn,j
Pn,jdVn,j =
ln∑
j
eαj+βcn,j+γjzn
−β
V
policy
n,j
V no policyn,j
(4.12)
48This assumptions leads to an underestimation of the excess burden. It means that the investment
costs of heating systems and energy prices are not influenced by demand changes of the residential
heating sector. We assume that the residential sector demand is too small to have an impact on energy
prices. The producers of heating systems in Germany sell all types of heaters. Thus, they do not depend
on a specific system and would adapt their product composition according to the changing demand
conditions.
49Tra (2010) provides an application of this discrete choice equilibrium framework to the valuation of
environmental changes.
Chapter 4. Greenhouse gas abatement curves of the residential heating market 79
The amount of money that is needed to keep the original utility level and compensate
for the additional costs CVn caused of the policy measures is then computed as follows:
ln
∑
j
eαj+β(c
policy
n,j −CVn)+γjzn
−β = ln
∑
j
eαj+βc
no policy
n,j +γjzn
−β (4.13)
where cpolicyn,j indicates the respective total annual heating costs of household n with
heating system j including a tax or subsidy and cno policyn,j describes these costs without
any policy measures.
To compute the compensating variation per dwelling type n the formula by Small and
Rosen (1981) can be applied50:
CVn = (4.14)
1
−β
[
ln
∑
j exp(V
policy
n,j )− ln
∑
j exp(V
no policy
n,j )
]
We have to account for the number of households belonging to the same group with the
same building characteristics (Hn) which have to install a new heating system. Thus,
the aggregated compensating variation is:
CV =
N∑
n=1
HnCVn (4.15)
Finally, we define the excess burden EB for each period y following Diamond and Mc-
Fadden (1974):
EBtax = CV tax − T (4.16)
50See the Appendix for a more detailed derivation. This approach assumes a constant marginal utility
of income denoted by 1
β
. Torres et al. (2011) investigate the sensitivity of mistaken assumptions about the
marginal utility of income and their impacts on the welfare measures in Monte Carlo experiments. They
find that mistaken assumptions about the marginal utility of income can amplify misspecification of the
utility function. However, throughout all misspecification cases analyzed, they find an underestimation
of the compensating variation (referred to as ’compensating surplus’ in their paper). Thus, the analysis
conducted in this paper assuming a constant marginal utility of income is conservative and might even
underestimate the compensating variation (and excess burden).
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where T indicates the overall tax income in this period with:
T =
∑
n∈N,j∈J
HnPn,jTj (4.17)
We consider a carbon tax Tj which equals a carbon tax τ in Euro per tons greenhouse-gas-
equivalent times a conversion factor that converts τ into Tj accounting for the greenhouse
gas emissions of the different systems.
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The excess burden of a subsidy is determined similarly:
EBsub = S − CV sub (4.18)
with
S =
∑
n∈N,j∈J
HnPn,jSj (4.19)
If we assume behavioral misperception to be the cause for the household choices, the
compensating variation based on utility might not be an adequate measure.51 Therefore,
we also compute total heating system cost differences that result from the introduction
of greenhouse gas abatement policies. We take the total annual heating costs over all
households and heating systems:
c =
∑
n∈N,j∈J
HnPn,jcn,j (4.20)
In case of a carbon tax, the total heating system cost differences (CD) are the following:
CDtax = (cpolicy − cno policy)− T (4.21)
Again, we assume that the tax income is redistributed lump-sum. For a subsidy we get:
CDsub = S − (cno policy − cpolicy) (4.22)
51The utility maximizing approach to model the diffusion process is still appropriate as long as the
misperception and household preferences cannot be affected by public policies. However, in this case the
evaluation of the compensating variation does not reflect real consumer losses and society’s costs.
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Microeconomic greenhouse gas abatement curve
The excess burden EB changes with different tax rates Tj (equivalently for changes in
the subsidy levels Sj). dEB covers the changes in welfare losses of an additional unit
increase of the tax rate (or subsidy):
dEBtax =
∑
n∈N,j∈J


∂EB
∂CVn︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
∂CVn
∂V policyn,j︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
∂V policyn,j
∂cn,j︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
∂cn,j
∂Tj︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
− ∂T
∂Tj︸︷︷︸
(+/−)
 dTj
 (4.23)
The signs in brackets below the derivatives indicate their direction such that (+) indi-
cates a positive and (−) a negative derivative.
∂T
∂Tj
=
∑
n∈N
HnPn,j︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
+
∂Pn,j
∂cn,j
∂cn,j
∂Tj
HnTj︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
 (4.24)
The first part of the equation indicates the positive impact of the increasing tax rate
on the total tax income T whereas the second part displays the negative impact of the
decreasing tax base. Hence, ∂T∂Tj is positive for the increasing part of the Laffer curve
and negative for the decreasing part.
∂T
∂Tj
< ∂EB∂CVn
∂CVn
∂V policyn,j
∂V policyn,j
∂cn,j
∂cn,j
∂Tj
(see Auerbach and Feldstein (1985)). Thus, dEB > 0
when the tax rates are increasing (dTj > 0).
For the change of total subsidy spending in Sj , we would have:
∂S
∂Sj
=
∑
n∈N
HnPn,j︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
+
∂Pn,j
∂cn,j
∂cn,j
∂Sj
HnSj︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
 (4.25)
as the subsidy increases the costs decrease (
∂cn,j
∂Sj
< 0) and the installation rate Pn,j of
the technology j increases through decreasing costs. Adapting equation 4.23 accounting
for equation 4.18 we would get dEBsub > 0 for dSj > 0.
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In the case of behavioral misperceptions, the changes in the total annual heating costs
might be more appropriate to be considered than dEB:
dCDtax =
∑
n∈N,j∈J

∂cn,j∂Tj︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
− ∂T
∂Tj︸︷︷︸
(+/−)
 dTj
 (4.26)
The amount of greenhouse gas emissions CO2n,j that is consumed by household n who
installs a new technology is determined by the proportion of installations Pn,j .
CO2n,j = f(Pn,j) (4.27)
where f(Pn,j) is a linear function that transfers the energy consumed by the chosen
technology into greenhouse gas emissions. Besides the new technologies, the technology
stock (i.e. the currently installed heating systems) ST also emits greenhouse gas. Thus,
the aggregated greenhouse gas emissions over all households sum up to:
CO2 =
∑
n,j
f(Pn,j) + ST (4.28)
We analyze the impact of a carbon tax and investment subsidies on the diffusion process
and on greenhouse gas abatement. We assume that the emissions of the stock are not
targeted by the policies. Introducing a new policy Tj , Ti ∀i 6= j (or Sj , Si ∀i 6= j)
thus leads to the following change of total greenhouse gas emissions:
dCO2 =
∑
n,j

∂f(Pn,j)∂Pn,j︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
∂Pn,j
∂cn,j︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
∂cn,j
∂Tj︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
 dTj +∑
i
∂f(Pn,j)∂Pn,j︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
∂Pn,j
∂cn,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
∂cn,i
∂Ti︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
 dTi

(4.29)
and equivalently for Sj , Si with
∂cn,j
∂Sj
< 0 and
∂cn,i
∂Si
< 0 ∀i 6= j.
The greenhouse gas abatement −dCO2 is increasing with an increasing tax rate dTj > 0
(or with a decreasing subsidy dSj < 0) of the carbon-intense system j. The greenhouse
gas abatement dCO2 is decreasing with the increasing tax rates dTi > 0 (or the de-
creasing subsidy dSi < 0) of the alternatives i. Setting a Pigovian tax τ with
dTi
dTj
being
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constant would therefore lead to −dCO2 < 0.
∂f(Pn,j)
∂Pn,j
,
∂cn,j
∂Tj
and
∂cn,i
∂Ti
are constants due to the respective linear relations. Thus,
the changes in the total greenhouse gas emission level are determined by the impact of
the cost changes on the diffusion of technologies
∂Pn,j
∂cn,j
< 0 and
∂Pn,j
∂cn,i
> 0.
The marginal excess burden dEB and the marginal greenhouse gas abatement dCO2
of introducing abatement policies enable to display a microeconomic greenhouse gas
abatement curve that accounts for the reaction of households and the resulting diffu-
sion process of technologies as well as marginal welfare losses. In case of behavioral
misperceptions dCD might be considered instead of dEB.
4.4 Data and Methodology
4.4.1 Microsimulation using DIscrHEat
We developed the model DIscrHEat (DIscrete choice HEat market simulation model)
which is a dynamic simulation model for the German heat market of private households.
It simulates the development of installed heating systems and insulation levels of German
dwellings in five-year intervals until 2030. Starting point of the model calculations is a
detailed overview of the current German building stock of private households in 2010.
We distinguish single and multiple dwellings and six vintage classes. Each of those
building classes has an average net dwelling area and a specific heat energy demand
(kWh/m2a). Additionally, we include data on the distribution of heating systems in
each building class.
To simulate the future development of the German building stock (i.e. the installed
heating technologies and the buildings’ insulation level), DIscrHEat accounts for new
buildings and demolitions. Furthermore, we assume that a certain percentage of build-
ings has to install a new heating system. Those modernization rates are given exoge-
nously. IWU / BEI (2010) show that in Germany, investments into new heaters mostly
take place when mendings or replacements need to be done. Therefore, we assume that
heater replacements only take place according to empirical rates of the last years based
on IWU / BEI (2010).
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The household’s decision for a new heating technology is modeled by the approach
presented in Section 4.3 which is included in DIscrHEat. The econometric model (al-
ternative specific conditional logit model) estimates the household’s choice behavior by
using data on the actual heating choice in 2010 and the according cost data of different
heating systems. Using this approach allows to take into account not only the observable
costs (investment costs, operating costs and fuel costs) but as well non-observable in-
fluences (switching costs or preferences) on the household’s decision based on empirical
data. (See Appendix for the model and estimation results.)
4.4.2 Policy scenarios
Based on our simulation model results of three greenhouse gas abatement policies, we
analyze the diffusion process of newly installed heating systems until 2030. We simulate
a scenario without any policies as reference. In a first policy scenario, we introduce
a Pigovian carbon tax as it is the first best policy measure if households are utility
maximizing. We increase the carbon tax gradually to achieve higher levels of greenhouse
gas abatement.52 We consider a carbon tax tj in Euro/kWh which equals a carbon tax
τ in Euro per tons CO2-equivalent times the conversion factor CFj that converts τ into
tj accounting for the amount of CO2-equivalents in the different energy carriers.
53 In
case of a carbon tax all households of the stock that have a heat pump, a gas or an oil
heater are thus affected by such a tax and not only the households that have to make the
decision on their heating system, i.e. have to modernize it. However, we assume that the
households of the building stock that do not have to change their heating system due to
break-down are inelastic to price changes. They neither change their heating system as
a result of the tax nor do they change their energy consumption behavior for heating.
Thus, their compensating variation is equal to the tax revenue that they generate. In
terms of the welfare changes of the introduction of a tax or subsidy only the households
who modernize their heating system are relevant.
In addition, we simulate two different subsidy regimes, which both provide subsidies on
newly installed heating systems reducing the investment costs of the respective systems.
52For the assumed emissions of the energy carriers, see Table B.3. We assume that no tax is levied on
biomass.
53See Table B.3 in the Appendix.
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For the first subsidy scenario (subsidy I), we implement a simplified version of the
German subsidy system with subsidies on heat pump and biomass heaters. Thereby,
subsidies on biomass are significantly larger. The second subsidy scenario (subsidy II) is
a hypothetical policy scenario. It provides the same level of subsidies on heat pumps as
on biomass heaters and additionally a low subsidy on gas heating systems. We choose
this parameterization subsidizing heat pumps and natural gas heaters relatively more
than in the German system because marginal abatement costs of biomass heaters are the
highest. Contrarily, biomass heaters are highly subsidized in the German system. Like
this we can generate a subsidy based greenhouse gas abatement curve that generates
lower welfare losses for the first major part of abatement units (see Table B.4 for the
subsidy levels). For both subsidy scenarios we increase these subsidies proportionally to
effectuate higher greenhouse gas abatement.
Since the heat market and in particular the installation of heating technologies only
changes inertially, we focus on the total modeling period and aggregate all greenhouse
gas emission reductions until 2030. We compute the final values of the tax income and
subsidy expenses and excess burdens in 2030 based on an interest rate of 6% that has
been applied throughout the model.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Greenhouse gas abatement policies and diffusion of heating sys-
tems
To evaluate the three policy scenarios, we first investigate the diffusion process of the
newly installed heating systems in this section. Figure 4.1 presents the mechanism of
our simulation approach exemplarily for the carbon tax: in each policy scenario we
increase taxes and subsidies proportionally which leads to different amounts of green-
house gas abatement. Until 2030, about 300 million tons of greenhouse gas abatement
are already achieved in the reference scenario without any policies. The accumulated
tons of CO2 abatement correspond to a decrease from 134 million tons greenhouse gas
emissions in 2010 to 105 million tons in 2030 in the reference scenario without policy
measures. These reductions are achieved because of the assumed increases in annual use
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efficiencies of the heating systems over time, the diffusion of the recent non-fossil heat-
ing technologies heat pump and biomass, the demolition of old insufficiently insulated
buildings and the construction of well-insulated new buildings. Additional greenhouse
gas abatement then requires policy intervention. The additional greenhouse gas avoid-
ance achieved by policy measures is slightly increasing with the proportional increase
of the tax rate (as in Figure 4.1) or a subsidy. At levels between 700 and 800 million
tons of accumulated CO2-equivalent (CO2-eq.) abatement no additional volumes can
be reduced. This corresponds to emissions between 64 and 56 million CO2-eq. in 2030
in comparison to 104 million tons in the reference scenario, i.e. a maximum decrease by
39% to 47%. A carbon tax rate of 100 Euro per tons CO2-equivalent (t CO2-eq.) leads
to an accumulated greenhouse gas abatement of about 330 million tons until 2030 (or a
level of 102 million tons in 2030). 30 million additional tons of accumulated greenhouse
gas abatement are therefore achieved by the carbon tax of 100 Euro per t CO2-eq. A
420 Euro per t CO2-eq. carbon tax results in an additional reduction of accumulated
200 million t CO2-eq. until 2030 (see Figure 4.1).
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Figure 4.1: Tax rate, subsidy level and resulting greenhouse gas abatement
Figure 4.2 presents the effects on the government’s budget of introducing all three dif-
ferent policies. For abatement levels above 500 million tons of accumulated CO2-eq.
expenses for the subsidies increase overproportionally and are significantly higher than
the tax revenue that is generated by a carbon tax. At about the same abatement level,
the tax revenue starts to decrease indicating the falling part of the Laffer curve. This
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is where the shrinking tax base, i.e. mainly fossil heating systems disappearing in the
building stock, reduces the revenue more than the increasing tax rate adds to the rev-
enue.







        	 	

	




 
 

Figure 4.2: Tax revenue and subsidy expenditure
The diffusion of heating systems and the resulting accumulated amounts of greenhouse
gas abatement until 2030 in the three policy scenarios are illustrated in Figure 4.3. The
increasing greenhouse gas reduction amounts thereby result from increasing taxes or sub-
sidies. The high subsidy on the investment costs of biomass heaters in comparison to the
subsidy on investments into heat pumps leads to lower installation rates of heat pumps
in the subsidy I scenario compared to the tax scenario. The diffusion resulting from the
Pigovian tax indicates that heat pumps would be more greenhouse gas abatement cost
efficient than biomass heaters for a further reduction of CO2-eq. of 300 million tons to
550 million tons of greenhouse gas abatement. The subsidy II scenario causes a slightly
slower reduction of gas heatings and keeps heat pumps and not only biomass heaters
in the market. This is a result of the constant relative subsidy levels for heat pumps
and biomass heatings. In this scenario 709 million tons of accumulated greenhouse gas
abatement is the maximum that could be achieved because for additional reductions of
CO2-eq. biomass heaters need to be installed instead of heat pumps. In the tax and
subsidy I scenario this abatement limit is at accumulated 786 million tons CO2-eq.
54
54Please note that very high tax and subsidy levels, especially on the downward-sloping part of the
Laffer curve, would not be politically implementable because of their government budget effect. More-
over, such high relative cost changes would probably change household behavior and make them install
new heating systems before they are broken.
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The abatement level is higher as all installations of the greenhouse-gas-emitting heating
systems oil, gas and heat pump are completely phased out in favor of biomass heaters.







    	

	

			
	

   







    	

	

			


   







    	

	

			


   
Figure 4.3: Installed heating systems in 2030 depending on CO2 reduction and policy
measures
4.5.2 Welfare analysis
In this section, we compare different welfare measures of the three policies in relation
to the accumulated greenhouse gas abatement. We compute the accumulated excess
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burden and heating system cost differences over time, i.e. their net future values, given
a discount rate of 6%.55
Figure 4.4 presents the different accumulated welfare measures, i.e. the excess burden
and (total) heating system cost differences of the three policy measures. The excess
burden is thereby always significantly larger than the heating system cost difference and
increases much stronger.
The carbon tax thereby leads to a significantly lower excess burden for all greenhouse
gas reductions than the subsidies on investments and is therefore the more efficient policy.
If we cannot observe all costs and impacts determining the heating system choice of
households, the determination of an investment subsidy that is equivalent to a Pigovian
carbon tax is impossible and thus always leads to larger distortions on the household
choice. Thus, a subsidy on the heating investment causes a higher excess burden than a
carbon tax as it affects the price of the ”bad” greenhouse gas directly. We could therefore
identify the first best carbon tax as the lower bound for CO2 abatement. Assuming that
administration costs would be the same or even higher, other policy measures would lead
to higher distortions and welfare costs. However, in case of an energy efficiency gap,
Allcott and Greenstone (2012) point out that if investment inefficiencies exist, subsidies
for energy efficient capital stock might have greater benefits than costs. Applied to
the public good of greenhouse gas abatement in our case, this could mean that in case
of financing constraints, a subsidy as a second best policy could help to reduce this
problem and get households to invest in less CO2-intense heating systems. Thus, in
reality welfare losses of optimal greenhouse gas abatement policies might lay somewhere
between the first best Pigovian tax and the subsidy curve.
55Please note that the formulae presented in the previous section refer to the excess burden and heating
system cost differences for one period.
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Figure 4.4: Tax, subsidy and excess burdens depending on CO2 reduction based
The accumulated heating system cost differences are significantly lower than the ex-
cess burdens of all policies. These curves are still based on the diffusion process of the
heating systems accounting for household behavior as before but they neglect the losses
in consumer utility and focus on pure heating system costs spent. Technology based
approaches to determine greenhouse gas abatement curves would neglect household be-
havior, which leads to even lower plain technology costs. However, a comparison of
the curves in Figure 4.4 already shows, that a plain heating system cost consideration
underestimates costs that incur for households and thus society. The cost differences
caused by the subsidies are even below the carbon tax.
We further analyze different welfare measures relative to the greenhouse gas abate-
ment level achieved by a Pigovian carbon tax and subsidies on heating system invest-
ments to investigate the marginal costs of greenhouse gas abatement. We define the
following measures based on Auerbach and Feldstein (1985), Baumol (1972), Mayshar
(1990):
• The average costs of public funds in Figure 4.5 equal the compensating variation of
a policy measure relative to the tax revenue T generated: ACPF = CVT . 1−ACPF
thus indicates the level of excess burden caused in percent of tax revenue.
• The marginal costs of public funds are the marginal compensating variation per
marginal additional tax revenue T generated: MCPF = ∆CV∆T . MCPF measures
the additional welfare loss in raising the total tax income. 1−MCPF thus indicates
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the marginal level of excess burden caused in percent of an additional tax revenue
unit. The different levels of MCPF for different CO2 abatement levels are shown
in Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.5: Marginal and average cost of public funds per CO2 abatement level
The ACPF are increasing slightly whereas the MCPF first increase slowly, but getting
closer to an abatement level of 450 million t CO2-eq., the MCPF increases significantly.
At this abatement level, the slope of the tax revenue curve is already close to zero in
Figure 4.4 indicating that the tax base, i.e. mainly the oil and gas heaters, is decreasing
significantly. This is also shown in Figure 4.3. Further greenhouse gas abatement is thus
very costly for society because large amounts have already been reduced and additional
welfare losses are comparatively high relative to the additional tax revenue generated.
Up to a level of 430 million t of accumulated CO2-eq. abatement, the MCPF remains
below 1500% and the ACPF below approximately 120%. Thus, at this point the excess
burden of an additional accumulated greenhouse gas reduction of 130 million t CO2-eq.
amounts to approximately 20% of the total tax revenue generated and the generation of
a marginal tax income unit causes additional welfare losses of 1500% of the additional
tax revenue generated. In summary, accounting for the quantity effects or the decreasing
tax base of the carbon tax, i.e. the decreasing number of oil and gas heaters, the MCPF
indicate that the additional welfare losses relative to tax revenue generated increase
significantly for accumulated abatement levels of 450 t CO2-eq. until 2030 or total
annual greenhouse gas emissions of 92 million tons in 2030. Hence, referring to Figue
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4.1 we can conclude that tax rates above 350 per t CO2-eq. cause immense marginal
costs of public funds and thus seem politically rather unrealistic.
4.5.3 Welfare-based greenhouse gas abatement curves
For the derivation of greenhouse gas abatement curves we use the marginal excess bur-
den for different greenhouse gas abatement amounts for the three policy measures. The
results are presented in Figure 4.6. To derive a greenhouse gas abatement curve based
on welfare losses in our partial analysis, we compute the marginal excess burden per
additional unit of greenhouse gas reduction: MEB = dEB−dCO2 . In Figure 4.6, per green-
house gas abatement level −dCO2 on the abscissa an additional unit of abatement
−dCO2 would cause an additional excess burden of MEB. The marginal excess burden
of the carbon tax is significantly lower than the marginal excess burden of the subsidy
throughout all realistic abatement levels up to 450 million t CO2-eq. The MEB of
subsidy I is decreasing at very high abatement levels because multiple dwellings mainly
start switching their heating systems at very high subsidy levels in this policy regime.
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Figure 4.6: Marginal excess burden of greenhouse gas reduction
The marginal cost difference curves (MCD = dCD−dCO2), which include solely the monetary
heating system costs instead of the utility, are also displayed in Figure 4.6. These
marginal cost difference curves reflect the additional heating system costs of a unit
of greenhouse gas reduction at the different abatement levels already achieved. The
curves indicate that the cost based curves are again significantly below the welfare loss
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based curves. These marginal heating system cost differences of subsidy I are also
significantly higher than those of a carbon tax (for abatement levels up to 700 million t
CO2-eq.). Contrarily, the marginal cost difference of subsidy II are lower indicating that
in case of behavioral misperceptions, for which a utility-based measure is not appropriate,
subsidies might be effective. However, Figure 4.2 indicates that such a policy requires a
large budget to finance the subsidy expenses. A policy that changes household behavior
could then be more appropriate.
In general, the welfare based greenhouse gas abatement curve might overestimate
the abatement costs assuming that households do not change their behavioral patterns
until 2030. If one assumes that the households’ cost elasticities might change over
time and that more households might switch to a less carbon intense heating system
over time bearing less non-observed costs, the abatement curve might be somewhere
between the cost-based and utility-based abatement curves. However, in comparison to
pure technology based curves, these curves account for households’ reactions to policy
measures and policy costs that society would have to bear.
4.6 Conclusion
Analytically, we derive a welfare based greenhouse gas abatement curve, thereby taking
into account household behavior and cost effects of policy measures. We implement the
theory into the behavioral micro-simulation heat market model DIscrHEat and use the
model to derive an abatement curve based on household preferences and welfare losses
for the German residential heating market: based on a discrete choice estimation of
the heating system choice of households in 2010, we simulate the diffusion of heating
systems until 2030 with and without policy measures to finally derive the compensating
variation, excess burden and heating system cost differences in relation to greenhouse gas
abatement. In comparison to technology-based abatement curves, this approach takes
household investment behavior in heating technologies into account as well as welfare
costs of policy measures.
Our microeconomic analysis provides a partial analysis of welfare based greenhouse
gas abatement costs in the context of optimal abatement strategies. Analyzing these
costs and options of greenhouse gas abatement is of major importance in the residential
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heat market and also holds for other sectors, where the behavior of economic agents af-
fects the greenhouse gas reduction potential and the implied welfare costs. Implementing
certain policies to give incentives for greenhouse gas reduction needs to account for the
behavior of economic agents whose elasticities determine the welfare costs and thus the
costs society would have to bear in order to achieve certain abatement objectives.
Based on our model results for the German residential heating market we conclude
that a carbon tax is more efficient than subsidies on heating system investments in most
cases. A subsidy on investments might cause lower abatement costs in case of behavioral
misperceptions, but this policy requires very high subsidies (and lump-sum taxes) and
precise information on household investment behavior into heating systems. Hence,
such a policy seems rather not implementable in reality. The subsidy regime currently
implemented by the German government that subsidizes expensive biomass heaters to a
large extent reflects a suboptimal design: For the first affordable section of greenhouse
gas abatement units, the curves of this policy regime run above carbon tax curves and the
alternative subsidy regime curves. The alternative subsidy regime promotes heat pumps
and natural gas systems more than the German regime. In summary, regarding policies
that change heating system choices through relative costs, a carbon tax is optimal.
However, if financing constraints for households exist, subsidies on new heating system
installations might be reasonable.
In our model, household preferences and cost elasticities remain constant over time
and the policy measures that we introduce are assumed to not affect the preferences.
There are alternative policy measures that might change the household behavior over
time and might impact abatement curves. These could be information campaigns or
letters sent to households that compare their energy behavior with others56. The eval-
uation of the greenhouse gas abatement potential and costs of such policy measures
remains open for further research.
The partial analysis of the paper does not cover additional welfare effects of the policy
measures caused by cutting other taxes at the same time (see the analyses of the double
dividend hypothesis for Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), Goulder (1995) and Fullerton
and Metcalf (1998)). In addition, environmental policies might have redistributive effects
56Allcott (2011) evaluates such a program for the electricity use of households and finds a significant
decrease in energy consumption.
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which might need to be included in the welfare analysis of different policy measures if
equity or equality are highly valued by society (see Cremer et al. (2003) and Llavador
et al. (2011)). This type of analyses are beyond the scope of our paper.
The results of our paper have implications to policy makers: Understanding how
households react to different policies to derive microeconomic greenhouse gas abatement
curves is crucial for developing targeted policies and for achieving abatement objectives.
Chapter 5
Does subsidizing investments in energy efficiency
reduce energy consumption? Evidence from
Germany.57
The paper empirically analyzes the effectiveness of subsidies in increasing energy ef-
ficiency in German residential dwellings. In a first step, the impact of subsidies on
the number of dwelling modernizations is investigated. Next, the impact of renovations
on energy consumption is analyzed using a differences-in-differences-in-differences ap-
proach. It becomes apparent that the landlord-tenant problem tends to broaden the energy
efficiency gap. It is also found that the number of modernizations made by landlords does
not increase with higher subsidies. However, the renovations made during the subsidy
periods decrease the heating consumption of tenants. Given the condition that homeown-
ers already invest more in energy efficiency, they increase modernizations only slightly
with increasing subsidies. Nonetheless, these modernizations during subsidy periods do
not further decrease homeowners’ energy consumption and the large part of the overall
subsidies received by homeowners can be identified as windfall profits.
5.1 Introduction and Background
The promotion of energy efficiency in the residential sector has already been addressed
in public policies for several decades. Reasons for the attention have been diverse. High
prices of heating energy during the oil crises, fossil fuel depletion and the reduction of
57This chapter includes the working paper Dieckho¨ner (2012a).
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greenhouse gas emissions following the UNCED58 in Rio de Janeiro 1992 are common
explanations. More recently, the Stern Review (Stern, 2007) and the IPCC reports on
climate change in 2001 and 2007 (IPCC, 2001, 2007) have increased awareness. In the
current European political debate, the curtailment of energy consumption, especially
of fossil fuels, and the abatement of greenhouse gas emissions are major objectives of
European energy policy. The EU is aiming to cut 20% of Europe’s annual primary
energy consumption by 2020 (European Commission, 2011).
The European Commission estimated buildings to cause 40% of final energy con-
sumption and 36% of greenhouse gas emissions in the European Union, mainly caused
by space and water heating (European Commission, 2012). Major energy savings can
only be achieved by increasing energy efficiency, requiring significant investments. Im-
provements of the level of energy efficiency of buildings, such as improvements in heat
insulation, imply high initial investment costs for households. These high investment
costs are associated with three major obstacles for reaching the policy objectives of
energy savings in residential dwellings. First, households may underinvest causing the
cost-minimizing level of investment in energy efficiency to deviate from realized invest-
ments, often referred to as the ‘energy efficiency gap’(Allcott and Greenstone, 2012).
These underinvestments may be a result of hyperbolic discounting, major credit con-
straints or specific information asymmetries. Second, inefficiently high energy consump-
tion may occur, despite investments in energy efficiency, referred to as the rebound effect.
Third, the principal-agent problem between landlords and tenants reduces incentives to
invest in energy efficiency improvements. This so-called landlord-tenant problem (Jaffe
and Stavins, 1994) characterizes barriers for landlords to ensure appropriate investment
returns by including investment costs in the rent.
Therefore, an evaluation of policy measures to enhance energy efficiency in residential
dwellings should consider both the impacts on investments and on energy consumption.
Subsidies being prominent policy measures may give incentives for investments in energy
efficiency, e.g. by reducing credit constraints, which may result in a larger number of
renovations (quantity effect). In addition, or alternatively, subsidies may increase the
degree of energy efficiency that is achieved through the subsidized investments (quality
58United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
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effect). Hence, the comprehensive research question may be raised whether subsidies
have such a quantity and/or quality effect. The presented paper attempts to analyze
both effects by performing a twofold analysis to investigate how subsidies can promote
investments in energy efficiency and reduce energy consumption. Moreover, specific
attention should be given to the landlord-tenant problem when considering residential
dwellings. Thus, the paper raises further questions of how the landlord-tenant problem
affects heating energy consumption and how the policy measures work given different
owner and landlord investment and owner and tenant energy consumption behavior.
Germany is an important subject to consider since Germany has highly ambitious
national objectives concerning greenhouse gas reductions and improvements in energy
efficiency. Germany set a target of 40% reduction and voluntarily aims at outperforming
the EU targets of 20% greenhouse gas abatement until 2020 relative to the levels of 1990
(The Federal Environment Agency (Umweltbundesamt), 2007). In fact, the German
government spent more than 6.5 billion Euros between 1996 and 2002 and an additional
31.5 billion Euros between 2003 and 2010 to promote investments in energy efficiency
in residential dwellings in Western Germany (KfW (Kreditanstalt fu¨r Wiederaufbau),
2012). Moreover, Germany has a high proportion of households that live in rented
dwellings and therefore may be strongly affected by the landlord-tenant problem.59
Therefore, using detailed micro-data on dwelling modernizations and heating ex-
penditures, as well as socio-economic and dwelling characteristics of more than 5000
German households for the period 1992–2010, the impact of policy measures on invest-
ments in energy efficiency and their impact on energy expenditures are investigated in
the presented paper. The analysis is performed by assessing the standard policies used to
increase investments in energy efficiency, i.e. lump-sum subsidies and subsidized credits.
The empirical analysis proceeds in two steps. In the first step, the effects of the subsidies
on the probability of dwelling modernizations are analyzed, controlling for household and
dwelling characteristics. In a second step, the empirical analysis investigates the impacts
of dwelling modernizations made during the periods of the subsidy program on heat-
ing expenditures. In this analysis, a differences-in-differences-in-differences approach is
59The proportion of German households that rented is more than 50% compared to less than 30% in
the United Kingdom or even less than 20% in eastern European countries (Eurostat, 2010).
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applied to control for the difference between owner- and tenant-occupied dwellings, the
heterogeneity of households and modernization trends.
The major empirical findings of the paper show that subsidies spent on dwelling
modernizations only have a slight impact on the probability of renovations, i.e. a slight
quantity effect, and only in owner-occupied dwellings. However, referring to the quality
effect, the investments made during the subsidy period only reduce energy consumption
in tenant-occupied buildings excluding the effect of the generally lower energy expendi-
tures of homeowners. In summary, the empirical results show that subsidies have only
a minor quantity and no quality effect in owner-occupied dwellings and thus reveal that
subsidy payments for owners are mostly windfall profits. There is no quantity effect on
modernizations in tenant-occupied dwellings and quality effects are small. Moreover,
the results provide evidence for the landlord-tenant problem and the lack of invest-
ments in tenant-occupied dwellings. Tenants live in significantly less insulated homes
and consume more heating energy per square meter.
The next section provides a literature overview and Section 5.3 presents the hy-
potheses of the estimations. Section 5.4 describes the database. In addition to the
socio-economic and dwelling characteristics, policy variables are included in the analy-
sis, reflecting the subsidies spent for housing reconstructions. The estimation strategy
is presented in Section 5.5 as well as the applied differences-in-differences-in-differences
approach used to analyze the impacts of the investments made during the subsidy pro-
gram periods, while controlling for homeownership. Section 5.6 provides evidence of the
effects of policy measures and further variables on the probability of dwelling modern-
izations. Furthermore, Section 5.6 discusses the empirical results on the determinants
of heating energy and warm water expenditures and the impact of investments made
during the subsidy program periods in owner- and tenant-occupied dwellings. Section
5.7 concludes the analysis.
5.2 Literature overview
A broad range of literature analyzes the determinants of energy consumption: Baker
et al. (1989) investigate the determinants of electricity and gas demand for households
during the period 1972 to 1983, accounting for socio-economic characteristics such as
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ownership, household size and income, as well as details of the dwelling such as the
number of rooms. They find that energy consumption increases with income and that
the price sensitivity of households is higher for families with children and lower in-
come. Meier and Rehdanz (2010) investigate determinants of residential space heating
expenditures in the UK in a panel data analysis of more than 5000 households for
the years 1991 to 2005. They analyze socio-economic factors, building characteristics,
heating technologies and weather conditions, and derive price and income elasticities
both for different types of British households and for Britain as a whole. They find
that owner-occupied and tenant-occupied households react differently to changes in in-
come and prices. Brounen et al. (2012) investigate the impact of dwelling and socio-
demographic household characteristics on residential energy use in a cross-sectional es-
timation. The study shows that residential gas consumption is mostly determined by
structural dwelling characteristics, such as the vintage class, building type and charac-
teristics of the dwelling. They evaluate that well-insulated homes may reduce natural
gas consumption, primarily for heating, by 12%.
Several studies have identified the need and obstacles for energy efficiency policies
caused by underinvestment, the rebound effect and the landlord-tenant problem. Allcott
and Greenstone (2012) present an overview of reasons for underinvestment in energy ef-
ficiency measures, often referred to as the ’energy efficiency gap’ and provide a survey
on the relevant literature. They identify two major market failures that need to be
addressed by energy efficiency policies: the internalization of environmental externali-
ties (such as greenhouse gas emissions) and the mitigation of investment inefficiencies.
Similarly, Train (1985) shows that consumers may base their investment decisions on
excessive discount rates and undervalue future benefits from energy savings.
Subsequent to dwelling modernizations as a result of lower expenditures for energy,
households may increase their consumption, resulting in the so-called ‘rebound effect’
and counteracting energy conservation objectives. Greening et al. (2000) present differ-
ent studies which analyze the rebound effect and find different magnitudes of the result-
ing behavioral response, depending on the deviating definitions and different empirical
analyses. Furthermore, for energy end uses, they conclude that the range of estimates
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for the size of the rebound effect is low to moderate. Allcott (2011) shows that provid-
ing information to consumers about their energy consumption and the consumption of
similar households gives an incentive to reduce energy consumption.
The landlord-tenant problem, i.e. that the investor is not the person who pays the
energy expenditures, may limit investments in energy efficiency (see Jaffe and Stavins
(1994)). With a low ownership rate, the German housing market is an interesting
case. Regarding the impact of ownership status, Gebhardt (2012) empirically evalu-
ates whether the allocation of asset ownership (with the risk of expropriation) effects
relationship-specific investments. In an empirical analysis of the German housing mar-
ket, he finds evidence of more frequent relationship-specific investments, such as bath-
room renovations, if the occupant is protected against expropriation, which is the case for
homeowners. Gebhardt (2012) concludes that renovations are significantly dependent on
the ownership status and his model predicts underinvestment in rental housing. Hence,
the heating energy consumption of households that own their dwelling may deviate sig-
nificantly from that of tenants. Rehdanz (2007) also reveals differences in owner- and
tenant-occupied dwellings. She examines the determinants of household expenditures
on heating and warm water supply in Germany. She includes a variety of socio-economic
and dwelling characteristics in her analysis. In addition, Rehdanz (2007) finds a signifi-
cant difference between the effects of energy price increases for owners and tenants, and
concludes that owners are more likely to have installed energy-efficient heating and hot
water supply systems.
While the aforementioned studies have identified the need for policy interventions to
promote energy savings, several other papers have gone further and analyzed the impact
of policy measures on energy conservation. Hassett and Metcalf (1995) investigate the
effects of energy tax credits on residential energy conservation, controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity of energy saving tastes. They analyze panel data on individual tax returns
for residential conservation investments to measure the impact of tax policies on the
probability of making these investments. They find that a 10 percentage point decrease
in the tax paid on investment in energy efficiency would lead to a 24% increase in the
probability of investments. Eichholtz et al. (2010) show that ‘green ratings’ significantly
increase rents and selling prices of office buildings. Eichholtz et al. (2012) however
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show that this only holds among green buildings. Brounen and Kok (2011) find that
consumers capitalize on information collected from energy performance certificates in the
housing market and take it into account when considering the price of their prospective
home. They also show that adoption rates of energy labels implemented by the European
Union are low and that European policy needs to further stimulate their dissemination.
Allcott and Mullainathan (2010) reason that understanding the behavior of households is
crucial for the design of effective policies to reduce energy consumption. They argue that
policies need to consider insights from the behavioral sciences rather than focusing solely
on price changes (e.g., subsidies for energy-efficient goods) and information disclosure
(e.g., through energy-use labels).
Allcott and Greenstone (2012), Allcott et al. (2012) and Heutel (2011) investigate
the effectiveness of a subsidy theoretically. Allcott and Greenstone (2012) argue that
if energy is priced below social cost and neither a feasible Pigovian tax nor effective
information disclosure policies are available, subsidies and standards may be a second
best approach. Subsidies (and standards) may cause higher welfare costs for mainly two
reasons: First, subsidies change prices for all households equally despite the heterogene-
ity of household preferences. Second, subsidies do not price the usage of energy and
may therefore rarely be targeted. Most probably, the greenhouse gas abatement level
achieved by a subsidy would be higher or lower than the one achieved by a Pigovian tax.
Thus, marginal abatement costs of subsidies would vary among households and would
rarely equal marginal damage costs. However, Allcott and Greenstone (2012) discuss
that subsidies may increase welfare by reducing credit barriers. Moreover, Allcott et al.
(2012) and Heutel (2011) argue that a subsidy or standard may be optimal in addressing
hyperbolic discounting or undervaluation of energy savings in contrast to a Pigouvian
tax.
In summary, the majority of previous studies focus on the determinants of residential
energy consumption. However, energy consumption could only significantly be reduced
through investments in energy efficiency. Several studies analyze the effects of policy
measures on investments in energy efficiency. The potential positive effects of subsi-
dies on energy conservation are theoretically discussed in the literature. The presented
paper contributes to the existing literature by providing evidence for the effectiveness
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of subsidies in an empirical analysis investigating quantity and quality effects of subsi-
dies on investments in energy efficiency. Moreover, the impact of the landlord-tenant
problem and differences between the effects of subsidies on investments in owner- and
tenant-occupied dwellings have not been investigated so far. The presented paper thus
attempts to fill a gap in the existing literature by empirically analyzing the different
effectiveness of subsidies in owner- and tenant-occupied dwellings.
5.3 Hypotheses
An important instrument of the German National Energy Efficiency Action Plan (NEEAP)
(Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Technology, 2007) to achieve the ambitious
German greenhouse gas reduction targets are subsidies on investments in energy ef-
ficiency. The presented paper investigates the impact of these subsidy programs on
investments in energy efficiency and on energy consumption by examining three hy-
potheses.
The theoretical considerations of Allcott and Greenstone (2012) and Allcott et al.
(2012) have shown that subsidies may overcome credit barriers or other barriers such
as hyperbolic discounting or asymmetric information problems and may increase energy
conservation. Thus, the German subsidies may reduce the costs of investments in en-
ergy efficiency and hence energy consumption. These energy savings may be achieved
by two effects of the subsidies. The subsidies may give incentives for more households
to invest in energy efficiency, or the subsidies may increase the level of energy efficiency
realized through the subsidized investments. Therefore, the following two hypotheses
are evaluated:
Hypothesis 1: Subsidies may increase the number of dwelling modernizations (quantity
effect).
Hypothesis 2: Subsidies may decrease energy consumption by increasing the quality of
investments in energy efficiency (quality effect).
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The existing literature has presented differences in investments in owner and tenant-
occupied dwellings (Gebhardt, 2012) and in the energy consumption of owners and
tenants (Rehdanz, 2007). Thus, the landlord-tenant problem is assumed to have signif-
icant impacts on investments in energy efficiency and thus may also have impacts on
subsidized investments.
Hypothesis 3: Renovation frequency and energy consumption are different in tenant- and
owner-occupied dwellings as well as the effects of subsidies.
Section 5.6 investigates these hypotheses in two empirical analyses.60 The next section
presents the database for these analyses.
5.4 Data and descriptive statistics
5.4.1 Sources and variables
The data used for the empirical analyses of this paper are provided by the German
Socio-Economic Panel Survey (SOEP).61 The survey is a representative and longitudinal
study of private households, carried out by the German Institute for Economic Research
(DIW Berlin), and includes data on household composition, occupational biographies,
employment, earnings, housing, health and satisfaction indicators. The survey started
in 1984 and covers nearly 11,000 households and more than 20,000 persons for each
year. The data is collected by the fieldwork organization TNS Infratest Sozialforschung,
which surveys the same households every year. The sample applied in this study ranges
from the year 1992 to 2010 and covers more than 5000 households per year. Only data
for Western Germany is used, as the structure and development of the Eastern German
residential building sector is quite different than the Western German sector, especially
during the first decade after the reunification. Significant amounts of money and different
types of subsidies were transferred to the East after the reunification in 1990. Due to
both the different types of implemented policies and the fast structural changes of the
60The hypotheses are illustrated in a simple theoretical model based on Allcott and Greenstone (2012)
in C.1 in the Appendix.
61Wagner et al. (2007) provide a detailed description of the panel survey.
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building sector in Eastern Germany, consistent impacts cannot be identified between
Eastern and Western Germany. Hence, Western Germany is taken as the focus of the
analysis.
The presented paper uses SOEP data on the household and dwelling characteristics.
The economic situation of households is given in terms of disposable income and heating
and warm water expenditures. Table 5.1 provides an overview of all variables included
in the estimations. In the dataset, data on whether households made major dwelling
renovations or installed new windows, which improve the state of dwelling, are covered.
The two variables are combined to make the variable dwelling modernizations.
The variable log. of heating expenditures per m2 is the logarithm of average annual
heating expenditures per dwelling size. Controlling for the gas price increases, the
average heating expenditure in the sample is 12.20 Euros per m2 for an average dwelling
size of 103.93 m2 over the years 1992–2010. For owner-occupied dwellings the average
heating expenditure amounts to 10.50 Euros per m2 for an average dwelling size of 125.39
m2. The average heating expenditure of tenant-occupied dwellings is 14.26 Euros per
m2 for an average dwelling size of 78.08 m2.
The socio-economic (household) variables included are the logarithm of monthly
disposable household income (log. of adj. income) and a categorial variable for different
household compositions (household type), which increases with an increasing number
of household members. A dummy variable (owner-occupied) indicating whether the
dwelling is owner- or tenant-occupied is also included.
Variables representing dwelling characteristics used in the analyses are the number
of relocations, i.e. how often a household relocated, the number of rooms (room), a
categorical variable for construction periods (construction period), and the condition of
the dwelling (need of renovation), which is a categorical variable from 1 to 4 with 1
indicating a good status and 4 the need for renovation. The status of the dwelling has
been evaluated by the interviewed household member.
Based on the variable dwelling modernizations, additional variables are generated.
The variable modernized indicates whether a household’s dwelling has been modernized
in previous periods. The variables treated household group 1 and treated household group
2 indicate the types of households that made investments during the subsidy periods
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Table 5.1: Overview of variables
Name Description
dependent
dwelling modernizations 1 if household installed new window or made other major
modernizations in previous year, 0 else
log. heat. exp. per m2 logarithm of average annual heating
and warm water expenditure per m2
independent
household characteristics:
owner-occupied 1 if household is owner of the dwelling, 0 else
log. of adj. income logarithm of disposable monthly household income
household type categorial variable with
1 one person household
2 childless couple
3 single parent
4 couple with children ≤ 16 years
5 couple with children > 16 years
6 couple with children ≤ and > 16 years
7 multiple generation household
8 other combination
dwelling characteristics:
construction period categorial variable with
1 built before 1918
2 built in 1918–1948
3 built in 1949–1971
4 built in 1972–1980
5 built in 1981–1990
6 built in 1991–2000
7 built in 2001–2010
number of relocations number of relocations between 1992–2010
room number of rooms > 6m2
need of renovation condition of dwelling (1–4; 1 good, 4 renovation necessary)
modernized 1 if dwelling has been modernized,
0 else
treated household group 1 1 for households that modernized between 1996 and 2002,
0 else
treated household group 2 1 for households that modernized between 2003 and 2010,
0 else
macro-indicators:
subsidy ratio average subsidy as a proportion of
average modernization spendings by program
(interest rate reductions, or lump-sum subsidies)
log. of gas price logarithm of gas price index for residential heating (2005 = log(100))
HDD heating degree days published by ECA&D
year dummies year dummies for each other year between 1992 and 2010
state dummies state dummies for ten different states
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1 and 2. The subsidy period 1 indicates the years 1996–2002 and the subsidy period 2
covers the years 2003–2010.
In addition, macro-data is added, i.e. non-individual data such as heating-degree-days
(HDD, published by Klein Tank et al. (2002)62) and the variable log. of gas price, i.e.
logarithm of the annual natural gas prices index for households (published by the German
Statistical Office). Only prices of gas are included as input data, since approximately
70% of all households used natural gas for heating during the time period considered and
the heating systems of the single households cannot be differentiated by energy carriers.
An additional 17% to 27% of all households in Germany had oil heaters.63 As most
households heat with natural gas, and as oil and gas prices are highly correlated, the
gas price is assumed to be a good proxy for a heating energy price.
To cover policy impacts on the macro-level64, annual subsidies alloted to households
for dwelling modernizations (published in the subsidy reports of KfW (Kreditanstalt
fu¨r Wiederaufbau) (2012)65 are used. The subsidies are provided to households through
different KfW building renovation programs primarily via direct subsidies on investment
interest rates.66
Including these total subsidies may cause endogeneity problems. A high relative
frequency of modernizations due to other reasons than the subsidies may lead to a large
number of applications for a subsidy and thus increase total subsidies spent. To as-
certain that causality is vice versa and to check whether increasing subsidies cause a
higher probability of dwelling modernization, a subsidy ratio indicating the subsidized
proportion of dwelling modernization spendings is included in the analysis. The variable
subsidy ratio is the average subsidy divided by the average modernization expenditure
in residential dwellings during a sub-program period.67 Data on modernization expendi-
tures of residential dwellings is provided by the German Statistical Office (DESTATIS).
62Heating degree days =
∑I
i (17
◦C − Ti), with Ti equaling the daily mean temperature at day i.
63See BDH (2010) for a distribution of heating systems in the German building stock.
64Micro-data for subsidies for energetic building modernizations received by households are not covered
by the SOEP.
65KfW stands for Kreditanstalt fu¨r Wiederaufbau (Reconstruction Credit Institute)) and is a German
government-owned development bank.
66For further details on the subsidy programs see Section C.3 in Appendix C.
67An average of the program periods is used to account for the different time lags between approval
of the subsidy and the completion of the renovation.
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Two main program periods are differentiated. The first program period of the CO2-
reduction programs is 1996–2002 and the second program period is 2003–2010 when
the dwelling modernization program provided additional subsidies. The CO2-reduction
program has been modified in 2001 and the dwelling modernization program has been
adapted in 2005. Therefore, the subsidy ratio varies over the years 1996–2000, 2001–
2002, 2003–2004, 2005–2010 and over the ten different Western German states68. Figure
5.1 shows the development of the subsidy ratio for the states and years covered in the
analysis. Moreover, dummies for the ten different states as well as year dummies for the
years 1992–2010 are included.
Figure 5.1: Average subsidies per state
5.4.2 Heating expenditure and dwelling modernization
Germany is a special case concerning the tenancy structure of dwellings. Only about
50% of the dwellings are actually owned by the residents (see Figure 5.2). Renovations
in rented dwellings are made by landlords. Several studies have shown the importance of
68The states included are Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria, Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony,
North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland and Schleswig-Holstein. Berlin is excluded
because of the aforementioned potential impacts of the reunification.
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accounting for the ownership status to explain investments and renovations (Gebhardt,
2012), as well as heating expenditures (Rehdanz, 2007), in German dwellings.
Figure 5.2: Percentage of households with owners or tenants in Western Germany
Figure 5.3 shows the development of the average heating expenditure per square meter
between 1992 and 2010 for all households together and for owners and tenants separately.
The level of the average heating expenditure of an owner is far below the average tenant’s
expenditure. However, the development of the heating expenditure follows a similar
pattern for owners and tenants. Heating expenditure decreased after 1996 and increased
again consistently from 2000 onwards. The development of the gas price index (2005 =
100) indicates that increases in heating expenditures mainly result from increases in gas
price increases.
Figure 5.4 shows the subsidy ratio of 1-7% percent for renovation spendings in the
first program phase until 2002. The subsidy ratio increases significantly to 12-29%
during the second period reaching the peak after 2003. Figure 5.4 also depicts the share
of dwellings that are modernized in a respective year as well as real heating expenditures
for owners and tenants separately. The share of modernized dwellings is relatively stable
between 1996 and 1999, decreases in 2000 and increases constantly after 2003, indicating
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Figure 5.3: Heating expenditure and gas price development
a quantity effect of the subsidy, i.e. that the subsidy may have a positive impact on
the number of renovations. Moreover, the real heating expenditures, i.e. accounting for
changes in gas price levels, follow almost the opposite pattern over time. Figure 5.4 shows
a strong decrease in real heating expenditures between 1996 and 2000, and a continuing
decrease after 2003. Thus, it is worth analyzing if the subsidies effectively promote
dwelling modernization and cause lower heating energy consumption (Hypothesis 1 and
Hypothesis 2).
Furthermore, the proportion of modernizations made in owner-occupied dwellings is
considerably higher than in tenant-occupied dwellings. Gebhardt (2012) shows that ren-
ovations are more frequent if the occupant owns the dwelling (as observed in the data)
and in turn cause lower heating expenditures for owners. The difference in moderniza-
tions made in owner- and tenant-occupied dwellings and the lower energy expenditures
for owners indicating lower insulation give reason to Hypothesis 3. The landlord-tenant
problem may broaden the energy efficiency gap and impact the effectiveness of the sub-
sidies.
A comparison of the disposable income of owners and tenants, as presented in the
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Figure 5.4: Average subsidy payments for different treatment periods and real heating
expenditure
boxplots in Figure 5.5, reveals that the disposable income of owners tends to be sig-
nificantly greater than that of tenants. Over all years, 75% of the tenants have less
disposable income than the average owner. Baker et al. (1989) also find a significant
correlation between homeownership and income.
In a functioning renting market, a landlord would modernize a dwelling as long as the
rent could adapt according to the tenant’s payment abilities. The income of a tenant
thus may indicate a potential credit barrier to investments in energy efficiency. On the
contrary, the high income of owners and the high proportion of subsidies received by
owners – more than 50% of all subsidies in 200969 – may give reason to analyze whether
subsidies may be a windfall in case of a high a priori willingness to pay.
69See Clausnitzer et al. (2010).
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Figure 5.5: Boxplots of disposable monthly income in Euros for households with
owners or tenants
5.5 Estimation Approach
The estimation objective is to analyze the effects of the German subsidy program on en-
ergy efficiency and to test the hypotheses presented in Section 5.3. The subsidy program
is meant to give incentives to invest in energy efficiency thus reducing energy consump-
tion. The subsidy program can be effective by increasing the number of investments in
energy efficiency (quantity effect) and/or by improving the quality of the investments
in terms of energy efficiency (quality effect). In the first model approach, the impact
of the subsidy on the probability of dwelling modernizations is analyzed to capture the
quantity effect (see Figure 5.6 arrow A). In the second approach, the impact of these
dwelling modernizations investments on energy expenditures70 is investigated (see Fig-
ure 5.6 arrow B). A differences-in-differences-in-differences (DDD) approach is applied
which allows for an identification of the impact of dwelling modernizations made during
the subsidy periods and estimates the effect B. Thus, the second approach measures the
70Energy expenditures and energy consumption are used as synonyms because prices are controlled
for while estimating the impacts on energy expenditures.
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quality effect, i.e. whether dwelling modernizations reduce energy expenditures depen-
dent on the prevailing subsidy program. Moreover, both approaches, A and B control
for the ownership status in order to identify potential differences in the dwelling mod-
ernization and energy consumption behavior in owner- and tenant-occupied dwellings.

	

	
	 	
	
	
 
Figure 5.6: Estimation strategy
5.5.1 Number of investments in energy efficiency
First, an examination is performed to determine to what extent the number of dwelling
modernizations can be explained by household characteristics and subsidies. The model
estimates:
zi,t = α+ βhi,t + γsri,pt + δ0d0,i,t + δd0,i,t · γsri,pt + δrdri + δtdt + i,t, (5.1)
where zi,t ∈ {0, 1} describes whether a dwelling is modernized, hi,t is a vector of time-
variant household and dwelling characteristics, sri,pt is the subsidy ratio in state ri (with
each household i being a part of state ri ∈ R) in the subsidy program period pt (for
the years t ≥ 1996, as a part of the program period pt ∈ P ), d0,i,t is a dummy variable
indicating the ownership of the dwelling and i,t is an error term that is assumed to
be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). To control for time and regional
effects, dummies are included for the different states (dri) and for the different years
(dt). Two ordinary least squares models (OLS) with and without state dummies and a
probit model are implemented. To avoid an underestimation of standard errors (due to
serial correlation), all standard errors are robust and clustered at the household level.71
71Standard errors based on other clusters such as on a state, year or state and year level have been
estimated and the clusters at the household level turned out to be the highest and thus the most
conservative.
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5.5.2 Heating energy expenditures
The second analysis investigates the impacts of the investments in energy efficiency on
heating energy expenditures. The following panel data model is introduced:
log(yi,t) = α+ βhi,t + γ1log(pt) + γ2wsi,t + δd
DDD
i,t + δrdri + δtdt + i,t (5.2)
with δdDDDi,t = δ0d0,i,t + δ1d1,i,t + δ2d2,i,t + δ3d3,i,t + δ4d1,i,t · d2,i,t + δ5d1,i,t · d3,i,t
+ δ6d0,i,t · d1,i,t + δ7d0,i,t · d2,i,t + δ8d0,i,t · d3,i,t
+ δ9d0,i,t · d1,i,t · d2,i,t + δ10d0,i,t · d1,i,t · d3,i,t,
where log(yi,t) is the logarithm of monthly heating expenditures, hi,t is the matrix of
time-variant household characteristics, log(pt) is the vector of the logarithm of gas prices
that vary over time (but not over households), wsi,t are the heating degree days that
vary over states and time, dri are state dummies and dt year dummies. The variable i,t
is the error term, assumed i.i.d.
The estimation strategy is a differences-in-differences-in-differences (DDD) approach.
The presented DDD approach controls for treated groups of households, modernizations
and ownership status in order to ensure unconfoundedness so that conditional on these
controls treatment assignment is essentially randomized. The matrix δdDDDi,t presents
the dummy variables and dummy interaction variables of the (DDD) approach. These
dummy variables include dummies for dwelling modernizations, the treated household
types and the ownership status. Specifically, the dummy variable d0,i,t indicates whether
a dwelling is owner-occupied and d1,i,t indicates whether the dwelling has been modern-
ized in previous years. d2,i,t identifies the treated households of the first subsidy period
and d3,i,t the treated households of the second subsidy period. The treated household
group 1 indicates those households that modernize during the first subsidy period 1996–
2002. The treated household group 2 are those households that modernize during the
second subsidy period 2003–2010. Households that apply for a subsidy may be house-
holds that invest more frequently in general or care more than average about their
energy consumption and thus may already have lower heating expenditures before the
renovation during the subsidy programs (or the contrary). Hence, the dummies d2,i,t
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and d3,i,t control for general differences in energy expenditures between the treated and
non-treated household types.
The interaction terms d1,i,t · d2,i,t and d1,i,t · d3,i,t indicate whether a treated household
type has modernized. As the ownership status is additionally included in the last three
interaction terms, the first three interaction terms without d0,i,t are included to measure
the effects in tenant-occupied dwellings. The landlord-tenant problem may result in a
significant difference between heating expenditures of owners and tenants and Figure 5.3
and Figure 5.4 in Section 5.4.2 already gave an indication for this assumption. Therefore,
the interaction term d0,i,t ·d1,i,t identify modernizations made by owners. The interaction
terms d0,i,t · d1,i,t · d2,i,t and d0,i,t · d1,i,t · d3,i,t indicates treated households that have
modernized and are owners.
The DDD approach and the inclusion of two treatment periods identify further pre-
existing differences in trends and serve to cope with the parallel trend assumption that is
assumed to hold for the development of energy expenditures and modernizations between
the considered households.
A simplified interpretation of the effects of the DDD approach is presented in Table
5.2:
Table 5.2: Interpretation of dummy variables in the differences-in-differences-in-
differences approach
δ0 = yown. − y!own.
δ1 = ymod. − y!mod.
δ2,3 = (ytreatj − y!treatj )
δ4,5 = (ytreatj ,mod. − ytreatj ,!mod.)− (y!treatj ,mod. − y!treatj ,!mod.)
δ6 = (ymod.,own. − ymod.,!own.)− (y!mod.,own. − y!mod.,!own.)
δ7,8 = (ytreatj ,own. − ytreatj ,!own.)− (y!treatj ,own. − y!treatj ,!own.)
δ9,10 =
[
(ytreatj ,mod.,own. − ytreatj ,mod.,!own.)− (ytreatj ,!mod.,own. − ytreatj ,!mod.,!own.)
]
−
[
(y!treatj ,mod.,own. − y!treatj ,mod.,!own.)− (y!treatj ,!mod.,own. − y!treatj ,!mod.,!own.)
]
For δ2, δ4, δ7, δ9, the subscript j refers to the first subsidy period 1996–2002. For
δ3, δ5, δ8, δ10, the subscript j refers to the second subsidy period 2003–2010. The variable
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y reflects the average heating energy expenditure of the respective group. The term own.
indicates ownership of the dwelling and !own. refers to tenants. The term mod. identifies
households that modernized their dwellings and !mod. describes households that did not.
The term treatj indicates the households that modernized in the subsidy program period
in general (not only during the subsidy period) and !treatj are all other households.
Thus, δ9,10 can be interpreted as the triple deviation in the heating expenditures of
a) owner and tenants, b) households that modernized c) treated households. The time
and regional effects on energy expenditure are additionally controlled for through dri
and dt.
In the first step, the model presented in Equation 5.3 is estimated without the DDD
approach, i.e. excluding the matrix δdDDDi,t , and is additionally separately estimated
for only owners and only tenants. These reduced models are estimated to analyze the
impact of the household and dwelling characteristics on energy consumption and to get
an idea of the different energy consumption behavior and price elasticities of owners and
tenants.
In the second step, the model in Equation 5.3 is estimated in an ordinary least
squares approach (OLS) with and without state dummies, and then in a feasible least
squares approach (FGLS) again with and without state dummies. All standard errors
are robust and clustered at the household level to avoid an inconsistent estimation of
standard errors due to a serial intra-household correlation (see Bertrand et al. (2004)).
The FGLS estimation capturing the assumption of serial correlation in the variance
covariance matrix, additionally serves to check the robustness of the results.
5.6 Results
5.6.1 Impacts on dwelling modernizations
Previous studies presented in Section 5.2 have shown the importance of accounting
for socio-economic and dwelling characteristics in analyzing household investments in
energy efficiency. Therefore, the impacts of these characteristics are first described and
the effects of the subsidies and the ownership status on renovations are then investigated.
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5.6.1.1 Impacts of socio-economic and dwelling characteristics
Table 5.3 presents the determinants of dwelling modernizations based on Equation 5.1.
The mean dwelling modernization rate in the dataset for all households between 1992
and 2010 is 5.9% (see Table C.1), which is only slightly impacted by socio-economic and
dwelling characteristics. A 1% increase in income increases the probability of dwelling
modernization by only 0.01 percent on average over all households. These results indicate
that credit barriers may not play a major role.
The categorical variable household type is an indicator for the household size and has
larger values for more family members. The results mirror that the larger the household,
the lower the probability of dwelling modernizations.
The modernization state of buildings from older vintage classes may probably be
Table 5.3: Results Estimation A: Probability of dwelling modernizations
OLS OLS Probit AME1, Probit
dwelling modernizations (1) (2) (3) (3)
owner-occupied 0.0115∗∗∗ 0.0115∗∗∗ 0.0917∗∗∗ 0.0115∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0185) (0.0025)
log. of adj. income 0.0108∗∗∗ 0.0106∗∗∗ 0.0957∗∗∗ 0.0111∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0109) (0.0013)
household type -0.0011∗∗∗ -0.0012∗∗ -0.0083∗∗ -0.0010∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0035) (0.0004)
construction period -0.0075∗∗∗ -0.0075∗∗∗ -0.0652∗∗∗ -0.0075∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0036) (0.0004)
number of relocations 0.0085∗∗∗ 0.0084∗∗∗ 0.0684∗∗∗ 0.0079∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0048) (0.0006)
number of rooms (> 6 m2) 0.0036∗∗∗ 0.0037∗∗∗ 0.0282∗∗∗ 0.0033∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0036) (0.0004)
need of renovation 0.0034∗∗ -0.0034 0.0291∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0111) (0.0013)
subsidy ratio 0.0089 -0.0202 -0.0235 -0.0027
(0.0411) (0.0314) (0.3480) (0.0402)
subsidy ratio, owner 0.0304∗ 0.0308∗ 0.3876∗∗∗ 0.0448∗∗∗
(0.0166) (0.0166) (0.1425) (0.0165)
Observations 125686 125686 125686
Clusters 16870 16870 16870
Overall (Pseudo-) R2 0.0071 0.0068 0.0159
Wald-Test (Probit/) F-Test (OLS) 31.03 38.93 1095.16
Prob. > χ2 (Probit) / Prob. > F (OLS) 0.000 0.000 0.000
1 AME: Average Marginal Effects
Robust standard errors are clustered by households and are reported in parentheses.
All models include a constant and year dummies.
Models (1) and (3) additionally include state dummies.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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lower. The effect of the construction period variable shows that this holds true. The
effect is significant and reflects a significantly lower probability of younger dwellings
being modernized than those from earlier construction periods.
The number of relocations increases the probability of modernizations by 0.79 (model
(3)) to 0.85 (model (1)) percentage points, i.e. the more often households relocate, the
more probable it is that they will invest in their dwelling. The result seems surprising as
one may assume that a household that frequently moves is less likely to invest in their
dwelling. However, households in Germany seldomly relocate. 69% of all households in
the sample never move and 93% move not more than twice. Thus, the probability of
renovations is higher when households move into a new location rather than stay in their
current building. There may be various reasons for relocaters to invest, such as further
socio-economic characteristics that are not covered in the model (e.g. the type of job).
Dwellings with more rooms and more windows exhibit a higher probability of dwelling
modernizations. The probability increases by 0.33 (model (3)) to 0.37 (model (2)) per-
centage points for each additional room. As window modernizations are a major part
of dwelling modernizations, the more rooms that are in a dwelling, the more windows it
has, thus increasing the need and probability of modernization. In addition, the worse
the condition of the dwelling evaluated by the household (need of renovation) the higher
the probability of dwelling modernizations.
5.6.1.2 Impacts of subsidies and ownership status
To evaluate Hypothesis 1 and 3 presented in Section 5.3, the impacts of ownership status
and subsidies spent are analyzed.
The impacts of the subsidy ratio (proportion of subsidies to modernization spendings)
on the number of modernizations in tenant-occupied dwellings is not significant in all
models. Only a small proportion of dwellings is modernized each year and the mod-
ernization rates only change slightly. The probability of renovation of tenant-occupied
dwellings (made by landlords) thus seems to be mainly impacted by socio-economic and
dwelling characteristics. The number of dwelling modernizations by landlords is not
impacted by increasing subsidy levels, which may contradict Hypothesis 1. However,
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although the number of renovations does not increase through the subsidy, the qual-
ity might (Hypothesis 2). The quality impact is investigated in the results of the next
section.
The models show the significant impact of ownership status on the probability of
dwelling modernizations. The probability of dwelling modernizations increases by about
1.2 percentage points, i.e. almost 20% of the average dwelling modernization rate of
5.9%, when the dwelling is owner-occupied. The resulting effect confirms the results of
other studies (Gebhardt, 2012) that there exists an underinvestment in buildings that
are not occupied by the owners. Thus, this landlord-tenant problem is prominent in the
German building stock and has essential impacts on investments in energy efficiency,
supporting Hypothesis 3.
In accounting for the higher renovation probability owners generally have a 1 per-
centage point increase in the subsidy ratio increases the probability of dwelling modern-
izations by 0.030 (model (1)) to 0.045 (model (3)) percentage points. Thus, the effect of
the subsidy on renovations in owner-occupied dwellings is small. In addition, the effect
is only slightly significant in the OLS models. Hence, the results show that the subsidy
increased the incentives to renovate only for households of homeowners, which further
supports Hypothesis 3.
In summary, it can be concluded that the quantity effect of the subsidy, i.e. the
subsidy increases the number of dwelling modernizations, only occurs for homeowners.
During times of high subsidies, especially during the second program period, the prob-
ability of renovations only increases in owner-occupied dwellings. Landlords did not
renovate more buildings with an increasing subsidy. However, if the landlord had de-
cided to invest, the insulation level may have increased. In the next subsection, it is
investigated whether this is truly the case.
5.6.2 Impacts on heating energy consumption
After the analysis of the quantity effect of the subsidy on dwelling modernization, this
section analyzes the quality effect and attempts to answer the question whether ren-
ovations made during subsidy program periods decreased energy consumption. Socio-
economic and dwelling characteristics again play a major role and are controlled for. The
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first subsection describes their effects. The impacts of the renovations during subsidy
periods based on the DDD approach are presented in the second subsection.
5.6.2.1 Impacts of socio-economic and dwelling characteristics
Heating expenditures72 of households depend on a variety of household and dwelling
conditions, as well as energy prices and heating degree days. These variables need to
be controlled for in order to identify the impacts of modernizations with respect to the
subsidy programs. Therefore, the first three OLS models in Table 5.4 neglect the DDD
approach and estimate only the impact of the control variables on heating expenditures.
Figure 5.2 shows the large difference in the heating expenditures in owner- and tenant-
occupied dwellings. To demonstrate the different heating behaviors, separate models
are estimated for a sample of only owners (in model (2)) and only tenants (in model
(3)). Model (1) estimates the effects of the control variables for the whole sample. The
effects are found to be quite robust in the whole sample over all models ((1), (4) - (7))
and explain between 17.5% (model (1)) and 18.5.% (model (2)) of the variation of total
household warm water and heating expenditures. This is in the range of other studies.
Rehdanz (2007) explains between 17% and 27% of the variation in heating expenditures
and Brounen et al. (2012) explain about 16% of the variance in gas consumption in their
basic model.
Heating expenditures increase as the number of heating degree days (HDD) increases,
i.e. in colder years, for the whole sample. The impact of the heating degree days is
however not significant for the sample of only owners ((model (2)), which may indicate a
better insulation of owner-occupied dwellings. Cold days affect the heating expenditures
in tenant-occupied dwellings to a larger extent.
The results in Table 5.4 present the price elasticity of expenditure on average over all
households (models (1), (4) - (7)) as well as for owners (model (2)) and tenants (model
(3)) separately. The price elasticity of energy-demand q,p can be derived from the price
elasticity of expenditure ∂e(p)p
p
e : For a single household, the gas price is exogenous such
that the heating expenditures e(p) can be described as e(p) = pq(p), where p is the price
72Controlling for the price effect, the terms ‘expenditures’ and ‘consumption’ are used synonymously.
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and q(p) is the heating energy consumed. Therefore:
∂e(p)
∂p
p
e
=
(
q(p) + p
∂q(p)
∂p
)
p
pq(p)
= 1 + q,p (5.3)
q,p =
∂e(p)
∂p
p
e
− 1 (5.4)
with q,p =
∂q(p)
∂p
p
q(p)
(5.5)
The effect of gas prices is significant with an price elasticity of expenditure of 82.55%
(model (2)) to 25.37% (model (3)) on average over all households. Thus, for owners, the
price elasticity of energy-demand is approximately q,p =
∂e(p)
p
p
e − 1 = 0.83− 1 = −0.17
and for tenants q,p = 0.25−1 = −0.75. Tenants with higher mean heating expenditures
per square meter (see Figure 5.3) react more elastic to increases in energy price compared
to owners, who exhibit a very low price elasticity of demand. For tenants, a 10% increase
in energy prices results in a 7.5% reduction of energy consumed. According to Khazzoom
(1980), a high demand elasticity indicates a larger rebound-effect. Hence, investments in
energy efficiency for tenant-occupied dwellings may be less effective in increasing energy-
savings. The price elasticity of tenants can be ascribed to the landlord-tenant problem:
Since the landlord cannot internalize his investment costs in the rents paid by tenants,
the tenant benefits from the energy savings but does not bear the investment costs.
The adjusted income has a significant impact on heating expenditures. A 1% increase
in income increases the heating expenditures per m2 by 0.024% (model (6)) to 0.037%
(model (5)) on average for all households. A 1% higher income of owners increases energy
expenditures, by 0.053%, compared to tenants who only exhibit an expenditure income
elasticity of 0.016. These differences in income elasticities indicate to the landlord-tenant
problem. Higher income of tenants does not increase the insulation level and decrease
energy consumption to the same extent as the higher income of homeowners does.
Impacts of the household composition (household type) are more relevant in explain-
ing heating expenditures than dwelling modernizations. Brounen et al. (2012) have
already shown the importance of including the household composition and other socio-
economic factors in the explanation of residential gas consumption. The heating expen-
ditures increase as the number of household members increases. However, the impact of
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the number of household members is not significant for owner-occupied dwellings, which
may be traced back to higher insulation standards.
Heating expenditures are significantly lower for dwellings from later rather than from
earlier construction periods, especially the effect is stronger when considering owner-
occupied dwellings. The number of relocations has a negative and significant impact
on heating expenditures, as opposed to a positive impact on the probability of dwelling
modernizations, as previously discussed. The previous section shows that households
which relocate tend to invest more in energy efficiency, thus significantly decreasing
heating expenditures. The negative impact is considerably higher for owners than for
tenants. Investments made by owners thus appear to be more energy-efficient. More-
over, it may be that households, and especially owners, relocate to more energy-efficient
dwellings. The number of rooms decreases the heating expenditures per square meter by
6.1% (model (2)) to 8.8% (model (3)). Furthermore, the need for renovation, as assigned
by the interviewed household members, increases heating expenditures significantly.
In summary, the estimation results have shown that the heating expenditures of
owners and tenants differ significantly and that tenants tend to be significantly more
price sensitive. The next section analyzes the impacts of ownership status and the
impacts of modernizations made during subsidy periods.
5.6.2.2 Impacts of ownership status and modernizations during subsidy pe-
riods
In addition to the quantity effect investigated in Section 5.6.1.2, this section examines the
quality effect (Hypothesis 2), i.e. the impact on energy consumption of modernizations
made by owners and landlords during subsidy periods. The analysis of the impact of
the subsidies on the number of dwelling modernizations presented in Section 5.6.1.2
shows that the subsidies only have a significant impact on renovations when made by
homeowners. This section attempts to further analyze Hypothesis 3, i.e. whether the
landlord-tenant problem causes underinvestment in energy efficiency and reduces the
effectiveness of subsidies.
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In general, heating expenditures are by 18% (model (1)) to 22.3% (model (7)) signifi-
cantly lower in owner-occupied dwellings. Homeowners tend to renovate buildings more
energy efficiently than landlords do.
In comparison to models (1) to (3), models (4) to (7) additionally include the dummy
variables and the interaction of dummy variables in the DDD approach. In general,
modernized tenant-occupied (modernized) dwellings exhibit significantly higher heating
expenditures than other dwellings. Tenant-occupied dwellings seem to be poorly insu-
lated, which, despite being renovated, still cause high energy consumption levels. Putting
it differently, it appears that especially poorly insulated tenant-occupied dwellings are
modernized and still exhibit high energy consumption levels after the modernization.
The tenants who belong to the treated household group 1 (whose dwellings are mod-
ernized during the first program period) have significantly lower heating expenditures
on average compared to other households. Given these conditions, modernizations made
within the period 1996–2002 additionally decrease their heating expenditures by 4.7%
(model (4)) to 5.7% (model (7)). Tenants who are part of the treated household group
2 already exhibit lower heating expenditures than other households in general. Their
heating expenditures are further reduced by 4.9% by renovation.
Thus, a landlord-tenant problem is present. However, the subsidy programs appear
to have a positive impact on investments in energy efficiency made by landlords, despite
the landlord-tenant problem. These findings provide a proof for Hypothesis 2 and 3.
Moreover, the significant effects of the dummies that control for the household types liv-
ing in dwellings that were modernized during the sample years, presents the importance
of the DDD approach. The DDD approach controls for energy consumption behavior
which would have otherwise affected the estimators of the modernizations made during
the subsidy periods.
Heating expenditures in modernized owner-occupied dwellings are by 8.8% (model
(4)) to 9.8% (model (7)) lower than the heating expenditures in modernized tenant-
occupied dwellings. Nontheless, homeowners belonging to the treated household group
1 generally have by 4.3% (model (4)) to 4.9% (model (7)) higher expenditures and
homeowners of the treated household group 2 have even higher expenditures. These
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comparably high energy expenditure levels indicate the need of renovation or a lavish
energy consumption behavior of treated homeowners.
The isolation of the effects (i.e. δ9,10) of modernizations made by owners during the
two subsidy program periods shows an increase for both periods, by 12.7% (model (6)) to
13.7% (model (5)) for the first and by about 13% for the second program period. These
positive impacts indicate that the modernizations do not decrease heating expenditures
of homeowners of the treated household group 1 during the subsidy periods. On the
contrary, modernization measures made by owners during the subsidy period even lead
to higher heating expenditures. These higher heating expenditures may be caused by
dwelling modernizations that increased energy consumption such as dwelling extensions
and proves that homeowners did not sufficiently invest in energy-efficiency or that they
overconsume energy after the investment. These effects control for the generally lower
heating expenditures of owners and for the treated household types.
Figure 5.7 sums up the results and presents the differences between the two treated
household types in owner- and tenant-occupied dwellings. Figure 5.7 displays the dis-
tributions of real heating expenditures for households that did not modernize between
1996 and 2010, for owners and tenants separately. In addition, the distributions of ex-
penditures of households that modernized are shown, before and after the renovation,
again separately for owners and tenants. In summary, households comprised of owners
exhibit significantly lower heating expenditures than tenant households and invest more
in energy efficiency than landlords. By isolating the impact of the already lower heating
expenditures of owners, it can be seen that the modernizations made during the subsidy
period result in reduced heating expenditures for tenants but not for owners. More
than half of the subsidies were paid to owners. Thus, it can be concluded that owners
make significant windfall profits when they are willing to renovate and invest in energy
efficiency, even without subsidies.
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Figure 5.7: Treatment effect on real heating expenditures in Euros per m2
The whiskers of the boxplots indicate the 10% to 90% range.
‘no mod.’ indicates households that did not modernize their dwelling between 1992–2010.
‘hh1’ (‘hh2’) are households that invested in 1996–2002 (2003–2010).
‘before’ and ‘after’ indicates the real heat. exp. before and after the modernization.
5.7 Conclusion
Households are heterogeneous concerning their socio-economic characteristics and the
state of their dwellings. Hence, the reasons for and the degree of investment inefficiencies
are diverse. The theoretical and empirical results show the importance of the hetero-
geneity of households, as well as the impact of their socio-economic characteristics on
investments in energy efficiency and on energy consumption. The effectiveness of policy
measures is determined by varying credit constraints and the different valuation of en-
ergy savings of households. The results of this paper thus support the results of Brounen
et al. (2012) reiterating that socio-economic aspects need to be taken into account in or-
der to develop an optimal policy design. Accounting for the heterogeneity of households
is crucial in the design of targeted policies.
The landlord-tenant problem in the German heating market represents a restrictive
investment barrier. Investments responsible for decreasing energy consumption mostly
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occur in owner-occupied dwellings as opposed to tenant-occupied ones. The presented
paper provides evidence for this principal-agent problem and the lack of investments in
tenant-occupied dwellings. Thus, the energy efficiency gap is broadened by the landlord-
tenant problem.
The empirical results show only slight increases in the probability of dwelling mod-
ernizations in owner-occupied dwellings throughout the subsidy programs. Therefore,
a quantity effect, i.e. when a subsidy leads to more dwelling modernizations, cannot
be found for investments made by landlords in tenant-occupied dwellings. However,
modernizations made during subsidy periods significantly decrease energy expenditures
in tenant-occupied dwellings. Households who own their dwelling generally have signifi-
cantly lower heating expenditures (by about 20%) than tenants and renovate more often
than landlords. The modernizations made by owners during the subsidy program peri-
ods did not further decrease their heating expenditures. Homeowners invest in energy
efficiency even without subsidies and could realize significant windfall profits through
the subsidy payments. Furthermore, a higher income of owners indicates to a lower
probability of credit barriers and a higher probability of windfall profits. Thus, the sub-
sidies reflect an indirect redistribution of income to a group that is already economically
better off.
The impact of energy prices on heating energy consumption is heterogeneous. Whereas
tenants exhibit a high price elasticity, the price elasticity of owners is low. Therefore,
the rebound effect in tenant-occupied dwellings may be larger than in owner-occupied
ones, which can again be traced back to the landlord-tenant problem. Higher energy
consumption of tenants due to insufficient renovations by landlords increase the price
sensitivity of tenants and may further counteract the effectiveness of the subsidies.
The investment barrier in tenant-occupied dwellings first needs to be directly elim-
inated before policy measures can be implemented. Changes in tenancy law and the
resolving of information asymmetries between tenants and owners concerning the energy
consumption of dwellings may lower the investment barrier. The provision of informa-
tion and the transparency of the heating energy requirements of dwellings may affect the
choice of potential tenants and increase investments by landlords in energy efficiency.
Institutional adaptations (e.g. adaptations of the rental law) to increase incentives
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for landlords to independently invest may be more effective in achieving energy and
greenhouse gas conservation objectives. However, such changes may have other welfare
effects. Moreover, demographical changes such as increases in dwelling size and reduction
of household members may counteract energy-savings in the future. An analysis of
policies accounting for such effects is open for further research.
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A.1 Main equations of the TIGER model
The TIGER model originally developed by Lochner and Bothe (2007) optimizes the
European natural gas dispatch given the infrastructure components, i.e. long-distance
transmission pipelines, storages and LNG import terminals, minimizing the total costs of
gas supply. A detailed model description can be found in EWI (2010b). The Objective
Function
C =
∑
sc
θsc
∑
t
ϑt
[ ∑
t,n1,n2
(
(Tsc,t,n1,n2 + Tsc,t,n2,n1) · ctranst,n1,n2)
)]
(A.1)
+
∑
sc
θsc
∑
t
ϑt
[∑
t,n1,p
(
Psc,t,n1,p · cprodt,n1,p
)]
+
∑
sc
θsc
∑
t
ϑt
[∑
t,n1,s
(
Stsc,t,n1,s · cstort,n1,s
)]
+
∑
sc
θsc
∑
t
ϑt
[∑
t,n1,r
(
LNGStsc,t,n1,r · cLNGstort,n1,r
)]
+
∑
sc
θsc
∑
t
ϑt
[∑
t,n1,r
(LNGRsc,t,n1,r · rtr)
]
+
∑
sc
θsc
∑
t
ϑt
[∑
t,n1,z
(DDsc,t,n1,z · dcn1,z)
]
is minimized over the vector X = (T, P, St, LNGSt, LNGR,DD).
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Gas supply and demand need to balanced. At each node, gas supply, that could either
be storage withdrawal, pipeline supply, LNG import or production, needs to equal gas
demand. Thus, the Node Balance Constraint yields:
∑
dr
dsc,t,n1,dr︸ ︷︷ ︸
demand
= (A.2)
∑
n2
Tsc,t,n2,n1 +
∑
pr
Psc,t,n1,pr +
∑
r
LNGRsc,t,n1,r +
∑
z
DDsc,t,n1,z︸ ︷︷ ︸
inflow at node
−
∑
n2
Tsc,t,n1,n2 −
∑
st
[StInsc,t,n1,st − StOutsc,t,n1,st]︸ ︷︷ ︸
outflow at node
The marginal supply costs estimator at a certain node n1 at time t is the dual variable
associated with the Node Balance Constraint. The dual variable reflects the increase of
the Objective Function’s optimal value by marginally increasing demand in the Node
Balance Constraint. The dual variable is thus interpreted as the shadow price of sup-
ply. For a more detailed model description with focus on the determination of marginal
supply costs (or nodal prices) see Lochner (2009) and Lochner (2011a).
The following Technical Constraints must hold:
Production capacity constraint:
For each y the sum of daily supply volumes from a production region has to be smaller
or equal to the annual supply capacity.
∑
t
ϑt · Psc,t,n1,p ≤ capannualsupplyn1,p (A.3)
Daily production is constrained by daily peak capacity.
Psc,t,n1,p ≤ cappeaksupplyt,n1,p (A.4)
Pipeline capacity constraint:
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Transported gas volumes are restricted by pipeline capacity.
Tsc,t,n1,n2 ≤ cappipet,n1,n2 (A.5)
Tsc,t,n2,n1 ≤ cappipet,n2,n1
LNG constraint:
Similar to the supply constraints, LNG imports are restricted by daily and annual ca-
pacity constraints.
LNGRsc,t,n1,r ≤ cappeakregast,n1,r (A.6)∑
t
ϑt · LNGRsc,t,n1,r ≤ capannualregasy,n1,r
LNG volumes to be imported are only restricted by LNG import capacity. The LNG
costs assumptions (presented in A.3) mirror a long term equilibrium and are therefore
higher than pipeline costs. LNG costs cover the costs of volumes on the tanker in front
of the terminal.
Storage constraint for t, n1 and s:
Storage volumes depend on withdrawals and injections of the previous period and are
restricted by storage specific working gas volumes.
Stsc,t,n1,s = Stsc,t−1,n1,s + StInsc,t,n1,s − StOutsc,t,n1,s (A.7)
Stsc,t,n1,s ≤ wgvt,n1,s
The storage level is determined by withdrawals and injections (minus compressor con-
sumption) and restricted by working gas volume. The gas volumes injected into and
withdrawn from the storages StInt,n1,s and StOutt,n1,s are a function of maximum in-
jection and withdrawal rates and the storage level. The maximum injection and with-
drawal rates depend on pressure and thus on the current storage level as well as on the
storage type. LNG storages operate in the same manner.
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List of symbols
Sets and identifiers
dr ∈ D: demand region
n1 ∈ N : (start) nodes
n2 ∈ N : (end) nodes
p ∈ P : production region
r ∈ R: LNG regasification terminal index
s ∈ S: storage index
sc ∈ SC: scenario index
t ∈ T : time period (days in this model version)
z ∈ Z: demand groups
Parameters
θsc: weight of scenario
ϑt: weight of modeled period t
dt,n1,dr: demand at node n1
ctranst,n1,n2 : transportation costs between nodes n1 and n2
cstort,n1,s: storage costs of storage s
cLNGstort,n1,r : LNG storage costs at regasification terminal r
cprodt,n1,pr: production costs at node n1
rtr: regasification tariff of regasification terminal r
dcn1,z: disruption costs for group z
cappeaksupplyt,n1,p : peak supply capacity at node n1
capannualsupplyy,n1,p : annual supply capacity at node n1
cappipet,n1,n2 : pipeline capacity from node n1 to node n2
cappipet,n2,n1 : pipeline capacity from node n2 to node n1
cappeakregast,n1,r peak regasification capacity of regasification terminal r
capannualregasy,n1,r annual regasification capacity of regasification terminal r
wgvt,n1,s working gas volume of storage s,
Please note that all cost parameters reflect real values over the time period considered.
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Optimization Variables
Tsc,t,n1,n2 : gas volumes transported from n1 to n2 Tsc,t,n2,n1 : gas volumes transported
from n2 to n1
Psc,t,n1,p: production at node n1
Stsc,t,n1,s: gas volumes in storage s
StInsc,t,n1,s: gas volumes injected into storage s
StOutsc,t,n1,s: gas volumes withdrawn from storage s
DDsc,t,n1,z: demand disruption for demand group z
LNGRsc,t,n1,r: LNG volumes regasified in terminal r
LNGStsc,t,n1,r: stored LNG volumes at regasification terminal r.
A.2 Model versions applied in Chapters 2 and 3
The model version applied in Chapter 2 is a linear optimization which does not account
for different scenarios. Therefore, the identifier sc reflects just one scenario (sc = 1, sc ∈
{1}) and the weight of this scenario equals one (θsc = 1). In addition, only one demand
group z (z ∈ {1}) to model demand disruptions is considered.
For the analysis in Chapter 3, we include demand stochasticity to account for
temperature-related demand fluctuations and the possibility of loss of imports from
a country (i.e. Libya and/or Algeria). The model is a stochastic version of the previ-
ous linear optimization model minimizing the expected total cost of gas supply in the
European gas market. Moreover, we assume two threshold prices dcn1,z above which de-
mand declines: an interruptible contract price above which industrial consumers reduce
their demand, and an infinitely high threshold price above which other consumers are
assumed to reduce consumption (z ∈ {1, 2}).
A.3 Parameterization and data sources
The TIGER model’s input parameters for the simulations of this paper are based on the
sources presented in the following table:
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Table A.1: Data and sources
Input data Specification of parameters Sources
supply export potential of EWI (2010a)
non-European production regions
and indigenous production
costs transportation costs OME (2001)
and regasification tariffs
storage costs UNECE (1999)
production costs and EWI (2010a)
costs of gas supply from
a certain production region
demand annual demand Capros et al. (2008),
EWI (2010a)
peak day demand ENTSOG (2009)
infrastructure all capacity assumptions and publicly available sources from
working gas volumes pipeline, LNG, and storage operators
and the European associations’
databases (see GIE (2010)
and see EWI (2010a,b)
for more details)
Assumptions made on storages as discussed above in the context of the storage constraint
were developed with storage operators and are discussed in EWI (2010b).
Disruption costs are the most cost-intensive option to keep the node balance. The
concrete level of disruption costs does not impact the model results in terms of disrupted
volumes as long as these costs are higher than for alternative supply options. Disruption
costs vary between countries depending on their demand structure and type of demand
(household, industry or power demand), on weather conditions and substitutive energy
carriers. Further comprehensive research is necessary to reflect these aspects in precise
disruption cost estimations for the European gas market which was out of range within
this study. Therefore only the disrupted volumes are evaluated and not the costs of such
gas demand reductions.
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B.1 Assumptions
B.1.1 Data
The estimation of the discrete choice model is based on data on the distribution of energy
carriers chosen by a number of building type categories in 2010, characteristics of these
building types and the heating system costs. The number of buildings which have to
install a new heating system per model period is derived from the dwelling stock based
on exogenous modernization rates. The dwelling stock comprises six different vintage
classes, differentiates between single/double and multiple dwellings and three different
insulation levels (heat demand levels) per house type vintage class combination. Due
to a lack of data for the diffusion of energy carriers per insulation level, we include the
average heat demand per dwelling category in our discrete choice estimation. However,
we account for the different insulations in our simulation model. Thus, our data com-
prises twelve different representative dwelling types with different heat demand, heating
system costs and distributions of heating systems chosen in 2010. Out of this aggregated
data, we generate our data set which represents the number of buildings that changed
their heating system in 2010 differentiated by dwelling type with the respective charac-
teristics. We assume that the total annual heating costs TCn,j are a major driver for
the representative household n to decide on the investment into a heating system using
the energy carrier j.
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We define the total annual heating costs as follows:
TCn,j = AF · (ICn,j − Sn,j) +OCn,j + ECn,j (B.1)
where AF is the annuity factor, ICn,j the total investment costs of a heating system
of energy carrier j, OCn,j are the annual operating costs and Sn,j the subsidy paid by
the German government. The current German policy system to support the diffusion
of non-fossil heating systems is mainly based on subsidies and does not apply any extra
taxes on the ’bad’ carbon. ECn,j represent the energy consumption costs which are
defined as:
ECn,j = pj · (TDn/AEj) (B.2)
pj is the price of the consumed energy carrier, TDn the total heat demand of dwelling,
and AEj the annual use efficiency of a heating system. (See Tables B.1 and B.2 for
the cost and price assumptions.) The energy consumptions costs are determined by the
amount of final energy that a house type consumed times the fuel price.73 The amount
of final energy consumed depends on the house type’s heat demand, the heating system
installed and the corresponding annual use efficiency of the system in 2010. A fixed
interest rate of 6% and an assumed household’s planning horizon of 15 years determine
the annuity factor. For the data sources, see the follwoing tables in the Appendix. An
overview of all sources is provided in Table B.1. The costs included in the discrete choice
model equal the annual costs per demanded heat energy unit.
Based on the Pigovian carbon tax τ the rate Tj presented in Section 4.3 is derived by
the following conversion: τ · CFj = tj and Tj = tj TDnAEj . τ is the carbon tax in Euro per
t CO2-eq. and CFj converts the Pigovian carbon tax into an energy carrier specific tax
rate accounting for the amount of greenhouse gas emissions listed in Table B.3. Biomass
is not taxed.
73We assume households to not have perfect foresight and that they have bounded rationality. Hence,
only the energy costs of the current period are included in their considerations and future energy prices
are not accounted for.
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Introducing a carbon tax tj in Euro/kWh for oil, gas and power would lead to the
following total annual heating costs TC:
TCn,j = AF · ICn,j +OCn,j + (pj + tj) (TDn/AEj) (B.3)
and introducing a lump-sum subsidy Sn,j on non-fossil fuel heating systems biomass and
heat pumps would result in:
TCn,j = AF · (ICn,j − Sn,j) +OCn,j + pj · (TDn/AEj) (B.4)
In the case of a carbon tax being introduced all households of the stock that have a heat
pump, a gas or an oil heater are thus affected by such a tax and not only the households
that have to make the decision on their heating system, i.e. have to modernize it.
However, we assume that the households of the building stock that do not have to
change their heating system due to break-down are inelastic to price changes. They
neither change their heating system as a result of the tax nor do they change their
energy consumption behavior for heating. Thus, their compensating variation is equal
to the tax revenue that they generate. In terms of the welfare changes of the introduction
of a tax or subsidy only the households who modernize their heating system are relevant.
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Table B.1: Data and sources - overview
Input data Specification of parameters Sources
dwelling stock in 2005 Destatis (2008),Destatis (2010b)
extrapolation until 2010 IWU / BEI (2010)
new buildings and demolitions Destatis (2010c),Destatis (2010a)
costs capital costs
except for micro chp IE Leipzig (2009)
micro chp own
assumptions
distribution of new distribution of decentral
heaters installed heating systems BDH (2010)
in 2010 distribution in new buildings Destatis (2010b)
distribution in buildings with
different construction years IWU / BEI (2010)
greenhouse gas emissions of different
emissions energy carriers O¨ko-Institut (2011)
modernization rates rates for dwellings with
for heating systems different construction years IWU / BEI (2010)
and insulation
Table B.2: Energy prices in Euro/kWh
energy carrier year
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
biomass 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07
natural gas 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09
heating oil 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12
electricity 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.23
Own assumptions.
In addition, an annual fixed charge of 120 Euros has to be paid for natural gas.
Table B.3: Greenhouse gas emissions of energy carriers
energy carrier g CO2-eq./kWh
biomass 26
natural gas 242
heating oil 324
electricity 350
Based on O¨ko-Institut (2011).
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Table B.4: Subsidies on heating system investment in Euro
heating system single dwelling multi dwelling
subsidy I subsidy I
biomass 2500 2500
heat pump 900 1200
subsidy II subsidy II
gas 500 500
biomass 900 1200
heat pump 900 1200
Table B.5: Heat demand in kWh/m2a per insulation level
dwelling type construction period no low average
single 1900 - 1918 227 197 167
single 1919 - 1948 238 209 175
single 1949 - 1978 222 200 166
single 1979 - 1990 161 152 125
single 1991 - 1995 132 123 111
single 1996 - 2000 116 106
single 2001 - 2004 99 97
single 2005 - 2010 92 85
multi 1900 - 1918 189 163 140
multi 1919 - 1948 194 166 143
multi 1949 - 1978 178 157 138
multi 1979 - 1990 136 125 110
multi 1991 - 1995 121 113 104
multi 1996 - 2000 116 108
multi 2001 - 2004 105 104
multi 2005 - 2010 96 90
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Table B.9: Modernization rates
construction period 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
1900 - 1918 3.3% 3.3% 3.3% 3.3% 3.3%
1919 - 1948 3.3% 3.3% 3.3% 3.3% 3.3%
1949 - 1978 3.3% 3.3% 3.3% 3.3% 3.3%
1979 - 1990 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3%
1991 - 1995 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3%
1996 - 2000 0.0% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3%
2001 - 2004 0.0% 0.0% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3%
2005 - 2010 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.3% 2.3%
Based on IWU / BEI (2010).
Table B.10: Distribution of new heaters installed in 2010
dwelling type gas oil biomass heatpump
single dwelling
construction period
until 1918 7.9308% 2.6599% 0.5342% 0.6976%
1919 - 1948 7.7124% 2.5866% 0.5194% 0.6784%
1949 - 1978 21.3081% 7.1464% 1.4351% 1.8744%
1979 - 1990 5.6628% 1.1024% 0.2410% 0.8156%
1991 - 1995 1.7252% 0.3359% 0.0734% 0.2485%
new building (since 2005) 9.9751% 0.6252% 1.4881% 5.7876%
multi dwelling
construction period
until 1918 1.6996% 0.5256% 0.1056% 0.0055%
1919 - 1948 1.4807% 0.4579% 0.0920% 0.0048%
1949 - 1978 6.4123% 1.9832% 0.3983% 0.0209%
1979 - 1990 1.3330% 0.2280% 0.0498% 0.0068%
1991 - 1995 0.4531% 0.0775% 0.0169% 0.0023%
new building (since 2005) 1.0790% 0.0418% 0.1242% 0.2372%
Based on BDH (2010),Destatis (2010b),IWU / BEI (2010)
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B.2 Discrete choice model - welfare measurement and tests
Figure B.1 presents the structure of newly installed heating systems in Germany in
2010 across different dwelling types and their total annual heating costs in Euro. The
groups contain dwellings of the same type with the same year of construction, house type
(single/double or multiple and average insulation status/heat demand). The frequency
of each group in the sample is indicated by the area of the circles74. Analyzing these
heating system choices leads to the assumptions that the annual costs of a heating system
might have an impact on the households’ heating system choices but are not their only
driver. In addition, the heating system choice differs systematically across the different
dwelling types and the buildings’ vintage class.
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Figure B.1: Data: Costs and frequency of energy carriers installed in different
dwellings in 2010
Using this data, we estimate a discrete choice model to identify the effects of the annual
costs and further building characteristics that have an impact on the heating choice of
a household.We thus assume that the probability Pn,j that a representative household
n adopts a heating system characterized by the energy carrier j is a function of the
normalized annual heating system costs cn,j and some building characteristics zn: Pn,j =
f(cn,j , zn). We use the annual heating costs per unit of heat demand in kilowatt hour
74Please note that the group with the construction period 1949 – 1978 includes so many buildings
because it covers the longest time period. There was no further differentiation of construction periods
in the data. In the two vintage classes 1996–2000 and 2001–2004 there were almost no newly installed
heating systems in 2010 because of the 15-year lifetime of heating systems on average in Germany.
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(kWh) cn,j because we are interested in a normalized impact of costs on the choice of
a heating system irrespective of the different dwellings’ total heat demand. Considering
the total annual costs per unit, we can make them comparable for all buildings. We
further assume that all households having the same building characteristics as n behave
accordingly.
The normalized costs cn,j , i.e. total annual costs divided by the total annual heat
demand of the dwelling (the dwelling size times the specific heat demand in kWh/m2a)
are included in the model to estimate an overall cost impact. We additionally define
alternative specific, i.e. energy carrier based, variables that could have an impact on
the choice of a specific energy carrier based heating system. According to Figure 1, we
assume the probability of installing a specific heating system to be different in single
and double than in multiple dwellings and in buildings stemming from different vintage
classes. Therefore, we include the dummy variable ’single’ z1,n, with 1 for single and
double and 0 for multiple dwellings and the variable ’heat demand’ z2,n, serving as a
proxy for the vintage class75. αj are the alternative-specific constants. β represents the
impact of total annual heating cost per kilowatt hour (kWh) cn,j . γ1,j , γ2,j identify the
alternative-specific effects of the case-specific variables.
The indirect utility of household n for the chosen heating system j is:
Vn,j = αj + βcn,j + γ1,jz1,n + γ2,jz2,n (B.5)
with the choice probability being:
Pn,j =
eVn,j∑
i e
Vn,i
=
eαj+βcn,j+γ1,jz1,n+γ2,jz2,n∑
i e
αi+βcn,i+γ1,iz1,n+γ2,iz2,n
(B.6)
As only the differences of the utilities are of importance for the estimation of the impacts,
we define as base alternative ’gas’ for which αgas, γ1,gas, γ2,gas = 0.
Table B.11 presents the summary statistics and Table B.12 the results of our discrete
choice estimation. The cost impact is significant at a 10%-level and as expected the cost
impact is strongly negative. All alternative specific constants are significant at a 1%-
level and have a negative impact. Only the biomass constant is not significant. The
75By tendency, newer buildings c.p. have a lower heat demand.
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negative impact of the alternative-specific constants indicates that the probability to
choose either a heat pump, a biomass or oil heater is less probable than choosing a gas-
fueled heating system keeping all else equal. This seems realistic because the market
share of gas heaters in Germany is above 50% since the last years and households tend
to have a preference for well-established systems.
Table B.11: Summary statistics
Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
choice
biomass 0.0507 0.2194 0 1
heat pump 0.1042 0.3056 0 1
gas 0.6681 0.4710 0 1
oil 0.1770 0.3817 0 1
costs over all alternatives 0.1336 0.0315 0.0870 0.2155
biomass 0.1437 0.0362 0.0977 0.2155
heat pump 0.1222 0.0200 0.0985 0.1624
gas 0.1172 0.0264 0.0870 0.1711
oil 0.1514 0.0273 0.1206 0.2072
single 0.8313 0.3745 0 1
heat demand 122.3183 29.5189 70 149.2417
Table B.12: Estimation results
Number of observations = 11052 Wald chi2( 7) = 303.59
Number of cases = 2763
Log likelihood = -2471.1913 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
choice coef. std. err. z P> |z|
heating system
costs -26.7651 15.7391 -1.70 0.089
biomass
single 1.0193 0.4400 2.32 0.021
heat demand -0.0167 0.0051 -3.30 0.001
constant -0.7025 0.7290 -0.96 0.335
gas (base alternative)
heat pump
single 1.9561 0.4129 4.74 0.000
heat demand -0.0203 0.0037 -5.44 0.000
constant -1.3075 0.4355 -3.00 0.003
oil
single -0.4750 0.1514 -3.14 0.002
heat demand 0.0202 0.0028 7.17 0.000
constant -2.6533 0.6660 -3.98 0.000
However, our results show that solely the heating system costs are not the only driver of
a household’s heating system choice. Otherwise every household would have chosen the
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cost optimal gas based heating system. There might be additional costs a household has
to face when deciding on a heating system that cannot easily be observed or quantified.
Amongst other these could be switching costs, financing or infrastructure costs. More-
over, there might be further impacts on the heating choice of households in addition to
costs that cannot be observed. We are not able to identify the reasons for the household
heating choice structure. There might be financing constraints such that a household
does not get a credit at all. Behavioral misperceptions might also be a reason. In this
case households do not put enough weight on annual heating system costs and therefore
have a preference for certain heating systems.
However, some indirect relations such as income effects are mirrored through building
characteristics:76 For instance, one could assume that households with a higher income
spend more on insulation and thus live rather in dwellings with lower heat demand or
they live rather in single and double than multiple dwellings than households with lower
income. The differentiation between single/double and multiple dwellings also serves
as a proxy for the tenure status. Moreover, the inclusion of income or a tenure status
in the model might not even improve the model because the heating system decision
is often made by the builder, which is not necessarily the owner of a building. The
precise impact of such non-observable variables cannot be defined in the model but is
included indirectly via the building characteristics proxies. We could thus not identify if
the effect of z1,n is an income effect or driven by the ’tenure status’ or even other causes.
This is not of importance for our approach which focuses on cost elasticities to derive a
welfare-based greenhouse gas abatement curve.
Including just dwelling characteristics in our model, we only cover systematic differ-
ences of heating system installations in our model, which however mainly explain the
diffusion of heating systems (see also Braun (2010)). These serve as proxies for the
unobservable costs or other impacts that vary across dwelling types. The results in
Table B.12 show that the choice probability of non-fossil heating systems biomass and
heat pumps is higher in buildings with better insulation and thus lower heat demand,
76Based on Eurostat (2007) data, average gross household income in single and double dwellings in
2007 was about 51500 Euros and in multiple dwellings about 36000 Euros. 87% of households living in
single dwellings were owners and only 26% in multiple dwellings.
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which usually belong to younger vintage classes. The choice probability of these heat-
ing systems is also significantly higher for single and double dwellings than for multiple
dwellings.
Later works on random utility models of discrete choice or mixed logit models (Mc-
Fadden and Train (2000), Train (2003)) or the approach presented by Berry et al. (1995)
and Berry (1994) and others point out that the approaches presented in McFadden (1976,
1974) neglect product and taste heterogeneity. We assume, that this might be true for
products such as cars but is not valid in the case of heating systems installations since
the product heat energy is a rather homogeneous good. In addition, especially the ap-
proach of Berry et al. (1995) accounts for price endogeneity and price formation on the
market level by demand and supply. Our analysis sets its focus on energy consumption
neglecting supply and is thus a partial analysis of the residential heat market. Further,
we do not deal with price endogeneity as we assume that energy prices are not deter-
mined by the residential energy demand: the price of oil and gas is influenced by global
supply and demand effects and other sectors such as power generation, transport or in-
dustry sectors rather than private households’ heat demand. We also assume the price of
biomass to be exogenous because the final biomass consumption of the residential sector
accounted for 16% of German and only 3% of the European primary biomass production
and there is still a significant unused biomass potential (AGEB (2011), Eurostat (2011)
and European Commission (2007)). Another often mentioned problem with the pre-
sented approach is the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption, which
we test for (see the las section of the Appendix).
Computation of the compensating variation
Small and Rosen (1981) introduce a methodology to determine the aggregated compen-
sating variation for discrete choice models and overcome the difficulty of the demand
function aggregation and the discontinuity of the demand functions. We apply a gen-
eralization of this approach to determine the compensating variation CVn of the repre-
sentative household n based on McFadden (1999) associated with a movement of Vn,j
resulting from introducing a policy.
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We have the distribution of the energy carriers j chosen based on the following:
Pn,j =
eVn,j∑
i e
Vn,i
(B.7)
To compute the consumer surplus based on the utility in the no-policy case and the
policy case we get:
∫ V no policyn,j
0
Pn,jdVn,j (B.8)
and
∫ V policyn,j
0
Pn,jdVn,j (B.9)
Thus, for the difference in consumer surpluses of the two scenarios we get:
∫ V policyn,j
V no policyn,j
Pn,jdVn,j =
[
ln
∑
i
eαj+βcn,j+γ1,jz1,n+γ2,jz2,n
−β
]V policyn,j
V no policyn,j
(B.10)
To compute the compensating variation of household n CVn, we need to find the amount
of money CVnTDn that compensates the additional ’per heat unit’ costs caused by the policy
measures to keep the utility at the ’without policy’ level. Thus, the following equation
based on McFadden (1999) must hold for the compensating variation CVn of household
n for each period y:
ln
∑
j
eαj+β(c
policy
n,j − CVnTDn )+γ1,jz1,n+γ2,jz2,n
−β = ln
∑
i
eαi+βc
no policy
n,j +γ1,jz1,n+γ2,jz2,n
−β (B.11)
We have a constant β over all alternatives, so the formula by Small and Rosen (1981)
to compute the compensating variation in our logit model can easily be derived:
CVn =
TDn
−β
[
ln
∑
j exp(V
policy
n,j )− ln
∑
j exp(V
no policy
n,j )
]
(B.12)
where the difference in brackets just measures the change in utility per heating unit
as cn,i are per heating unit costs. TDn is the total annual heat demand of group n
and transfers the utility per kWh/a into the overall all utility of a household with a
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respective heating demand. The division by β translates the utility into monetary units.
This formula by Small and Rosen (1981) depends on certain assumptions: the goods
considered are normal goods, the representatives in each group (households with the
same dwelling characteristics) are identical with regard to their income, the marginal
utility of income β is approximately independent of all costs and other parameters in the
model, income effects from changes of the households’ characteristics are negligible, i.e.
the compensated demand function can adequately be approximated by the Marshallian
demand function.
Hausman-McFadden (1984) Test
We conduct tests of Hausman and McFadden (1984) to make sure the Independence
of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption holds. We therefore reestimate the model
presented in Table B.12 by dropping different alternatives i. For instance one could
assume that the choice of a heating technology depends rather on fossil versus non-fossil
fuels than on the different energy carriers presented. Thus, we first drop the alternative
biomass, oil, and heatpump in separate tests, and then both biomass and oil and both
oil and heatpump. We compare these estimators with those of our basic model.
Under H0 the difference in the coefficients is not systematic. The test statistic is the
following:
t = (b− β)′(Ωb − Ωβ)−1(b− β) (B.13)
with t ∼ χ2(1)
b is the cost coefficient of the reduced estimations dropping alternatives and Ωb and Ωβ
are the respective estimated covariance matrices.
We get:
Table B.13: Hausman-McFadden test of IIA
b β T Prob(T>t)
cost coeff. drop biomass -31.97016 -26.76507 0.83 0.3633
cost coeff. drop oil -26.06515 -26.76507 0.04 0.8399
cost coeff. drop heat pump -3.358324 -26.76507 0.28 0.5969
cost coeff. drop biomass and oil -32.64896 -26.76507 0.66 0.4167
cost coeff. drop heat pump and oil -19.15256 -26.76507 0.03 0.8693
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The results show that IIA cannot be rejected.

Appendix C
Supplementary Material to Chapter 5
C.1 Theoretical framework
In recent economic literature, there are different economic reasons why government
should intervene in the market and introduce policies on energy efficiency to reduce
energy intensities:
• Internalizing externalities such as greenhouse gas emissions
• Reducing the consumption of fossil fuels
• Correcting market failures on the household level (such as credit barriers or ineffi-
ciently high personal discount rates caused by market failures for energy savings)
Reasons for following the second objective include supporting sustainability of finite
energy resources and keeping energy prices low.77 The last point is a further issue that
may be another barrier for policymakers to overcome while addressing the first two
objectives. Inefficiently high personal discount rates for energy savings mean that the
evaluation of energy savings from investments by households is inefficient.
The internalization of externalities and the maximization of energy savings in the
private housing sector are addressed by national policy by enhancing investments in
energy efficiency. Two popular policy measures on energy efficiency are lump-sum sub-
sidies and subsidies on interest rates of investments in energy efficiency. The policies
are introduced in a basic theoretical model presented by Allcott and Greenstone (2012)
77This paper focuses on the achievement of energy savings through policy interventions. An evaluation
whether it is an economically appropriate approach to strive for energy savings or especially fossil fuel
savings requires a much larger temporal and geographical scope and will not be addressed.
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and Allcott et al. (2011). The socially optimal levels of policy measures are derived ac-
counting for the household investment condition in energy efficiency. It is assumed that
an energy efficiency gap exists. Policies can increase welfare because the investments
made by households into energy-consuming systems are not economically efficient, i.e.
the private net present value of energy savings following the investment is lower than
the social net present value.
The consumer (or household) i is willing to make an investment in an energy-efficient
good if the following condition holds:
γimip(e0 − e1,i)
1 + r
−  ≥ ci (C.1)
with ci = c
The household i may make an investment in energy efficiency at cost ci to achieve
energy savings e0 − e1, where e0 and e1 are the energy intensities before and after
the investment with e0 > e1, and p are the private cost of energy. For e1, the model
differentiates between e1,i and e1,s. The optimal social energy intensity e1,s is conditional
on the socially optimal investment level c with e1,i ≥ e1,s. The privately chosen energy
intensity e1,i reflects either a potential rebound effect, in a case in which the energy
efficiency level c has been invested or the result of underinvestment in energy efficiency
ci such that ci < c. Thus, it is assumed that the energy intensity level realized by the
investment e1,i may be larger than the social level and lower than the level before the
investment (e1,s ≤ e1,i ≤ e0). For simplification, each household i chooses only one level
within this range.
Variable mi with 0 < mi, indicates household specific preferences concerning the
energy consumption (or usage of the energy-consuming good) and mi = 1 in case of
homogeneous preferences among all households. In the case of mi > 1, household i’s
energy usage is higher, and in the case of mi < 1, the energy usage is lower than
average. The term γi reflects the implied discount rate of household i and γi 6= 0
indicates behavioral misperceptions of the implied discount rate.78 The term γi < 1
indicates an undervaluation of energy savings. Reasons why γi may be low or even close
to zero include market failures such as a lack of information or principal-agent problems.
78Allcott and Greenstone (2012) consider γ instead of γi.
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Principal-agent problems occur when the investment decision in energy-efficiency is made
by other parties than those who are confronted with the energy expenditures (see Jaffe
and Stavins (1994)). Another cause may be low energy price elasticities of demand.
The variable r is the specific risk-adjusted discount rate. In total, the energy savings (or
decrease of energy intensity) e0 − e1 is discounted by the factor γimi1+r . The opportunity
costs of an alternative investment are indicated by . The model differentiates between
two periods: In the first period, the household makes the investment in an energy-
consuming system (investment period) and in the second period, the system is applied
and energy is consumed (consumption period).
The household’s investment condition deviates from a social optimum as the house-
hold neglects the externality ϕ. In addition, the optimal investment level in energy
efficiency may not be achieved if the household is confronted with a credit barrier.79:
In the case of a credit barrier, the willingness to pay of consumer i is ci < c or it is
a more restrictive credit barrier which does not allow a consumer i to get a credit c
for the investment in energy efficiency at all. Thus, given a credit barrier, ci is always
assumed to be smaller than the efficient investment level c (ci < c), which causes an
underinvestment in energy efficiency as e1,s is conditional on c. There could be different
reasons why a household is not willing or able to invest at all. The credit barrier could be
caused by a lack of sufficient income, a lack of information or other reasons. A restrictive
credit barrier is simplified within the presented theoretical approach by indicating that
in this case γi → 0 such that any policy measure would be ineffective to encourage the
household to invest.
The socially optimal energy efficiency level e1,s is below the private energy efficiency
level chosen by household i e1,s ≤ e1,i. A social optimum internalizing the costs of the
externality ϕ and reaching the socially optimal energy efficiency level80 e1,s would be
the following:
mi(p+ ϕ)(e0 − e1,s)
1 + r
−  ≥ c (C.2)
79The inclusion of the credit barrier is an extension of the model of Allcott and Greenstone (2012)
made by the author.
80Here, the socially optimal energy efficiency level means an economically efficient usage of energy.
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The next sections introduce two different policies that are applied in Germany – lump-
sum subsidies and subsidies on interest rates – to this framework. The optimal social
tax and subsidy levels are derived. So far, this basic theoretical framework has mainly
been presented by Allcott and Greenstone (2012). The introduction of policies in the
next sections are further developed by the author.
C.1.1 The energy efficiency gap
An intervention of public policy is only required if an energy efficiency gap exists. The
energy efficiency gap may be defined as the difference between the social and the private
gain of the investment in energy efficiency:
ge = mi(p+ ϕ)(e0 − e1,s)− c(1 + r)− (γimip(e0 − e1,i)− ci(1 + r)) (C.3)
The energy efficiency gap ge reflects the net social gain of the energy efficient invest-
ment. The energy efficiency gap ge is the deviation of the value of the private investment
γimip(e0 − e1,i)− ci(1 + r) from the value of the socially optimal investment in energy
efficiency mi(p+ ϕ)(e0 − e1,s)− c(1 + r). The social gain is achieved through the inter-
nalization of the externality and the reduction of energy consumption. To get the net
social gain, the value of the energy savings that would have been achieved without any
policy intervention is deducted from the social value of energy savings.
C.1.2 Lump-sum subsidies for investments in energy efficiency
Subsidies for energy efficient investments could be introduced to overcome potential
credit barriers ci < c.
The household is willing to invest if:
γimip(e0 − e1,i)
1 + r
−  ≥ ci (C.4)
with ci ≥ c− s
The private benefits of the energy savings must be higher than the expected household’s
willingness to pay incorporating the subsidy.
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For the socially optimal subsidy ss the following must hold:
γimip(e0 − e1,i)
1 + r
− ci + ss = mi(p+ ϕ)(e0 − e1,s)
1 + r
− c (C.5)
ss =
mi(p+ ϕ)(e0 − e1,s)− c(1 + r)− (γimip(e0 − e1,i)− ci(1 + r))
1 + r
(C.6)
The optimal subsidy level ss must thus equal the discounted deviation of the private
valuation of energy savings (γimip(e0 − e1,i)− ci(1 + r)) from the optimal social value
of energy savings mi(p+ ϕ)(e0 − e1,s)− c(1 + r).
The deviation in the numerator equals the energy efficiency gap ge in the consumption
period. Thus, we get:
ss =
ge
1 + r
(C.7)
Thus, the optimal subsidy ss equals the discounted energy efficiency gap ge.
The consumer’s undervaluation of energy savings γi, the usage of energy mi as well
as the energy savings independently realized by the household (e0 − e1,i) reduce the
effectiveness of the subsidy and thus both reduce the optimal subsidy level. The lower
the willingness to pay of the household ci or the higher the credit barrier c−ci the higher
the subsidy needs to be.
A subsidy is able to correct for credit barriers. However, it does not affect the household
behavior after the investment and cannot mitigate a rebound effect. In addition, for
households that would invest anyways, the subsidy is a windfall.
C.1.3 Subsidies on interest rates of investments in energy efficiency
Subsidies on interest rates aim at decreasing the financing costs of households and ad-
dress potential credit barriers ci < c.
The household is willing to invest if:
γimip(e0 − e1,i)
1 + r − s −  ≥ ci (C.8)
with ci ≥ c
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where s is the subsidy, i.e. the percentage of the investment and financing cost (c(1+r))
that is subsidized. The private benefits of the energy savings discounted with the reduced
interest rate (r − s) must be higher than the expected household’s willingness to pay.
For the socially optimal subsidy ss, the following must hold for each household i:
γimip(e0 − e1,i)
1 + r − ss − ci =
mi(p+ ϕ)(e0 − e1,s)
1 + r
− c (C.9)
ss =
mi(p+ ϕ)(e0 − e1,s)− c(1 + r)− (γimip(e0 − e1,i)− ci(1 + r))
mi(p+ϕ)(e0−e1,s)
1+r − (c− ci)
(C.10)
Replacing the numerator by the energy efficiency gap ge, Equation C.10 can be
rewritten as follows:
ge
mi(p+ϕ)(e0−e1,s)
1+r − (c− ci)
(C.11)
The optimal subsidy level must equal the level of the energy efficiency gap in the con-
sumption period (numerator) relative to the net social gain of the investment in energy
efficiency in the investment period (denominator). Here, the net social gain of the in-
vestment in energy efficiency in the investment period is the value of the social energy
savings level internalizing the externality mi(p + ϕ)(e0 − e1,s) minus the credit barrier
c − ci (or the additional investment capital needed for the socially optimal investment
level).
As for the lump-sum subsidy, the consumer’s undervaluation of energy savings γi, the
usage of energy mi as well as the energy savings independently realized by the household
(e0 − e1,i) decrease the effectiveness of the subsidy and thus both reduce the optimal
subsidy level. A high willingness to pay of the household ci also reduces the optimal
subsidy level. On the other hand, an increasing credit barrier results in a higher optimal
subsidy level ss.
To summarize, subsidies can be quite effective in reducing credit barriers or ineffi-
ciencies of the investment caused by high discount rates (γi) for energy savings, but not
in reducing overconsumption of energy after the investment (Allcott and Greenstone,
2012, Train, 1985). However, for households that would also invest in energy efficiency
without policy intervention, a subsidy is a windfall.
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C.1.4 Investment barriers in tenant-occupied dwellings
In the German housing market, landlords are confronted with barriers to internalize the
positive externalities of investments made in dwellings because of existing impediments
concerning rent prices. On one hand, rent controls restrict the landlords from including
investment costs in the current rent price. On the other hand, the independence of
heating expenditures from rents and the lack of information on gross warm rent tenants
are confronted with, additionally impedes the inclusion of investment costs in rent prices.
Moreover, tenants are not willing to make investments in energy efficiency as they
are relationship-specific. A major part of the investment’s value is lost when the tenant
moves out. This risk of expropriation significantly reduces the tenant’s incentive to
make the investment himself (see Gebhardt (2012)). In the context of the analysis of
investments in energy efficiency, this specific principal-agent is often referred to as the
landlord-tenant problem (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994).
The landlord assumes a very high discount rate of energy savings (1 > γi > 0). To
illustrate how this may impact the optimal subsidy level, we consider the extreme case
in which the landlord may not be able to adapt the rent and benefit from energy savings:
γi → 0. This leads to the maximal energy efficiency gap ge in tenant-occupied dwellings:
lim
γi→0
ge = lim
γi→0
(mi(p+ ϕ)(e0 − e1,s)− c(1 + r)− (γimip(e0 − e1,i)− ci(1 + r)))
= mi(p+ ϕ)(e0 − e1,s)− (c− ci)(1 + r) (C.12)
In this case, the energy efficiency gap equals the social value of the sum of the internaliza-
tion of the externality and the social optimal energy intensity mi(p+ϕ)(e0−e1,s) minus
the additional amount that is needed to be able to make the energy-efficient investment
(c− ci)(1 + r).
The landlord’s investment condition
γimip(e0−e1,i)
1+r −  ≥ c can hardly be fulfilled as
limγi→0 because the tenant would profit mainly from an investment in energy efficiency
and the landlord can scarcely internalize this positive externality, which results in an
underinvestment problem in energy efficiency and higher energy consumption levels of
tenants.
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The socially optimal subsidy level to promote the landlord’s investment is then:
lim
γi→0
ss = lim
γi→0
(
ge
mi(p+ϕ)(e0−e1,s)
1+r − (c− ci)
)
=
(
mi(p+ ϕ)(e0 − e1,s)− (c− ci)(1 + r)
mi(p+ϕ)(e0−e1,s)
1+r − (c− ci)
)
= 1 + r (C.13)
As ss indicates a percentage level, the absolute level of the optimal subsidy would be
c(1 + r). Hence, in the extreme case (limγi→0), the subsidy would need to compensate
for the total investment and financing costs.
C.1.5 Subsidies, the heterogeneity of households and information as-
symetries of policy makers
To be able to set the optimal level of a subsidy (either a lump-sum or a subsidy on
interest rates), the policy maker has to know the investment household i needs to make
to achieve the optimal level of energy savings and abatement of the externality. Thus,
he needs to know all the parameters of Equation C.2. In this simplified illustrative
model, there is just one socially optimal investment level c and energy intensity level
e1,s. However, in reality the optimal investment and energy intensities would vary among
households. Risk-adjusted discount rates may further depend on houseold i.
Moreover, even the heterogeneity of households captured by the model does not
allow policy makers to introduce first-best subsidies. The policy maker would need to
have private information on all parameters of Equation C.2 because first-best policies
would need to be household-specific without causing additional administration costs.
The less heterogeneous the population is and the closer the policy measures are set to
the optimal level for a median household, the more efficient is the market outcome.
The policy maker is confronted with information assymetry concerning the individual
preferences of energy usage mi, the undervaluation of energy savings γi and a potential
rebound effect e1,i. To determine a second-best subsidy level ss the policy maker could
include the average energy usage m =
∑
∀imi instead of mi based on empirical data.
Nevertheless, information on a potential rebound effect e1,i is not available to the policy
maker. Thus, he will build expectations E[e1,i]. If the policy maker underestimates the
rebound effect E[e1,i] < e1,i, the expected energy efficiency gap will be smaller than the
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real efficiency gap E[ge] < ge. Then the subsidy s chosen by the policy maker is below
the optimal subsidy s < ss and the energy efficiency objectives are not achieved. In case
of an overestimation E[ge] > ge, the subsidy is set inefficiently high s > ss which may
cause welfare losses and may provide potential windfall profits to households.
Nonetheless, despite the unlikelihood that a policy maker may set the optimal subsidy
ss, the actual subsidy set may still be able to reduce energy consumption and reduce
the externality. It may be that households were not able or willing to invest at all and
even a suboptimal subsidy may reduce the credit barrier. Thus, even though the level
e1,s cannot be achieved, reducing the energy to the level e1,i is already an improvement
compared to e0 as long as the investment and subsidy costs are lower for society than
the costs of the externality. A subsidy may therefore increase the number of investments
in energy efficiency made by households (Hypothesis 1).
It may also be that a household, who is willing to invest in energy efficiency may
be encouraged by the subsidy to choose a higher investment level than the initial one
ci. Such an investment level may be between ci and c and the resulting energy intensity
would be between e1,i and e1,s. A subsidy may therefore reduce the energy consumption
of a household (Hypothesis 2).
Moreover, if the policy maker has asymmetric information about the landlord-tenant
problem and the level of γi, he will have difficulties in estimating the energy efficiency
gap ge and in setting an optimal subsidy, which may impact the effectiveness of a subsidy
(Hypothesis 3). In addition, if γi differs significantly between owners and tenants, the
policy maker may need to introduce separate subsidies for investments in owner- and
tenant-occupied dwellings.
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C.2 Summary statistics
Table C.1: Summary statistics: Estimation A
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
dwelling modernizations 0.059 0.235 0 1 125686
owner-occupied 0.474 0.499 0 1 125686
log. of adj. income 7.685 0.605 0 11.531 125686
household type 2.876 1.704 1 8 125686
construction period 3.404 1.527 1 7 125686
number of relocations 0.594 1.119 0 12 125686
number of rooms (> 6 m2) 3.942 1.734 1 22 125686
need of renovation 1.319 0.521 1 4 125686
subsidy ratio 0.104 0.078 0 0.29 125686
Table C.2: Summary statistics: Estimation B, owner
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
logarithm of heating expenditure per m2 2.119 0.603 -5.075 5.051 56022
heating expenditure 1168.296 697.893 1 9999 56022
dwelling size in m2 125.388 44.664 10 650 56022
owner-occupied 1 0 1 1 56022
HDD 262663.021 39374.617 63908 356910 56022
log. of gas price 4.518 0.251 4.143 4.881 56022
log. of adj. income 7.913 0.567 3.526 11.531 56022
household type 3.194 1.722 1 8 56022
construction period 3.537 1.603 1 7 56022
number of relocations 0.37 0.865 0 9 56022
number of rooms (> 6 m2) 4.938 1.703 1 20 56022
need of renovation 1.202 0.418 1 4 56022
Table C.3: Summary statistics: Estimation B, tenant
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
logarithm of heating expenditure per m2 2.366 0.496 -0.693 4.692 46513
heating expenditure 901.33 526.877 36 11160 46513
dwelling size in m2 78.079 29.204 9 938 46513
owner-occupied 0 0 0 0 46513
HDD 263994.771 36608.335 63908 356910 46513
log. of gas price 4.449 0.258 4.143 4.881 46513
log. of adj. income 7.53 0.54 3.584 10.645 46513
household type 2.722 1.659 1 8 46513
construction period 3.192 1.39 1 7 46513
number of relocations 0.743 1.252 0 12 46513
number of rooms (> 6 m2) 3.133 1.195 1 22 46513
need of renovation 1.445 0.584 1 4 46513
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Table C.4: Summary statistics: Estimation B, all
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
logarithm of heating expenditure per m2 2.231 0.570 -5.075 5.051 102535
heating expenditure 1047.192 640.079 1 11160 102535
dwelling size in m2 103.927 45.072 9 938 102535
owner-occupied 0.546 0.498 0 1 102535
HDD 263267.143 38150.194 63908 356910 102535
log. of gas price 4.487 0.256 4.143 4.881 102535
log. of adj. income 7.739 0.587 3.526 11.531 102535
household type 2.98 1.71 1 8 102535
construction period 3.38 1.52 1 7 102535
number of relocations 0.539 1.075 0 12 102535
number of rooms (> 6 m2) 4.119 1.744 1 22 102535
need of renovation 1.312 0.515 1 4 102535
modernized 0.347 0.476 0 1 102535
treated household group 1 0.186 0.389 0 1 102535
treated household group 2 0.222 0.416 0 1 102535
C.3 Subsidy programs
The high greenhouse gas reduction objectives self-imposed by the German government
require effective measures to enhance energy efficiency. Various measures are listed in the
National Energy Efficiency Action Plan (NEEAP) of the Federal Republic of Germany
(Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Technology, 2007) to promote investments
in energy efficiency in residential dwellings. The Credit Institute for Reconstruction’s
(Kreditanstalt fu¨r Wiederaufbau (KfW)) CO2 building redevelopment program and the
KfW’s living space modernization program as part of the EEAP are major subsidy
programs that promote investments in energy efficiency in the residential building stock.
The KfW spent more than 38 billion Euros on these two programs in Western Germany
between 1996 and 2010, which was mainly financed through government funds. 255
million Euros of the total 38 billion Euros spent were lump-sum payments and the
major part of the subsidies have been provided through subsidized credits (subsidies on
interest rates). Both programs subsidize investments in energy efficiency but differ in
terms of their promotional framework. The CO2 building redevelopment program had
been modified in 2001 and the KfW’s living space modernization program had been
modified in 2005. The four project variations are summarized in Table C.5.
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